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Viewing cable 06HANOI2710, MFA OUTLINES BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES IN ADVANCING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI2710 2006-10-24 10:32 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO8264
RR RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #2710/01 2971032
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241032Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3788
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 2025
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002710 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KIRF VM
SUBJECT: MFA OUTLINES BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES IN ADVANCING 
BILATERAL AGENDA BEFORE POTUS VISIT 
 
Ref: A) Hanoi 2624; B) Hanoi 2663 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On October 23, the DCM met with MFA Americas 
Department Deputy Director Nguyen Ba Hung to discuss the status of 
bilateral issues in advance of the POTUS visit.  The DCM reviewed 
the list of as-yet unresolved official and commercial agreements 
that need to be concluded, noting our desire to make the POTUS visit 
as substantive as possible.  Explaining the MFA's role as the 
coordinator for POTUS deliverables, Hung outlined various 
bureaucratic and political obstacles to finalizing agreements, as 
well as the recent anxiety of some GVN leaders over U.S. support for 
free speech and political change in Vietnam.  Comment: With APEC 
weeks away, the GVN is indeed overtaxed, but sustained USG pressure 
across the board will help the GVN (and MFA) focus on our priorities 
and nail down a good package of deliverables.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The DCM began the meeting by stressing our desire to 
achieve a full range of substantive objectives for the POTUS visit. 
The DCM urged the GVN to accelerate its efforts to reach agreements 
in a number of areas, including Peace Corps, PSI, the nuclear fuel 
removal at the Dalat reactor and the DEA-Ministry of Public Security 
law enforcement MOU.  He also mentioned the need for further 
progress on religious freedom in advance of the decision on Country 
of Particular Concern status.  He noted progress needed to finalize 
commercial agreements with U.S. businesses prior to the President's 
visit and to sign a bilateral maritime agreement.  Finally, he 
discussed Administration efforts to work with members of Congress to 
address issues which have led several senators to place holds on 
PNTR legislation. 
 
Bureaucracy:  Inter-Agency Coordination Slow 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) In addition to commenting on several issues, Hung spoke 
generally about the procedural difficulties of resolving these 
matters in the GVN.  While the MFA is working as coordinator to push 
for progress with the various lead ministries, most of the issues 
raised by the DCM are "beyond the control of the MFA," Hung 
complained.  He mentioned the Peace Corps and Dalat nuclear fuel 
agreements, saying that the MFA is working hard but does not have 
anything new to report.  The MFA still wants to get as much as 
possible done, but a lot of work remains. 
 
4. (SBU) Hung mentioned bureaucratic difficulties related to 
procedures put in place (since June) by the new administration of 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung, which require a higher degree of 
formal inter-agency coordination; it is no longer possible for the 
MFA to sign an agreement on behalf of another GVN ministry if the 
MFA is not the lead GVN agency responsible for implementation of the 
agreement.  On the other hand, each ministry now has the authority 
to enter into direct agreements with foreign partners, provided the 
Prime Minister approves.  (In this regard, Hung underscored that the 
Ministry of Education and Training is authorized to complete a 
government-to-government Peace Corps agreement with the United 
States.)  Regarding our list of pending bilateral agreements, Hung 
said it is a question of getting it done "both your way and our 
way," and not just "telling us what to do." 
 
5. (SBU) In any event, we need to prepare for a successful visit 
under any circumstances, Hung agreed.  We want the relationship to 
move forward and not focus on setbacks.  Both sides should realize 
this and work together.  So many things are still unclear.  PSI and 
the Dalat nuclear fuel issues still "need much further work."  The 
MFA leadership meets almost daily with other senior leaders to push 
these and other issues forward. 
 
Politics: Hard-liners' Criticism Makes MFA's Job Harder 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
6. (SBU) Noting that anti-government political activists had become 
more active recently, Hung said that some GVN officials have been 
working more intensely to "protect the political stability and 
security of Vietnam."  At this point, Hung raised the Ambassador's 
statement, made during an October 2 interview with Radio Free Asia, 
supporting the right of political free speech (Ref A).  "Some 
officials" in Vietnam are upset by these comments, he said. 
Referring to the 2005 joint statement of POTUS and PM Phan Van Khai, 
Hung praised President Bush's "positive statement" as reassuring GVN 
leaders that the United States is not an enemy of the regime in 
Vietnam.  Now, these leaders "have to rethink how to integrate into 
the world and maintain stability."  The GVN will never accept regime 
change, stated Hung.  He stressed there is "concern and anxiety" 
among the leaders and agencies involved.  What is needed now is a 
framework to build a partnership similar to the President's 
statement in 2005, he concluded. 
 
7. (SBU) The DCM responded that the bilateral relationship has grown 
much over the past year.  It is disappointing, he continued, that 
the MFA would feel it necessary or appropriate to ask the Ambassador 
to refrain from stating established U.S. policy supporting universal 
political and human rights.  The Ambassador has worked hard to 
 
HANOI 00002710  002 OF 002 
 
 
strengthen relations between our countries, the DCM underlined. 
 
8. (SBU) Hung said he raised the point because he needed to say it 
"in order to avoid pressure from any [GVN] group that might want to 
control what we accomplish" before the President's visit.  He 
described the difficulty the MFA has experienced in gaining 
inter-agency approval for commitments related to, for example, 
International Religious Freedom.  Some in the GVN say, "out of CPC 
today, in again tomorrow."  Addressing this attitude has a lot to do 
with trust building.  At present, the GVN is asked to provide 
information about the exact number of new churches, but, according 
to Hung, this is very difficult.  "Let them grow up naturally, 
rather than as a response to pressure from the U.S. side."  The DCM 
responded that a more definite figure of expected church 
registrations could serve as a goal for what the GVN expects to 
achieve. 
 
Comment: We Should Keep Pushing 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) With leaders from a score of economies arriving in Hanoi in 
just over three weeks' time, the GVN inter-agency team is indeed 
overstretched.  Those pushing hardest will probably get the most. 
The bureaucratic issues mentioned by Hung are real, but the pressure 
to move quickly in advance of President Bush's arrival on November 
17 is as well.  We will continue to press forward on all fronts. 
 
MARINE