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Viewing cable 06DILI528, UPDATE ON EAST TIMOR ELECTION ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI528 2006-10-24 15:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO8607
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0528/01 2971547
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241547Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3064
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0720
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0791
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0700
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0532
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0564
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0639
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0430
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2400
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, DRL 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON EAST TIMOR ELECTION ISSUES 
 
 
DILI 00000528  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. Summary: Representatives of IFES, the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) on October 18 briefed Charge d'Affaires on their 
electoral related programs and the current status of 
preparations for the 2007 elections.  Discussions centered 
around three key areas of current concern.  First, Parliament 
has yet to approve an electoral law framework for the elections, 
and probably will not for at least another month.  Second, the 
government-controlled body responsible for election 
administration is slated to receive far more support than the 
independent body tasked with overseeing its work.  Third, both 
the ruling Fretilin party and some opposition parties may not be 
ready to campaign fairly or to accept an election outcome in 
which they lose.  End summary. 
 
IFES, IRI and NDI election support 
---------------------------------- 
2. At a briefing on October 18 for Charge d'Affaires, 
representatives of IFES, IRI and NDI provided an overview of 
their electoral-related activities and their views and concerns 
regarding current election developments.  Main activities 
include: 
-- IFES: providing analysis and advice regarding the development 
of electoral institutions and legal framework.  Organized a 
series of briefings for the international community on the draft 
electoral laws.  Commissioned an evaluation of the role of the 
National Elections Commission (CNE) during the local elections 
in 2005. 
-- IFES and IRI: with USAID support and in coordination with 
several national NGOs, organized a series of civil society 
workshops on the draft electoral laws. 
-- IRI: providing training for all registered parties.  Will 
also be training party agents as observers for the elections, 
with a goal of having 2-3 observers from each party at every 
voting station 
-- NDI: Providing support to the Parliamentary committee 
responsible for review of electoral laws.  Will be supporting 
the establishment of a network of domestic non-partisan 
observers. 
 
Electoral law discussions continue, no consensus law in sight 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
3. Currently under discussion in Parliament are two competing 
versions of the law on parliamentary elections, one drafted by 
Fretilin and one by the opposition.  (Discussions on drafts of 
the presidential election law are reportedly on hold until the 
parliamentary one is passed.)  Opportunities for key 
stakeholders and civil society to review and discuss the draft 
laws have been relatively good.  The Parliamentary Committee for 
Constitutional Issues, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees A, 
(Committee A) held public consultations on the draft 
parliamentary election laws over the first two weeks in October. 
 While the NDI representative remarked that there were a "large 
number of good inputs," the IFES rep highlighted several 
concerns, noting that much of the testimony to the committee was 
in the form of rote reading of statements with limited practical 
suggestions on the laws.  Moreover, it was evident that the 
election-related knowledge of the committee members is quite 
limited, with many key issues -- such as the representational 
system and the electoral formula -- getting little or no 
attention. 
 
4. Current estimates are that it will be at least another month 
before a parliamentary election law will be passed.  The 
Committee A chairman notes that there are only a "few items of 
divergence."  However, IFES rep argues that the currently 
identified areas of divergence are in fact significant so 
getting a consensus document will take time.  Given Fretilin's 
dominance in Parliament, there is the possibility that its 
version will simply be pushed through, resulting in a faster 
timeline.  However, President Xanana Gusmao has his own strong 
priorities for the law which are much more in line with 
opposition views and Fretilin would run the risk of a 
Presidential veto if they refuse to compromise on their version. 
 Anuncompromising stance by Fretilin conceivably could also 
result in a boycott of the election by opposition parties. 
 
DILI 00000528  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
National supervision of election administration may be weak 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
5. A major concern expressed by the briefing participants was 
that the National Elections Commission (CNE), the independent 
body to be entrusted with supervising and monitoring the 
elections,may lack the powers and capacity to do so effectively. 
 Current developments significantly disadvantage the CNE 
vis-`-vis the Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration 
(STAE), the government body responsible for election logistics 
which CNE is supposed to supervise.  The Government's 
FY2006-2007 budget funds STAE at ten times the amount allotted 
for CNE.  Moreover, the UN Development Program's (UNDP) 
electoral assistance plan is primarily focused on assistance to 
STAE with only cursory treatment of CNE.  Part of the difficulty 
of ensuring strong support of a CNE now is that the body does 
not yet exist since its establishment is predicated on the 
passage of the electoral law.  Given that the parliamentary 
election law discussions could continue into December, the 
future CNE is likely to be further weakened by having 
insufficient time to ramp up operations in advance of the 
elections.  (Note: A law proposing the establishment of a 
permanent CNE is also currently being reviewed by Parliamentary 
Committee A, but is considered a long shot.) 
 
Parties are preparing, but many may have unrealistic expectations 
--------------------------------------------- -------------------- 
6. The IRI representative reported that their political party 
training is in high demand, with all registered parties 
participating.  This includes Fretilin, which has in the past 
declined to participate in such programs.  (Note: Fretilin 
Mudansa, the party's reform faction, has requested to 
participate in IRI programs training, but IRI indicated that 
they can only work with the designates of the official 
leadership of registered parties.)  The IRI representative noted 
that their focus is of necessity on "Campaigning 101" training 
as the level of capacity in this area is limited across the 
board.  Most opposition parties are particularly weak in their 
campaigning skills and resources, with many having virtually no 
capacity outside of Dili. 
 
7. All briefing participants expressed their worry that the 
campaign environment will be tense and combative and that 
unrealistic expectations on the part of many parties could 
contribute to rejection of the outcomes as illegitimate.  The 
IRI representative cited as an example that smaller opposition 
parties have expressed unconcern regarding the possibility that 
a threshold as high as five percent may govern the parliamentary 
elections.  Many of these parties are considered unlikely to 
reach even that threshold.  Participants all noted need for an 
agreed code of conduct among the political parties, with a 
credible enforcement mechanism, and reported that they are 
looking at how they can support its developments.  In addition, 
they will be looking at options for parties to gain a better 
understanding of their popularity to both support more effective 
campaigning and to prepare for likely election outcomes.  (Note: 
This concern is also relevant to Fretilin which may well have a 
much lower outcome then they seem to currently expect.) 
 
8. Comment: Ensuring not only that elections are legitimate, but 
that they are accepted as such by all regardless of outcome will 
be the largest overall challenge.  To this end, the key issues 
to watch are a) ensuring a level playing field and fair play 
during the lead up to the election, including but not exclusive 
to the official campaign period, and b) ensuring a political 
environment conducive to both peaceful elections and wide 
acceptance of the results by both winners and losers.  There is 
a significant risk that an environment of mistrust, especially 
if accompanied by the country's polarization on East-West lines, 
will produce an outcome that the losers will reject regardless 
of how well the elections are run.  End comment. 
GRAY