Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06CHENNAI2308, SCA/INS DIRECTOR BERNICAT ENGAGES SOUTH INDIAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06CHENNAI2308.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CHENNAI2308 2006-10-10 11:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chennai
VZCZCXRO4114
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHCG #2308/01 2831147
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101147Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL CHENNAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0096
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2013
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1259
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0528
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1041
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0971
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0613
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4871
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHENNAI 002308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IN NP CE
SUBJECT: SCA/INS DIRECTOR BERNICAT ENGAGES SOUTH INDIAN 
INTERLOCUTORS ON SRI LANKA/NEPAL CONFLICTS 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Political analysts Lt. General V.R. Raghavan and 
N. Sathiya Moorthy agreed that prospects for the upcoming October 28 
talks were somewhat encouraging between the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during 
discussions on October 5 with visiting South and Central Asia Bureau 
Office Director for India, Nepal and Sri Lanka Marcia Bernicat. 
Both expressed doubt, however, that the Sinhalese majority was ready 
to share power with the Tamil and Muslim communities.  Both agreed 
that domestic politics consigned India to playing a strategic 
behind-the-scenes role to avoid a political backlash in the south 
and prevent rising resentment in both countries.  Raghavan did not 
think violent conflict in Nepal is imminent and advised, based on 
his peacekeeping experience in Sri Lanka that it is more important 
to move quickly to holding well-monitored elections than on focusing 
so completely on disarming the Maoists.  Both agreed that continued 
conflict makes both countries vulnerable to harboring terrorist 
activity that could threaten India, and that the U.S. and India 
should continue to complement each other's efforts to support the 
peace processes.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) During an October 5 visit to Chennai, Marcia Bernicat, 
Director for India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in the South and Central 
Asia Bureau discussed the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Nepal with Lt. 
General V.R. Raghavan, President of the Center for Security Analysis 
(CSA) and former Director of Military Operations in the Indian Army, 
who oversaw the deployment of forces and peacekeeping operations in 
the region.  Bernicat also met with Mr. N. Sathiya Moorthy, Honorary 
Director of the Chennai chapter of the Observer Research Foundation 
(ORF,) at which she spoke on U.S. relations with South Asia. 
 
3.  (SBU) General Raghavan, who has met Prabakharan, believes 
military and international community pressure will force the LTTE 
chief back to the negotiating table, but argued the Sri Lankan 
government must offer concessions that will enable the LTTE 
leadership to sell the peace process to its cadre.  Raghavan said he 
has advised the Sri Lankans not to press for additional military 
gains, fearing that the Army's recent successes have led officials 
and their supporters to think a military solution is now possible. 
He is concerned the Sinhalese majority remains incapable of sharing 
power, but said the proposal contained in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord 
of July 1987 remains a viable starting point for talks.  Sathiya 
Moorthy of the ORF told Bernicat that getting the two principal 
political parties in Sri Lanka to come to a consensus was an 
essential condition for talks, but he creatively suggested that the 
peace process could be significantly advanced by re-directing the 
activities of both antagonists - the LTTE cadre could be absorbed by 
forming a Tamil regiment in the Sri Lankan Army, and the government 
could contribute to United Nations peace keeping operations. 
 
4.  (SBU) Regarding Nepal, General Raghavan argued that Maoist 
leader Prachanda wants to move political power out of the hands of 
the upper caste elite leaders of the Kathmandu Valley, but not by 
mounting a military offensive, especially in the coming weeks.  He 
would not rule out Indian military intervention, but thought it 
highly unlikely.  The General noted that it was the Nepalese people, 
not the Maoists, who unseated the King and that a power vacuum 
remains.  Based on his experience with India's peacekeeping 
operation in Sri Lanka, Raghavan cautioned that the disarmament 
process is more "theatre" than effective and that the international 
community should move to well-monitored elections quickly to help 
fill the political void in Nepal.  In his opinion, talks will need 
to address distribution of economic as well as political power 
throughout Nepal, in part because Prachanda will need to be assured 
his followers will be able to support themselves.  Raghavan 
suggested the Indian government could address this by funding a 
pension plan for the armed Maoist cadres in addition to providing 
development assistance for regions outside the Kathmandu valley. 
 
5.  (SBU) Both General Raghavan and Sathiya Moorthy are concerned 
the conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka can be exploited by Pakistan 
and extremists to carry out terrorist attacks in India.  They 
pointed to reports of Kathmandu being a transit point for terrorists 
involved in the recent Mumbai blasts.  Sathiya Moorthy fears 
disaffected Muslim youth in Sri Lanka will become radicalized and 
recruited by "jihadist" groups.  They argued India and the U.S. 
would have to cooperate to ensure these conflict zones do not become 
havens for terrorists. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment:  Raghavan and Sathiya Moorthy agreed coalition 
politics require India to work behind-the-scenes to help resolve the 
conflicts in Sri Lanka and Nepal, and that India and the U.S. could 
complement each others' efforts in the peace processes.  End 
Comment. 
 
CHENNAI 00002308  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (U) Office Director Bernicat cleared this message. 
 
HOPPER