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Viewing cable 06BEIJING21224, REPORTED DPRK NUCLEAR TEST: RARE MFA ""STATEMENT""

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIJING21224 2006-10-09 11:50 2011-07-02 00:00 SECRET Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO3494
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1224/01 2821150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091150Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9071
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2958
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0662
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1070
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 021224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, IO, ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL MNUC CH KN JA KS RU
SUBJECT: REPORTED DPRK NUCLEAR TEST: RARE MFA  ""STATEMENT"" 
CONDEMNS TEST; CHINESE OBSERVERS EXPRESS  SURPRISE, 
FRUSTRATION 
 
Classified By: Classified by Political Minister Counselor Daniel 
Shields.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (S) The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a rare 
official ""statement"" (text at para 11) on October 9 
condemning the reported DPRK nuclear test that day. 
China had only issued four previous MFA statements of 
this kind in the last decade and a half.  Chinese 
contacts we spoke with expressed surprise and 
frustration over the reported test and its timing and 
pointed to the MFA statement as evidence of Beijing's 
anger with Pyongyang over the test.  Several contacts 
we spoke with believe that China will support 
imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council ""to 
some extent"" and assessed that the heart of the 
discussion would be over what sanctions to impose. 
One contact said the Pakistan nuclear test precedent 
will be highly relevant, given the similarities 
between Beijing's historically close relations with 
Islamabad and with Pyongyang.  Netizens discussing the 
issue on popular websites indicated concern about 
increased threats to China's security as a result of 
the test.  End Summary. 
 
Rare MFA Statement Condemning Test 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (S) The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued on October 
9 a rare, harshly worded and high-level statement 
(text at para 11) condemning the reported DPRK nuclear 
test that day.  China issues MFA statements of this 
kind only on unusual occasions to signal strong 
leadership concern over a foreign policy issue.  The 
October 9 statement expresses China's ""resolute 
opposition"" to the ""flagrant nuclear test"" and 
""strongly demands the DPRK to live up to its 
commitment to a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, stop any 
activity that would lead to a deterioration of the 
situation and return to the Six-Party Talks.""  (Note: 
China has only issued four MFA statements in the last 
decade and a half, regarding the U.S. sale of F-16s to 
Taiwan in 1992, Taiwan President Li Teng-hui's visit 
to the United States in 1995, India's nuclear test in 
1998 and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine in October 2005.  End Note.)  The 
October 9 statement calls on all sides to ""respond 
calmly and adhere to peaceful resolution of the issue 
through consultations and dialogue."" 
 
Scholars Cite Surprise, Harsh Official Reaction 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3.  (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX 
(protect), North Korea's nuclear test was ""highly 
unexpected,"" catching both the Chinese government and 
independent observers off guard.  Pyongyang's decision 
to test so soon after the October 6 UNSC Presidential 
statement, which China supported, is particularly 
surprising, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that China has 
shown both its displeasure and surprise by issuing a 
""very strong"" Foreign Ministry Statement. 
 
4.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) told Polmincouns that the Foreign 
Ministry statement condemning the DPRK nuclear test 
was remarkable.  It is highly unusual for Beijing to 
publicly criticize Pyongyang in blunt terms like ""the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea disregarded the 
international community's universal opposition and 
flagrantly conducted a nuclear test.""  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was 
astonished to see the MFA use the word ""flagrantly"" to 
criticize an action by the DPRK.  He could only recall 
the word being used by China previously to condemn 
actions by the United States and the former Soviet 
Union.  In the past Beijing strove to project the 
image that any criticism of Pyongyang was reluctant 
and moderate.  This statement is different, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated, 
particularly in terms of the negative official Chinese 
attitude it expresses toward North Korea. 
 
China Will Support Sanctions 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) all separately predicted that China 
would cooperate with other parties including the 
United States to bring additional pressure on North 
Korea through possible sanctions or other measures. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polmincouns that a North Korean nuclear test 
represents a turning point for China.  Beijing, while 
still not an adversary of North Korea, will shift from 
being a relatively neutral mediator to being a more 
active player willing to apply pressure on North 
Korea.  The North Koreans did not learn their lesson 
from Chinese support for UNSCR 1695 following the DPRK 
missile tests.  They have apparently taken a step that 
harms China's interests.  The Chinese Government is 
now likely to accept UN sanctions against North Korea, 
just as China accepted UN sanctions against India and 
Pakistan follwing the nuclear tests by those 
countries.  Te key will be precisely which sanctions 
are poposed.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Pakistan precedent will be 
highly relevant, given the similarities between 
Beijing's historically close relations with Islamabad 
and with Pyongyang. 
 
5.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff that the DPRK has now played 
its biggest and only remaining card.  ""Kim Jong-Il is 
used to games of brinksmanship,"" he commented.  ""Kim 
will use the nuclear test to see whether the U.S. 
redline is a nuclear North Korea or a nuclear North 
Korea that proliferates to other countries.""  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
predicted that China would support sanctions ""to some 
extent"" in the wake of a test, but declined to predict 
how far China would go in cutting off Chinese support 
for the DPRK.  XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that Beijing would support 
some sort of sanctions against North Korea, as long as 
such actions were taken through the UN Security 
Council.  China wants to be viewed as a ""great"" and 
""responsible"" power, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, and has opposed nuclear 
proliferation, including by supporting strong UNSC 
resolutions against both North Korea and Iran. 
 
Questions over Test Remain 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that 
China's statement on the test had harshly condemned 
the DPRK and she said that China is now waiting to see 
what the U.S. reaction will be.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that most 
Chinese analysts are skeptical of North Korean claims 
that 100 percent of radioactive emissions have been 
contained.  ""Unless North Korean technology is much 
better than we think it is, there should be traces of 
radioactive emissions at some point,"" she commented. 
 
7.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he 
had interviewed XXXXXXXXXXXX after the news of 
the test became public, who reportedly said that ""it 
appears that many aspects of the North Korean test 
were unsuccessful,"" but XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX would 
not elaborate.  XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern that the test 
shows that there is no leverage available to coax good 
behavior from the DPRK and that the contradiction 
between China's priority interests regarding the DPRK 
nuclear issue, seeking to maintain stability and 
eliminate nuclear weapons in North Korea, is becoming 
sharper.  ""China is in a difficult spot,"" XXXXXXXXXXXX said. 
 
Frustration High Among Experts 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (S) Other academics and contacts we reached 
expressed surprise and frustration over the DPRK's 
announced test.  XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the test could usher in a new era of instability in the region that would benefit no 
one.  XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that China would work closely with the 
United States on next steps, but expressed frustration 
that none of China's previous efforts to resolve the 
DPRK nuclear issue had been successful. 
 
9.  (S) Several contacts noted that the topic of the 
North Korean nuclear test might come up in discussions 
on the margins of the ongoing Party Plenum, but 
asserted that the North Korean issue would not be 
discussed in the plenary sessions.  ""The issue will be 
discussed by the Politburo or Politburo Standing 
Committee, but not by the Plenum,"" said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Going one step further, XXXXXXXXXXXX separately said 
that there is ""no way"" that the DPRK nuclear test 
would affect the Plenum, which is a ""major domestic 
event"" and largely ""immune"" from foreign affairs. 
 
Story Looms Large on Web 
------------------------ 
 
10.  (C) The North Korean nuclear test was the number 
one headline on popular Chinese Internet news sites, 
but the official Xinhua news site ran the story behind 
news about cracking down on corruption (in connection 
with a theme of the ongoing Party Plenum) and a 
headline about Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to 
Beijing on October 8.  Popular Chinese chatrooms 
carried some commentary on the North Korean test on 
October 9, most of it focused on the threat that North 
Korea could pose to China and the potential reaction 
of China's neighbors.  Examples were, ""now Japan and 
South Korea will both try to get nuclear weapons,"" 
""the North Korean test is an affront to China"" and 
""terrifying.""  One netizen posted a list of Chinese 
cities that are within reach of North Korean missiles. 
 
Text of MFA Statement 
--------------------- 
 
11.  (U) Begin text. 
 
Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China 
 
9 October 2006 
 
On 9 October, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea disregarded the international community's 
universal opposition and flagrantly conducted a 
nuclear test.  The Chinese Government expresses its 
resolute opposition in this regard. 
It has been the firm, unshakable, and consistent 
stance of the Chinese Government to realize non- 
nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and oppose 
nuclear proliferation.  The Chinese side strongly 
demands that the DPRK side abide by its commitment to 
non-nuclearization, stop all actions that may lead to 
further deterioration of the situation, and return to 
the course of the six-party talks. 
Maintaining peace and stability in the Northeast Asia 
region conforms with the common interests of all 
parties concerned.  The Chinese Government calls on 
all parties concerned to respond calmly and adhere to 
a peaceful resolution of the issue through 
consultation and dialogue.  The Chinese side will 
continue to devote unremitting efforts toward this 
end.  End text. 
 
SEDNEY