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Viewing cable 06BANGKOK6395, AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRIVY COUNCILLOR PREM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BANGKOK6395 2006-10-19 11:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO4108
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #6395/01 2921100
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191100Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2424
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3100
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6199
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2248
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006395 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
NSC FOR MORROW 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRIVY COUNCILLOR PREM 
TINSULANONDA 
 
1. (SBU)  Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda hosted 
lunch for me today, and we had an in-depth conversation about 
the coup and its implications for US-Thai relations.  While 
Prem is unapologetic about what happened September 19,  he is 
also sensitive to the international implications and 
especially to the US angle.  He is very close to the coup 
leadership as well as to Prime Minister Surayud.  Both 
General Sonthi and Surayud are considered acolytes of Prem. 
(While it does not appear that Prem was part of the coup 
planning, it seems likely that his blessing was sought a few 
days before the event, and Prem no doubt gave the King at 
least some advance notice about what was coming.) 
 
2. (SBU)  I described for Prem US unhappiness over the fact 
of the coup and outlined the measures we had taken to date in 
response.  Like most, he accepts that the US would be opposed 
to the military overthrow of an elected government, and 
understands the suspension of military assistance such as 
IMET, FMF, GPOI and section 1206.  He assured me that 
Thailand was heading back toward democratically elected 
government and thus anticipated the restoration of the 
suspended programs at that time. 
 
3.  (SBU) I told him we had noted various actions in the 
month since the coup, such as Surayud's appointment, the 
interim constitution, the new cabinet and the selection of 
the interim assembly.  In each case, there were just enough 
elements to leave the impression that perhaps the military's 
timeline for returning power might be lengthening rather than 
shortening.  These included: 
 
--  the fact that the PM was a retired military officer; 
 
--  the many references in the interim constitution to the 
coup council and its various continuing responsibilities; 
 
--  the lack of "upcountry" representation in the cabinet; and 
 
--  the large percentage of military officers in the interim 
assembly. 
 
4. (SBU)  While disagreeing that the military had in mind a 
lengthy exercise of power, Prem conceded that the optics of 
these various elements, taken together, could create that 
impression.  He asked what Washington's view was.  I told him 
we were watching closely for signals that things were in fact 
moving in a more positive direction.  Such signals would 
include lifting martial law and restoration of civil 
liberties, a shorter timeline to elections, indications of 
positive headway on the drafting of a new constitution and 
evidence that the new civilian interim government and 
assembly were indeed acting independently of the military. 
 
5. (SBU) I said we would reassess in early November the 
degree to which progress was being made in these areas. 
Possible further actions we might take in the absence of 
progress or if things got worse could include canceling Cobra 
Gold, suspending ship visits, limiting senior military 
interaction and cessation of commercial sales of military 
equipment.  There was also the issue of how to deal with 
Thailand at APEC in Hanoi, I added. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Prem was very interested in the APEC angle.  He 
understood instantly the equities at stake on the US side, 
with the President's strong commitment to our democracy 
agenda.  (It is widely commented upon here that the Thai coup 
coincided with the President's speech on democracy at the 
UN.)  He asked how I thought our deliberations would come 
out.  I told him much of it depended on actions the interim 
government would take in the next couple of weeks -- lifting 
martial law would be a huge signal, for example.  Prem did 
not push back with the line that other have used on this 
point (General Sonthi, for example) that martial law must be 
maintained to prevent "dark influences" associated with 
Thaksin from stirring up trouble.  Indeed, he was responsive 
to my point that existing legal authorities should be 
sufficient to control and punish anyone breaking the law. 
 
BANGKOK 00006395  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment:  We talked about various other issues, but 
Prem should take away from the meeting the need for an 
increased sense of urgency between now and early November if 
there is to be a successful encounter at APEC, and for that 
matter if the bilateral relationship is to avoid further 
friction. 
 
BOYCE