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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD3760, AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH IRAQI ANTI-PKK COORDINATOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD3760 2006-10-10 20:32 2011-08-16 19:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO4873
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3760/01 2832032
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 102032Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7330
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003760 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH IRAQI ANTI-PKK COORDINATOR 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met on October 8 with Iraqi 
State Minister for National Security Shirwan Wa'ili, the 
GOI's counterpart to Special Envoy Ralston in the trilateral 
U.S./Iraq/Turkey anti-PKK efforts.  Wa'ili is in the process 
of gathering information and talking to the various actors, 
after which he says he will be prepared for a trilateral 
meeting; Wa'ili is ready to meet with Ralston on October 16. 
The Ambassador gave Wa'ili a readout of a recent discussion 
about the PKK with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
President Masoud Barzani.  Wa'ili and the Ambassador agreed 
to the importance of political leadership in reducing 
violence in Iraq.  Wa'ili denied that his ministry is under 
Iranian influence and requested USG assistance for his 
ministry.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Wa'ili on His New Responsibility 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili for his assessment of the 
security situation and of his new responsibility as the GOI's 
representative to trilateral U.S./Iraq/Turkey anti-PKK 
efforts.  Wa'ili told the Ambassador he is in the process of 
gathering information on the PKK.  This is his second meeting 
with U.S. Embassy officials, but he is awaiting his first 
meeting with the Turkish Embassy.  Wa'ili anticipates meeting 
with the GOI KRG representative to the trilateral process, 
Karim Sinjari, later in the week.  Wa'ili is aware of the 
October 16 Ralston visit and is available to meet with him. 
Wa'ili said he would travel to the KRG for consultations as 
well.  After he speaks separately to all parties and tries to 
narrow differences, he will be prepared for a trilateral 
"workshop." 
 
4.  (C) Wa'ili pointed out the GOI issued a statement 
"diplomatically" calling the PKK a terrorist organization and 
saying the PKK should not be present in Iraq.  Wa'ili said 
the GOI is committed to closing PKK offices, noting that 
"there are even offices in Baghdad." 
 
------------------------ 
Getting Sequencing Right 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador told Wa'ili he had just been in the 
KRG and discussed the PKK issue with KRG President Barzani, 
who told him there is now a window of opportunity to resolve 
the problem.  Barzani told the Ambassador he met with PKK 
leader Cemil Bayik and pressed Bayik to declare a ceasefire, 
which the PKK did. 
 
6.  (C) According to Barzani, the PKK is ready to lay down 
arms permanently if there is "flexibility" on the Turkish 
side.  The PKK seeks a "federal" structure in southeast 
Turkey, cultural and political rights, and peaceful political 
settlement of its dispute with the Turkish government.  The 
Ambassador noted that Turkish CHOD Buyukanit had stated 
previously there is no purely military solution to the 
problem; Buyukanit had served in Turkey's southeast region 
and understood the issues. 
 
7.  (C) The challenge, the Ambassador told Wa'ili, is getting 
the sides to agree on the sequence of steps, to which Wa'ili 
agreed.  The Ambassador noted that all sides have internal 
political constraints on what they can do, and when they can 
do it.  The U.S. is ready to do whatever it can to help the 
process. 
 
-------- 
Security 
-------- 
 
8.  (C) On security, Wa'ili noted the difference between the 
work done and the results on the ground.  According to 
Wa'ili, GOI security agencies have done a good job.  Wa'ili 
blames the lack of results not on operational or intelligence 
failures by security agencies, but on poor political 
leadership.  He believes some political figures are behind 
sectarian violence, which makes the violence difficult to 
contain and requires a political solution. 
 
9.  (C) The Ambassador said the USG sees four sources of 
violence in Iraq:  terrorists like Al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates; insurgents attacking Coalition Forces; sectarian 
violence; and in the south, tensions between militias.  He 
agreed the key element is political, as this is the reason 
why the USG is urging reconciliation and resolution of major 
political issues that divide people.  The October 2 
four-point agreement on ending sectarian violence is 
encouraging; continuing sectarian violence threatens to 
 undermine U.S. public support for Iraq. 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador asked Wa'ili why some tribes had not 
attended the October 7 Anbar tribes meeting in Baghdad. 
Wa'ili attributed their absence to their objections to the 
Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP) participation.  The Ambassador 
suggested that Wa'ili reach out to tribes that did not attend. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Request for U.S. Help to the Ministry 
------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Wa'ili told the Ambassador that as a state ministry, 
his Ministry for National Security has many responsibilities 
but no fixed budget.  Wa'ili said he thought there is an 
impression in the USG that the ministry was under Iranian 
influence; the Ambassador replied he had heard others say 
this.  Wa'ili denied this, saying his was "an Iraqi ministry" 
which selects independent officials.  He asked why there is 
no USG support for his ministry and requested a USG point of 
contact to liaise with the his ministry.  He also asked for 
support to relocate the ministry to a larger building.  The 
Ambassador told Wa'ili he would look into Wa'ili's requests. 
KHALILZAD