Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA2775, AFRICAN UNION DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON SUPPORTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ADDISABABA2775.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA2775 2006-10-13 15:42 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO8947
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2775/01 2861542
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131542Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2879
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO, AF/E, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS AU SO SU ET ER
SUBJECT: AFRICAN UNION DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON SUPPORTS 
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS FOR DARFUR AND SOMALIA 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  African Union Commission Deputy 
Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka underscored the need for a 
robust U.N. mandate for peacekeeping in Sudan, noting that 
the AU lacked the resources to sustain an operation in Darfur 
and therefore sought to transfer responsibility to the 
international community.  The AU recognized that "heinous 
crimes" had occurred in Darfur, and that those responsible 
should be held accountable.  In addition to Darfur, 
implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement remained a concern.  On Somalia, Mazimhaka and 
other senior AU officials urged the immediate lifting of the 
UN Security Council arms embargo on Somalia, to allow 
assistance to be provided to the Transitional Federal 
Government.  Deployment of an IGAD peace support mission to 
support the legitimacy of the TFG and its institutions should 
not require the consent of the ICU, and would be the only way 
to ensure that TFG-ICU tensions do not engulf neighboring 
countries in a regional war, Mazimhaka said.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) On October 13, Charge, DCM, and CJTF-HOA Commander 
Rear Admiral Richard Hunt led Amcit delegation from the NGO, 
"Business Executives for National Security" (BENS), in a 
meeting at African Union Headquarters with AU Deputy 
Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, AU Conflict Management 
Director El-Ghassim Wane, and other AU Commission officials 
responsible for peace and security issues.  Deputy pol-econ 
counselor and CJTF-HOA officers accompanied the U.S. 
delegation. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
"ROBUST U.N. MANDATE" NEEDED FOR SUDAN 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Sudan's refusal to allow transition to a UN mission 
in Darfur created a dilemma for the international community, 
and set a "very bad precedent" that "needs to be addressed 
firmly," Mazimhaka said.  The only option had been to extend 
the current mandate of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur 
(AMIS).  However, the AU could no longer sustain the mission 
in Sudan, as the AU lacked the resources and capacity to 
conduct an operation envisaged at more than 20,000 troops. 
(NOTE: Current AMIS force strength is approximately 7,000; 
the AU Peace and Security Council has authorized enhancing 
AMIS by adding two additional battalions.  END NOTE.)  AU 
withdrawal would result in a "free-for-all" between rebels 
and armed groups, further suffering for the population of 
Darfur, and deterioration of relations between Sudan and its 
neighbors.  The AU therefore needed to transfer 
responsibility for the peacekeeping mission to the 
international community.  A "robust UN mandate" was needed in 
Sudan, Mazimhaka said, to ensure that all parties observed 
the Darfur Peace Agreement.  The AU's intervention in Darfur 
was not intended to be peace enforcement, as the AU lacked 
the capacity to enforce peace in Sudan "or anywhere else." 
 
4. (SBU) Darfur was a "tragedy for Africa and humanity," 
Mazimhaka said.  The situation in Kordofan, not Darfur, 
initially drew international attention; conflicts over 
resources in western and southern Sudan, "exacerbated by 
ideology," had led to the current crisis.  AU intervention 
came when rebels openly attacked the government.  Rapes, 
destruction, and the systematic displacement of civilians led 
some to characterize the situation as "genocide."  While the 
AU had cooperated with the UN commission of inquiry that 
could not conclusively define the situation as genocide, the 
AU nevertheless recognized that "heinous crimes" had 
occurred:  those responsible should be investigated and held 
before international justice, Mazimhaka said.  Numerous UNSC 
resolutions had been adopted holding individuals responsible 
for international crimes.  As Sudan was an AU member state, 
the AU had the right to intervene when the population faced 
danger, "but it is extremely difficult when a member state 
refuses to cooperate with us."  The AU had little leverage on 
Sudan, other than suspending Sudan's membership in the AU or 
endorsing UN sanctions on the Government of Sudan (GOS) or on 
Sudanese individuals.  The international community needed 
deeper engagement with Sudan, Mazimhaka said. 
 
5. (SBU) Asked whether China was obstructing international 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002775  002 OF 004 
 
 
pressure on Sudan, Mazimhaka noted that both Russia and China 
had abstained on UNSCR 1706.  He said the Russian foreign 
minister had explained to AU principals that Russia's 
abstention had been intended to give Sudan an opportunity to 
accept UN deployment.  China derived economic benefits from 
both Sudan and Chad, Mazimhaka said, noting that Chad now 
recognized China rather than Taiwan. 
 
---------------------------------- 
DON'T FORGET ABOUT NORTH-SOUTH CPA 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Questioned about North-South relations in Sudan, 
Mazimhaka said enthusiasm for the Government of Southern 
Sudan (GoSS) had waned over recent years.  The GoSS had 
strayed from the vision of John Garang, he said, by 
disagreeing on the implementation of the North-South 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), establishing a parallel 
cabinet rather than accept the structure of the national 
government, and by disagreeing on Darfur.  Salva Kiir spent 
most of his time in Juba as GoSS President, rather than as 
vice president of the government of national unity, Mazimhaka 
noted.  Integration of armed forces had slowed, and 
resolution of border conflicts remained dormant.  The GoSS 
was preparing to consolidate its gains and ultimately to 
secede, he said. 
 
7. (SBU) AU Commission Conflict Management Director 
El-Ghassim Wane underscored that while the international 
community focused on Darfur, the CPA still needed to be 
implemented.  Unresolved North-south issues included those 
related to oil, as well as the GOS rejection of the July 2005 
Abyei Boundary Commission's ruling.  Different positions on 
Darfur further strained relations between the GOS and the 
SPLM.  Southern Sudan endorsing independence through a 
referendum would not be good for either Sudan or Africa, Wane 
said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
SOMALIA: SUPPORT TFG IMMEDIATELY OR RISK REGIONAL WAR 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8. (SBU) The situation in Somalia requires immediate, urgent 
attention, Mazimhaka said.  He affirmed the legitimacy of 
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which 
resulted from international negotiations, and noted that the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) had not been party to those 
talks.  The African Union recognized the Transitional Federal 
Institutions (TFIs) as a step toward representational 
government, he said.  Mazimhaka warned that failure to 
resolve conflict between the TFG and the ICU would inevitably 
result in a regional war, with a projected 75,000 refugees 
fleeing to Kenya, Somaliland, and Ethiopia.  Mazimhaka said 
the AU believed that the ICU not only sought the military 
overthrow of the TFG, but also espoused Somali dictator Siad 
Barre's concept of a "Greater Somalia."  "Somalia's 
neighbors--Kenya, Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti--would 
get not only refugees, but war as well," Mazimhaka said.  A 
further concern, he said, was that while Siad Barre had 
espoused a secular revolutionary government, the ICU sought a 
religious revolutionary government. 
 
9. (SBU) Observing that failure to act now could lead to 
possible war in the Horn of Africa, Charge asked what 
immediate steps could be taken to stop conflict in Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and Kenya.  AU Commission Peace and Security 
Director Geoffrey Mugumya responded that while some nations 
had a strategic interest in Somalia's stability, others 
sought Somalia's instability.  Charge observed that 
instability served no country's interests:  stability in 
Somalia would better enable Ethiopia to address its internal 
situation, but now OLF and ONLF insurgents used Somalia for 
operations against Ethiopia. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
ERITREA SHIPPING ARMS; EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED TO HELP TFG 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Continuing contacts between the TFG and ICU was 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002775  003 OF 004 
 
 
important, Mazimhaka said, but one needed the will and 
resources to resist the advance of the Islamic Courts.  If 
the ICU believed it enjoyed greater popular support, it 
should compete against the TFG in popular elections, he said. 
 Rear Admiral Hunt noted that a third round of Khartoum talks 
between the TFG and ICU may not yield satisfactory results, 
if appropriate leaders did not attend.  Mazimhaka noted that 
the ICU had immediately dismissed its representative after 
the first round of talks.  Hawiye supporters of the ICU 
strongly resented TFG President Yusuf; so long as the ICU 
believed it could achieve its aims through war, it would not 
negotiate in good faith, he added. 
 
11. (SBU) Questioned about reported arms shipments to the ICU 
from jihadists in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran, Mazimhaka 
said that while the source of such arms was unknown, the AU 
had evidence of arms "coming through one of our member 
states."  "We know that most of the arms here come through 
Eritrea," he declared.  Director Wane observed that the UN 
monitoring group's report highlighted violations of the arms 
embargo by several countries, including Eritrea. 
Wane appealed for the UN Security Council to lift the arms 
embargo imposed on Somalia since January 1992, or at least 
provide an exemption for those assisting the TFG.  By failing 
to distinguish between those supporting legitimate authority 
and those supporting the ICU, the arms embargo was 
"counter-productive to our efforts to establish a 
transitional government," he said.  Mazimhaka observed that 
the arms embargo was intended for Somali warlords, not 
international peacekeepers.  As the ICU already controlled 
all the ports of Somalia, one could not limit arms shipments, 
especially through Eritrea, Yemen, or the Indian Ocean. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ICU'S CONSENT NOT NEEDED FOR IGASOM DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
12. (SBU) IGAD's proposal to deploy a peace support mission 
in Somalia (IGASOM) was "the only way to prevent the spread 
of war to neighbors," Mazimhaka said.  If the UN Security 
Council endorsed such a mission, then the arms embargo would 
not apply, he added, as it would be an UNSC-mandated 
peacekeeping operation.  In addition to IGAD member states, 
the AU needed to consider other potential troop contributing 
countries, in order to generate "more capable forces," 
Mazimhaka said.  A peacekeeping operation did not require the 
consent of all parties, Mazimhaka observed, and it was "not 
an acceptable position" for "a belligerent" like the ICU to 
require consent.  International law required only the 
consensus of the TFG, he said, whose legitimacy was 
recognized by both the AU and the international community. 
 
13. (SBU) Somalia's transitional federal institutions 
resulted from the Somali national reconciliation conference 
in Kenya, but faced both regional and internal obstacles, 
according to AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretary 
Dr. A.M. Kambudzi.  At the international level, failure to 
resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute exacerbated 
tensions within Somalia, he said, as did indeterminate 
borders between Ethiopia and Somalia, and between Somalia and 
Kenya.  Within the region, there was also "no spirit of good 
neighborliness" in the Horn of Africa.  Internally, domestic 
Somali political culture was one of clans, rather than 
political groups and parties. 
 
14. (SBU) Conflict Management Director Wane underscored the 
need to promote regional integration, as well as a regional 
approach to conflict resolution, involving the AU, EU, and 
IGAD.  International efforts to address localized conflicts 
(Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, North-South Sudan, Darfur) often 
considered such conflicts in isolation from others.  For 
example, while the United States focused on addressing the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, he said, Eritrea was 
supporting rebels in Darfur.  Ensuring that landlocked 
Ethiopia had access to the sea would resolve many security 
issues, Wane said.  Asked whether greater U.S. engagement in 
Somalia could have the unwanted effect of attracting 
additional negative elements, Mazimhaka noted the importance 
of U.S. supporting regional efforts by the AU and EU, and 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002775  004 OF 004 
 
 
building consensus with actors ranging from Horn of Africa 
countries to China.  Mazimhaka decried the "high level of 
intimidation" by countries in the Horn of Africa, intended to 
block such consensus.  The U.S. could also use its influence 
among League of Arab States members. 
 
15. (SBU) COMMENT:  Mazimhaka, the second-highest ranking 
official in the AU Commission, has previously expressed 
strong support for UN and even NATO involvement in Darfur, 
but his observations do not necessarily reflect the consensus 
of AU member states or members of the AU Peace and Security 
Council.  As for Somalia, his comments reflect a consensus 
among several senior AU officials responsible for 
international security issues that immediate action is needed 
to prevent the Somalia conflict from engulfing its neighbors 
in a regional war.  END COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON