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Viewing cable 06TOKYO5562, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO5562 2006-09-26 08:21 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO0187
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #5562/01 2690821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260821Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6768
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0749
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8199
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1559
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 7943
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9282
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4307
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0435
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2054
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 005562 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Media fear new Abe administration; Abe clearly critical of media 
and cool to media coverage 
 
(2) Abe aiming to strengthen Japan-US alliance with his new 
interpretation of collective self-defense 
 
(3) Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Economic policy could be new 
administration's Achilles' heel 
 
(4) Kantei-led policy councils increased to 71, seven of which have 
never met; Realignment as challenge for new administration 
 
(5) Weapons-carrying ships via Japan: Cargoes untouchable under 
Japanese law 
 
(6) Editorial: An incomprehensible proposal on amakudari 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Media fear new Abe administration; Abe clearly critical of media 
and cool to media coverage 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Pages 24 and 25) (Abridged slightly) 
September 26, 2006 
 
The new Abe administration is set to move into action. Abe is 
planning to enhance the functions of the Prime Minister's Official 
Residence (Kantei). Abe's response to the media deserves attention, 
as well. During his tenure as LDP secretary general, Abe harshly 
criticized television stations as lacking balance. LDP executives' 
refusal to appear on television programs also created a controversy. 
But he remains mum when it comes to the question of visiting 
Yasukuni Shrine. The media, challenged to perform the function of 
checks and balances, seems to be losing ground to Abe. This article 
examines the openness of Abe with a sense of self-reflection. 
 
The LDP's stance toward the media, especially television, hardened 
in September 2003, coinciding with Abe's assumption of office as 
party secretary general. 
 
First, LDP executives refused to appear on TV-Asahi programs on the 
day of the November 2003 Lower House election in protest against the 
station's long report on the main opposition Minshuto's (Democratic 
Party of Japan) cabinet vision earlier. 
 
This led to a letter in the name of Secretary General Shinzo Abe to 
the Broadcast and Human Rights/Other Related Rights Committee (BPC) 
run by the Broadcasting Ethics & Program Improvement Organization 
(BPO) calling for its deliberations. 
 
In the June 2004 Upper House election, the LDP also sent 200 - 300 
letters to media organizations, reading, "There were programs 
strongly suspected of having violated the spirit of political 
fairness and equality," apparently alluding to TBS and TV-Asahi 
programs on the pension programs. 
 
Japan's leading parodist Mad Amano's work posted on Environment 
Green Political Assembly (Midori no kaigi) head Atsuo Nakamura's 
website during the election campaigning was also followed by the 
secretary general's "strong message" that the work be removed from 
 
SIPDIS 
the website. 
 
TOKYO 00005562  002 OF 011 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
 
Abe later became acting secretary-general. In August 2005, the LDP 
effectively refused the Asahi Shimbun's news coverage on LDP 
executives except for press conferences on the grounds that the 
newspaper's data on an NHK program modification case had leaked out. 
During the September 2005 Lower House election campaigning, the LDP 
also sent letters to media organizations urging them not to refer 
the LDP candidates against the postal rebels as "assassins." 
 
"Lawmakers are unnecessarily edgy about the contents of media 
reports, which is not normal. We fear that such a trend will become 
stronger under an administration, " a midlevel commercial-network 
worker noted. 
 
This past July, TBS aired an irrelevant photogram of Abe in its news 
program, This, too, resulted in a stern warning to the broadcaster 
from the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry. 
 
"In the past, a program reporter would have been called in and 
asked, 'What was that? Do you have any ill intent? Be sure that you 
practice more caution from now on.' And that was it," the network 
worker also said. 
 
The story on LDP executive's refusal to appear on TV-Asahi programs 
stunned a worker of another broadcaster, who said: 
 
"It sounded like, 'You could become another TV-Asahi.' It certainly 
served as a threat to other broadcasters, as well. But I don't 
understand why they immediately resort to legal steps or the BRC 
instead of offering rebuttals on the media. The Internal Affairs and 
Communications Ministry, which oversees broadcasting, has also 
changed recently. The ministry often says, 'Turn in a report on a 
program aired on a certain date. We of course ask why, and the 
ministry inadvertently says, 'Because there was an query from a 
certain lawmaker.'" 
 
Meanwhile, Mad Amano, who received the "message" from the LDP, said, 
"It was more blackmail than a message." 
 
The message read: "The LDP has not approved your modifying our copy. 
You have clearly defamed Prime Minister Koizumi and the LDP." 
 
In response, Amano sent a letter to then Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Abe, asking, "I simply intended to correct mistakes in your copy 
from the standpoint of the general public. What is your view on my 
action?" Amano has not received any reply from Abe. 
 
How has Abe responded to media coverage on himself? 
 
In 2004, journalist Shunsuke Yamaoka covered a scandal allegedly 
involving a close relative of Abe. Yamaoka sent inquiries to the Abe 
office. But an Abe office staffer hung up on him, saying: "People 
here don't know anything about it." 
 
Yamaoka took this view: 
 
"I haven't received a reply from Mr. Abe. He is the kind of person 
who only answers questions that are convenient to him and ignores 
the rest. I have heard similar reactions from other journalists, as 
well. As a lawmaker, he has not fulfilled his accountability." 
 
It was reported this spring that Abe had sent a congratulatory 
telegram to a convention of an organization affiliated with the Holy 
 
TOKYO 00005562  003 OF 011 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity 
(Unification Church). 
 
In the wake of the report, Abe released this statement in June: 
 
"I learned from my local office that it had sent a congratulatory 
telegram in my personal capacity using the title chief cabinet 
secretary. The action was misleading, and I told the person in 
 
SIPDIS 
charge to exercise caution." 
 
But he has not replied to an open letter from the liaison council of 
lawyers to prevent the fraudulent sale of goods or services claimed 
to bring supernatural benefit to the purchaser. 
 
Remains elusive about Yasukuni issue 
 
Abe's posture is hardly open regarding political issues, as well. 
For instance, it became clear that he had visited Yasukuni Shrine in 
April this year despite the fact that it was already a political 
issue in Japan. But he repeatedly insisted: "I have no intention of 
saying whether or not I had visited the shrine." 
 
Also asked if he would pay homage at the controversial Tokyo shrine 
once he becomes prime minister, Abe only said: "With the matter 
escalating into a diplomatic and political issue, I have not 
intention of declaring my standpoint." 
 
Former LDP Secretary General Koichi Kato's house in Yamagata was set 
on fire last month. As was Prime Minister Koizumi, it took two weeks 
for Abe to release this comment: "If it was intended to suppress Mr. 
Kato's freedom of speech and cause other effects, the act is 
unforgivable." Abe's summer vacation began on the afternoon of the 
day the arson incident occurred and he did not regard it as an 
"emergency case." 
 
It is also eerie to know that persons critical of Abe have suffered 
from violent attacks, although Abe himself has nothing to do with 
them. Beside Kato, former Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, who had 
lambasted Abe, received threatening calls. Eggs and other objects 
were also thrown at the nameplate at the gatepost of Tanaka's 
house. 
 
Lawyer Yoichi Kitamura, a specialist on media lawsuits, explained: 
 
"In 1964, the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York Times. 
But since then, public figures, like lawmakers, have not been able 
to seek compensation of the media except for a case where the media 
knew that what was reported was false or the media reported a story 
regardless of its credibility." 
 
Sophia University Media Law Prof. Yasuhiko Tajima also sounds an 
alarm. Tajima cited the NHK program alteration incident as an 
example clearly reflecting Abe's posture toward the media. 
 
"Abe may lack the awareness that the media's role is to keep tabs on 
authority" 
 
Tajima noted: 
 
"Even though Abe himself doesn't mean to apply pressure, saying 
something about the contents of a program to NHK executives before 
broadcasting it, that is nothing but outside pressure, objectively 
speaking. Abe is not aware of that. Abe probably lacks the awareness 
 
TOKYO 00005562  004 OF 011 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
that journalism's role is to keep tabs on authority independent of 
it." 
 
The next administration has also expressed eagerness for 
constitutional revision and conspiracy legislation regardless of 
strong opposition. Tajima added: 
 
"The current administration has tried to capitalize on the media. 
The next administration might directly intervene in the media 
finding such incompatible with its wishes." 
 
Tajima also sounded an alarm for the current situation of the 
media: 
 
"Media organizations that have repeatedly been excluded from media 
coverage or experienced lawsuits may end up treating reporters 
coldly. The Asahi Shimbun reporters who had covered the NHK incident 
and the NHK's whistleblowers were all consequently removed from 
their posts. The media have become dispirited to some extent." 
 
(2) Abe aiming to strengthen Japan-US alliance with his new 
interpretation of collective self-defense 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged) 
September 23, 2006 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe will now become Japan's new prime 
minister in an extraordinary session of the Diet that convenes Sept. 
ΒΆ26. In its debate to be kicked off thereafter, the Diet will likely 
focus on his view of the right of collective self-defense. The 
government has so far taken the position that Japan has the right to 
collective self-defense but is not allowed under the Constitution to 
exercise it. In the meantime, Abe, bearing a stronger Japan-US 
alliance in mind, has revealed he is thinking of having the 
government's conventional interpretation altered after taking the 
reins of government. But there is something vague in his standpoint 
and there is also something inconsistent with the government's 
interpretation until now. His view has brought out both welcomes and 
objections in the government. 
 
"I think we should study this matter, including whether there can be 
a new interpretation," Abe said in a press conference on Sept. 5, 
when asked about the right of collective self-defense. With this, 
Abe implied taking a positive stance to pave the way for Japan to 
exercise its right to collective self-defense by reinterpreting the 
Constitution even without amending its provisions. 
 
The Japanese government has consistently taken the position that 
Japan is constitutionally not allowed to exercise its right to 
collective self-defense. However, the United States wants Japan to 
change course. In the United States, former Deputy Secretary of 
State Armitage, who knows Japan well, is one of those who would like 
Japan to do so. In 2000, Armitage wrote a report before the Bush 
administration's inauguration. In it, he argued: "Japan's 
prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on 
alliance cooperation." 
 
Abe probably wanted to answer such expectations. In May last year, 
Abe, who was then the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's acting 
secretary general, visited the United States, where he delivered a 
 
SIPDIS 
speech. "The government's conventional interpretation has now hit 
its limit," Abe remarked in his speech there. He added, "One of our 
generation's responsibilities is to alter the government's 
 
TOKYO 00005562  005 OF 011 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
interpretation and make it possible to exercise that right." 
 
Abe has also hinted at his intention of setting up a study group to 
reinterpret the Constitution when his administration is launched. 
Prime Minister Koizumi strengthened the Japan-US alliance by taking 
forward-looking postures, so it would seem that Abe, too, would like 
to further solidify the alliance when he comes into office. 
 
(3) Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Economic policy could be new 
administration's Achilles' heel 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
September 23, 2006 
 
House of Representatives member Sanae Takaichi of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) dined with Shinzo Abe in late June. 
 
Takaichi and Abe are allies in such areas as diplomacy and 
education. 
 
Around that time, an Abe landslide was almost certain. But Takaichi 
had something on her mind. 
 
It was economic policy. Abe is well versed in foreign 
affairs/national security, social security, and education, and he 
has many advisors. He also has a solid vision for the state. When it 
came to economic policy, though, she had hardly heard about his 
views. 
 
Abe has come up with a way of ensuring that the unemployed and those 
whose businesses have failed can get a second chance in society. To 
do this, it will be necessary to secure new financial resources and 
eventually undertake fiscal reconstruction, an essential challenge 
for the Abe government to tackle. 
 
Takaichi told Abe: "A single misstep could result in nothing more 
than doling out welfare subsidies." In response, Abe replied: "I 
know, I know. But ..." 
 
Takaichi thought at that time that she was somewhat worried that if 
Abe only adopted policies to win public favor, the size of the 
government could swell. 
 
Abe cites "innovation" as the key to Japan's economic growth. The 
father-in-law of his elder brother, Hironobu, is Jiro Ushio, 
chairman of Ushio Inc. Ushio repeatedly used this word during 
meetings of the Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy. 
 
The economic panel served as the engine of the Koizumi 
administration's structural reforms. After assuming the post of 
chief cabinet secretary, Abe attended about 30 sessions of the 
panel. 
 
Looking at the minutes, Abe spoke only 16 times, far less than the 
roughly 240 statements by State Minister in Charge of Economic and 
Fiscal Policy Kaoru Yosano and the 180 by Minister of Internal 
Affairs and Communications Heizo Takenaka. 
 
According to an informed source, "In most cases, he read in a flat 
tone from papers prepared by administrative officials." 
 
In the first half of this year, Yosano and Takenaka locked horns 
over fiscal reconstruction. At that time, Abe reportedly just 
 
TOKYO 00005562  006 OF 011 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
listened. 
 
Abe had never assumed a portfolio until he became chief cabinet 
secretary. In addition, he has been elected to the House of 
 
SIPDIS 
Representatives only five times. Given this, he has few contacts in 
government agencies, particularly in economic offices. 
 
Takenaka supported the Koizumi administration's economic policy, but 
he will leave Nagata-cho when the Abe administration is launched. 
There are no key advisors to support Abe's economic policy. 
 
It is generally believed that economic policy is Abe's Achilles' 
heel. Abe is eager to address foreign affairs and national security, 
but he seems to be less interested in economic matters. 
 
If Abe gives priority to principles or philosophy in working out 
policies while setting aside discussions on areas that are linked 
directly to the people's livelihood, his administration might become 
dominated by ideology. 
 
LDP Lower House member Katsuei Hirasaka, who tutored Abe when he was 
an elementary school student, said: "He should fully study economic 
affairs and appoint persons with a sense of balance as his 
advisors." 
 
(4) Kantei-led policy councils increased to 71, seven of which have 
never met; Realignment as challenge for new administration 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
September 26, 2006 
 
Jun Tabuse 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe has proposed establishing a Japanese 
version of the National Security Council (NSC) as part of his 
efforts to enhance the functions of the Prime Minister's Official 
Residence (Kantei). Prime Minister Koizumi also proposed 
strengthening the Kantei's functions. During his tenure as premier, 
the number of Kantei-led policy councils, which are viewed as the 
symbol of the enhanced functions, increased to 71, the largest ever 
among past administrations. On the other hand, there are evils, too, 
one of which is that seven of the councils have never met even once. 
Realigning the councils is likely to be added to the agenda for the 
new administration. 
 
Of those Kantei-led policy councils, 40 were established by the 
Koizumi administration in order to deal with emergencies, for 
example, the Ministerial Council on the Asbestos Issue and the 
Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters. 
 
The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) came into being in 
January 2001 when the Mori administration was in office, but 
economic management led by the Kantei never occurred before the 
Koizumi administration came into office. The CEFP met 187 times and 
shifted the budget compilation initiative from the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) to the Kantei. It also demonstrated its ability to 
break the vested rights and interests held by ministries and 
agencies, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Policy Research 
Council associated with them, and lawmakers working for special 
interests (zokugiin). 
 
In the areas in which the prime minister has a strong interest, a 
number of policy councils were established. One example is the 
 
TOKYO 00005562  007 OF 011 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09//06 
 
Council on Promotion of Food Education, which was established in 
response to the prime minister's policy speech in January in which 
he said, "a healthy diet is essential." In the area of tourism, the 
prime minister appeared on a video promoting tourism and established 
the Japan Tourism Advisory Council. 
 
On the other hand, seven councils have never met even once during 
the five and a half years of the Koizumi administration, such as the 
Ministerial Council on Public Pension System and the Office of 
Market Access.  The last time the Ministerial Council on Minamata 
Disease met was in 2000. This council has been retained, for "the 
government needs to make it clear it attaches importance to Minamata 
disease," a Secretariat staff member said. There are as many as 33 
councils that have met less than three times over the last five 
years. 
 
A senior official at the Cabinet Secretariat commented: "Aside from 
councils associated with top priority issues for the administration, 
some councils were established in a way that overlaps with those 
ministries or agencies handling the same services. This only leads 
to terrible inefficiency." 
 
In September 2004, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Sonoda 
said, "Rationalization is necessary; otherwise, the Kantei's 
functions will be dispersed instead of enhancement." There were 84 
councils in existence at the time, but by the end of that fiscal 
year, 17 councils that were moribund were removed. 
 
Abe is now trying to enhance the Kantei's functions by establishing 
a Japanese version of NSC to come under the prime minister's direct 
control. 
 
Speaking of the way the prime minister exercises his leadership, 
Keio University Professor of Political Science Yasunori Sone said: 
"The key is how best to use bureaucrats, politicians, and experts." 
He cited Britain, which has the same parliamentary cabinet system 
and where the existing organizations, such as the Foreign Ministry 
and the National Defense Ministry, concurrently hold posts under the 
prime minister's direct control to share information. Sone noted, 
"That could serve as a good reference." 
 
Councils and headquarters that have often met under the Koizumi 
administration 
 
Times of meetings 
First meeting 
 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 
187 
January 2001 
 
Senior Vice-Ministers' Meeting 
160 
January 2001 
 
Ministerial Council on Monthly Economic Report and Other  Relative 
Issues 
65 
April 1954 
 
Council for Science and Technology Policy 
54 
January 2001 
 
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Security Council 
53 
August 1985 
 
IT Strategic Headquarters 
35 
January 2001 
 
Headquarters for Administrative Reform 
19 
March 2001 
 
Councils and headquarters that have not met under the Koizumi 
administration 
 
Conference for Issue of US Military Bases in Okinawa 
0 
November 1995 
 
Ministerial Council on Public Pension System 
0 
February 1994 
 
Office of Market Access 
0 
February 1994 
 
Headquarters for the Promotion of the United Nations Decade for 
Human Rights Education 
0 
March 1996 
 
Office of Government Procurement Review 
0 
December 1995 
 
Headquarters for Prevention of Inhumane and Violent Acts including 
Hijacking 
0 
October 1977 
 
Ministerial Council on Minamata Disease 
0 
March 1977 
 
(5) Weapons-carrying ships via Japan: Cargoes untouchable under 
Japanese law 
 
MAINICHI (Page 30) (Full) 
September 13, 2006 
 
In western Japan, there is a port with a wire-netted berth for 
foreign ocean liners with 24-hour monitoring security cameras. This 
summer, a group of more than 10 officials from the Japan Coast Guard 
(JCG) got into a rusty foreign cargo ship berthed there. Their 
on-the-spot inspection of cargoes was carried out in the intervals 
of loading, and the inspection lasted for several hours. 
 
Foreign cargo ships loaded with weapons, such as antitank guns and 
shells, have been making frequent port calls in Japan. One of them 
was loaded with tons of material that can be diverted to make 
chemical weapons like poison gas. Another ship was loaded with 
 
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cargoes suspected of being missile-related components. 
 
According to public security sources, such cargoes are loaded in 
Chinese or North Korean ports to be shipped to the Middle East or 
South Asia. Among the exporters of those cargoes are Chinese 
companies banned by the US government in its sanctions. However, 
foreign ships carrying such cargoes do not unload them in Japanese 
ports. Their cargoes are therefore handled as transit cargoes. These 
cargoes, though confirmed in inspections, cannot be unearthed. 
Japanese authorities only report it to their next port of call and 
other countries. 
 
"Once their cargoes are unloaded, we can take legal action on 
suspicion of, for example, violating the Swords and Firearms Control 
Law," says a senior official of the National Police Agency. "But," 
this official adds, "even if they have cargoes that violate the 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, which prohibits 
weaponry- and WMD-related shipments, they're untouchable under the 
Japanese law as long as they're on board and not unloaded." 
 
The cargo ship, which was inspected in the western Japanese port, 
was on its way to the Middle East with cargoes on board from China. 
The Japanese authorities, though informed of weapons on board the 
ship before its entry into port, could not check it out. 
 
In January this year, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department and 
the customs discovered smuggled weapons in a foreign vessel that 
entered port in Yokohama. Those weapons included 23 pistols, 2 
machineguns, about 800 live cartridges, 2 grenades, and 6 hydraulic 
explosives that are as powerful as dynamite. In this case, police 
arrested a member of an organized crime group under the wing of 
Inagawakai, one of Japan's major gangland syndicates, on suspicion 
of violating the Swords and Firearms Control Law. The police raided 
that arrested gangster's linked place, where they seized an M-15 
submachine gun of the US military and an AK-74 submachine gun of the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
Those weapons were carried on the foreign freighter that arrived at 
the off-limits international berth. The gangster and his company 
entered the berth's restricted area with a pass they had obtained 
from the Yokohama Customs for "peddling" purposes, and they received 
those weapons and munitions from crewmen. 
 
This case exemplified Japan's failure to prevent arms from landing 
in Japan even from ships at international berths under tight 
security. 
 
"They transfer cargoes to another ship at sea and bring them into 
Japan," says Katsuhisa Furukawa, chief researcher at the Research 
Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX), who once 
worked for a US research institution studying terrorism. "Terrorists 
disguising themselves as seafarers could also bring weapons into 
Japan," Furukawa says. "If they try, they can even use weapons on 
board their ship," he added. 
 
Last year, a total of 108,179 foreign vessels entered port in Japan. 
The JCG patrols Japan's territorial waters and conducts rescue 
services on call. At the same time, the JCG also inspects incoming 
foreign ships on a routine basis in order to block their crewmen's 
smuggling of firearms and drugs into Japan and prevent the 
proliferation of WMD-related materials. Last year, the JCG inspected 
a total of 11,832 foreign vessels, including its check of transit 
cargoes in the western Japanese port. 
 
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However, the JCG needs to ask for foreign vessels' voluntary 
cooperation on its investigations, according to a JCG Guard and 
Rescue Department official. "We cannot answer anything about our 
investigations," the official commented. Facts about weapons passing 
through Japanese ports remain veiled. 
 
(6) Editorial: An incomprehensible proposal on amakudari 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
September 25, 2006 
 
The practice of amakudari or national government employees retiring 
to cushy positions in companies they previously used to regulate is 
one issue the new Abe cabinet will take over from the Koizumi 
cabinet. State Minister in charge of Administrative Reform Koki 
Chuma recently released a set of proposals for redressing the 
central government employees' personnel system centering on imposing 
penalties on illegal influence peddling, while liberalizing in 
principle the practice of amakudari. Sources involved in the 
drafting process call the set of proposals the Chuma plan. Chuma has 
called for the next administration to start working in specific 
terms, such as revising the personnel system for national government 
employees. 
 
The National Civil Service Law bans national government employees 
from landing jobs with profit-making companies for two years after 
retirement, if those companies are linked with the ministries or 
agencies they worked for five years until retirement. The revision 
plan called for the scrapping of this regulation, based on the just 
cause of lowering the fence between the government and the private 
sector. However, it is premature to liberalize amakudari practices, 
because an ex-ante-regulation-type administrative mechanism 
administered by central government agencies is still in place. 
 
The revisions prohibit retired national government employees from 
engaging in the following actions: (1) working to persuade companies 
that have close relations with their pre-retirement duties at their 
respective ministry or agency to employ them, (2) illegally working 
on those organizations to which they were assigned before retirement 
for a certain set period after taking up their new jobs. Just 
looking at these proposals reveals that the revision proposals have 
many loopholes. Usually it is not retired officials but personnel 
officials of each government agency that find companies that accept 
retired government employees. Ties between government offices and 
companies that have accepted retired government officials will 
strengthen if retired government officials go on to work at 
companies they previously used to regulate. It is possible for 
government officials who have landed jobs with private companies to 
work on government offices for which they used to work before 
retirement not directly but through subordinates. 
 
A proposal for strengthening a monitoring system to ensure the 
efficacy of the new reemployment rule, another aim of the revision 
plan, is also questionable. The plan proposes reorganizing the 
National Public Service Ethics Examination Committee into a 
monitoring organ, as well as to designate an inspector in an 
outsider's position for each government agency. No retired 
government officials would ever openly make an illegal proposition 
to bureaucrats within government offices. No bureaucrats would ever 
respond to such a proposition. If the government intends to 
seriously monitor wrongdoings, a considerable number of personnel 
and authorization for investigation would be needed. The revision 
 
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plan is far short of specifics to meet such needs. 
 
The revision plan also incorporates a dual-type personnel system of 
establishing expert posts so that bureaucrats can work until 
mandatory retiring age. It is better to speed up efforts to revise 
the personnel system this way. Revising the reemployment rule will 
only allow rampant amakudari practices. It is necessary to return 
this revision plan to the drawing board and await reconsideration by 
the next administration. Measures to encourage amakudari will never 
be able to obtain understanding from the taxpayers. 
 
SCHIEFFER