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Viewing cable 06SEOUL3158, ICG ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES: CAT AND MOUSE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL3158 2006-09-13 09:25 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO1543
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHUL #3158/01 2560925
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130925Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0249
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1226
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7504
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1306
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1349
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1827
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 003158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KN KS PREF
SUBJECT: ICG ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES: CAT AND MOUSE 
EXISTENCE 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
SIPDIS 
PROG 09/13/2006 
A/DCM:JYUN 
POL:BMCFEETERS 
POL 
 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 
COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR 
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI 
COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR 
COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016 
TAGS: KN KS PREF
SUBJECT: ICG ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES: CAT AND MOUSE EXISTENCE 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (U) International Crisis Group's (ICG) Northeast Asia 
Project Director Peter Beck said that North Korean refugees, 
predominantly in China but increasingly going to Southeast 
Asia, need from USD 1,000 to 10,000 to get out of North Korea 
and live a very precarious "cat and mouse" existence after 
they do, fearing that they will be caught and sent back to 
North Korea.  Beck said his group's research, starting in 
early 2006, did not point to a strong desire among refugees 
to go the United States, but that information about the North 
Korea Human Rights Act was still being disseminated.  ICG's 
"North Korea Refugees" report should be published by 
mid-October.  End Summary. 
 
NO RELIABLE NUMBERS 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) ICG's Peter Beck led off his presentation to about 100 
mostly expatriates at a Royal Asiatic Sociey gathering on 
September 12 by saying that even after nine months of 
intensive research, ICG had no firm handle on the number of 
North Korean refugees.  Beck said his sense was that about 
half of the refugees were unintended:  they had gone to China 
to visit family, find food, or work temporarily.  But they 
had then grown fearful about going back to the DPRK and 
perhaps being apprehended -- which Beck said could lead to no 
punishment, years of imprisonment in a detention facility 
such as Yodok, or even execution. 
 
3. (U) The other half of the refugees left the DPRK intending 
to go to the ROK or a third country.  While ICG did not know 
how many refugees there were, it was clearer how much they 
paid:  between USD 1,000 and 10,000 to escape.  The average, 
about USD 2,000, was an "unimaginable sum" for most North 
Koreans, few of whom could pay to evade internal travel 
restrictions within North Korea.  Of those who had the needed 
funds, most crossed to China, where border guards on both 
sides were notorious for accepting bribes.  One refugee, who 
wanted to return to North Korea temporarily to see family, 
brought two cases of whisky and handed out bottles at each 
checkpoint on the way in and back out.  The border with 
Russia was easy to cross but refugees found Russia 
inhospitable so they avoided it.  Increasing numbers of 
refugees were finding their way to Southeast Asia, especially 
Thailand.  Recent arrests there would spook some refugees, 
but amounted to local officials responding to complaints 
rather than a shift in Thailand's policy. 
 
4. (U) Beck described, leaving out any details, what he 
called a sophisticated underground railroad leading from 
China to South Korea or elsewhere.  Brokers who run the 
system range from sincere missionaries to businessmen making 
money to human traffickers. 
 
5. (U) Beck estimated that about 70 percent of the refugees 
were women, for reasons not fully understood.  All refugees 
lived a "cat and mouse" existence, seeking to avoid border 
guards, police, or even other people who could betray them 
with one phone call.  But women faced the additional hazard 
of possibly being trafficked into prostitution or sold as 
 
SEOUL 00003158  002 OF 002 
 
 
"picture brides." The flipside was that some women 
intentionally relied on prostitution to support themselves. 
Many had also married Chinese men, which Beck claimed would 
lead to complicated issues for the ROK, since these refugees 
would want to bring their husbands and sometimes children to 
South Korea with them. 
6. (U) While noting that the ICG report covers the refugees' 
situation outside of the ROK, Beck said that there were 
reasons to believe that more and more refugees would start 
trying to come to South Korea, perhaps overwhelming the 
system that he said is now at capacity with about 2,000 
refugees expected to be accepted this year.  The report will 
argue that the biggest factor drawing refugees to South Korea 
is that other family members have done so.  That implies that 
each contingent of refugees reaching South Korea will have a 
gravitational pull attracting even more members of extended 
families.  Some communication back to North Korea was 
possible either through brokers, or through Chinese 
cellphones used near the Northern border. 
 
7. (U) Asked whether China feared a vast increase in the 
number of refugees coming from North Korea, Beck said no, 
because the DPRK population centers are in the south, and 
relatively few North Koreans have the means to go north. 
Asked why the DPRK does not control the borders to prevent 
flight, Beck said that the DPRK lacked the resources to 
effectively control the border with China.  He recounted 
crossing the Yalu river by boat with a guide to talk to North 
Korean border guards, who suggested that if he threw a bit of 
money onto the shore, he could wander into North Korea and 
talk to people; Beck refused on security grounds. 
 
8. (U) Asked about the impact of the North Korea Human Rights 
Act, Beck said that his group's research starting in early 
2006 did not find refugees mentioning the Act, and that few 
mentioned wanting to go to the United States.  He suggested 
that information about the Act was still being disseminated 
into refugee networks. 
STANTON