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Viewing cable 06PRETORIA3888, EUFOR COMMANDER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DRC ELECTORAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PRETORIA3888 2006-09-18 16:02 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO6262
RR RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #3888/01 2611602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181602Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5744
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1904
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0447
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1842
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0416
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1031
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0933
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0277
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL CG SF
SUBJECT: EUFOR COMMANDER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DRC ELECTORAL 
PROCESS 
 
REF: A. KINSHASA 998 
     B. LIBREVILLE 489 
 
1. SUMMARY. European Union Force Commander in the DRC General 
Viereck told a Pretoria think tank audience that he was 
"optimistic" that the second round of the DRC elections would 
proceed smoothly.  Viereck emphasized that EUFOR's mandate is 
limited to supporting MONUC, and the mission will end on 
November 30.  The fighting between Bemba's and Kabila's 
forces August 20-22 has, paradoxically, created a more stable 
environment since the two sides are now communicating more 
openly.  However, Viereck expressed concern about the recent 
flow of weapons into Kinshasa and urged greater transparency 
in the movement of arms.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  Operations Commander for the European Force in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR R.D.Congo) General 
Karl-Heinz Viereck briefed approximately 50 South African 
officials, think tank analysts and diplomats at the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria August 13.  Viereck, a 
German national, also met with South African Great Lakes 
Envoy Kingsley Mamabolo, senior SANDF military officials, and 
the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 
which is providing ballots for the second round of the 
elections. 
 
3. Viereck provided a general overview of the EUFOR 
structure, which includes a strategic headquarters in 
Potsdam, a force headquarters in Kinshasa, 2000 troops from 
22 EU countries (800 troops in Kinshasa and 1200 in Gabon), 
and a strategic reserve in Europe.  In Viereck's view, the 
integrated EU operation has worked very well, despite the 
very short time to stand up the mission.  The EU mission to 
the DRC signaled European support for Africa and its peace 
and security agenda. 
 
--------------- 
Limited Mandate 
--------------- 
 
4. Viereck stressed that EUFOR's mandate in the DRC is 
limited to supporting MONUC.  Specifically, EUFOR will aid 
the electoral process, help secure the elections, rescue and 
recover people in distress, secure the airport, and share 
intelligence with MONUC.  The mandate is not, he emphasized, 
to rescue Europeans from the DRC if trouble breaks out.  The 
duration of the mission is limited to four months; it began 
July 29 and will conclude on November 30. 
 
5. Asked why EUFOR planned to end its mission at such a 
sensitive moment -- just as the second round of elections 
will likely be announced -- Viereck said he expected the 
announcement of results in early November, well before 
EUFOR's departure date.  He also noted that MONUC will remain 
after November 30, and that the EU would continue with its 
police cooperation and security sector reform programs. 
 
------------------------- 
Incidents of August 20-22 
------------------------- 
 
6. The incidents of August 20-22, when the presidential guard 
clashed with MDC leader Bemba's militia, served as a "wake-up 
call," Viereck said.  EUFOR expected violence, but was caught 
off guard by the timing and particular location in the city. 
Asked what triggered the violence, Viereck only said that 
"someone" felt the need to show force on the streets and the 
other side felt the need to respond.  From a military point 
of view, the events were a "contained, localized" dispute, 
and the response, led by local police with MONUC and EUFOR in 
support, went exactly as planned.  Viereck said that EUFOR's 
visible neutrality during the tensions has improved its image 
with the population in Kinshasa. 
 
7. Viereck said that the current military confidence-building 
measures between Kabila's and Bemba's forces, supported by 
MONUC and EUFOR, are working "very well."  EUFOR and MONUC 
now have much closer communication with Bemba's forces in 
particular.  Asked about how much control Bemba has over his 
 
PRETORIA 00003888  002 OF 002 
 
 
forces, Viereck admitted that he could not say for certain. 
He also noted that the key to stability is visible political 
cooperation between the two presidential candidates, not 
merely military coordination. 
 
---------- 
Arms Flows 
---------- 
 
8. Viereck also expressed concern about recent flows of 
weapons into Kinshasa, particularly the T-55 tanks.  Even 
though the government technically ordered the tanks some time 
ago, Viereck said that the timing of their delivery and lack 
of transparency has increased tensions and fed rumors.  He 
noted that tanks are not a real military factor in Kinshasa, 
but rather are a "show of force." 
 
---------- 
Optimistic 
---------- 
 
9. Concluding his remarks, Viereck said he was "optimistic" 
that the second round of elections would go smoothly.  The 
incidents of August 20-22 forced MONUC and EUFOR to work more 
closely with the parties, particularly Bemba's militia.  He 
believes the confidence-building measures are working. 
However, international pressure on the two presidential 
candidates -- such as the recent visits of President Mbeki 
and EU High Representative Solana -- remains critically 
important in the period leading up to the elections. 
Bost