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Viewing cable 06NAHA209, GOVERNOR'S RACE: REFORMISTS UNITE BEHIND ANTI-BASE CANDIDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAHA209 2006-09-22 11:02 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Naha
VZCZCXRO7040
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0209/01 2651102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221102Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0599
INFO RHMFIUU/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFIUU/5AF YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFIUU/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBANB/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFIUU/COMMARFORPAC
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0185
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 0130
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0257
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0221
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0005
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0598
RHMFISS/USARPAC COMMAND CENTER FT SHAFTER HI
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0648
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: JA PREL MARR
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR'S RACE: REFORMISTS UNITE BEHIND ANTI-BASE CANDIDATE 
ITOKAZU IN 11TH HOUR 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: After months of polarizing debate and a brief 
split, Okinawa's six reformist parties agreed to back a single 
candidate for the Okinawa prefectural governor's race, upper 
house national Diet member Keiko ITOKAZU.  If all six parties 
remain united, Itokazu's chances for election are good as she is 
telegenic and popular in Okinawa.  However, her ideological and 
extreme anti-base stance, lack of administrative experience in 
either the public or private sector, and perceived lack of ties 
to Tokyo could weaken her in the eyes of conservative and 
moderate voters, making this a close race for governor. 
Itokazu's views on the US-Japan security alliance and bases in 
Okinawa have been clear over the years - she has said many times 
she believes all bases should be closed and the Security Treaty 
should be reviewed. Her election would not be conducive to 
smooth implementation of base realignment plans in Okinawa. End 
Summary. 
 
The Path to the Itokazu Candidacy~ 
 
2. (SBU)  After four months of polarizing debate and a brief 
split, Okinawa's six reformist parties finally agreed on a 
single candidate to run in the prefectural governor's race, 
national Upper House Diet member Keiko ITOKAZU.  The reformist 
parties first met in April 2006 and many suggested Itokazu as 
the best candidate.  Her Okinawan Socialist Masses Party (OSMP) 
repeatedly refused to let her run because as OSMP's only 
nationally elected member, she was also its primary income 
source. 
 
3. (SBU) With Itokazu apparently out of the race, the candidate 
field narrowed from seven to two candidates, independent 
national Diet member Mikio SHIMOJI and former Okinawa 
prefectural government (OPG) Treasurer Tokushin YAMAUCHI. 
National upper house Diet member and Chairman of the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) in Okinawa Shokichi KINA told us that the 
reformist camp split into two, with Sozo, DPJ, and OSMP 
supporting Shimoji and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), and Jiyu Rengo supporting 
Yamauchi.  Deliberations continued with deadlines for a 
resolution being repeatedly set and broken.  Each failure to 
agree lead to renewed calls for Itokazu to run. 
 
4. (SBU) In late August, as the coalition was on the brink of 
dissolution, OSMP relented on the possibility of Itokazu 
running, on the condition all parties unite behind her.  OSMP 
chairman Masaharu KINA told us in May 2006 that the party 
believed the reformist camp lost the 2000 gubernatorial and 2006 
Nago mayoral races because it failed to unite behind one 
candidate, and that OSMP would be willing to compromise to 
assure unity.  The dissolution of the six party coalition on 
September 1 seemed to shake many within the reformist camp. 
Kina said after the dissolution OSMP contacted the different 
parties and asked them whom they could all unite behind.  All 
responded with Itokazu's name.  On September 13, OSMP reversed 
its stance and agreed to put Itokazu as a candidate, which she 
publicly accepted the next day.   Shimoji's Sozo party announced 
it would support Itokazu's candidacy (and drop Shimoji's) if all 
other parties united behind her.  The Democratic Party of Japan 
 
NAHA 00000209  002 OF 004 
 
 
(DPJ) followed suit. 
 
5. (SBU) Soon after, OSMP entered negotiations with the SDP and 
on September 16 SDP dropped its support for Yamauchi and 
announced it would back Itokazu.  The Japanese Communist Party 
(JCP), now the only backer of Yamauchi, announced on September 
17 that it did not want to run an independent candidate.  With 
momentum clearly behind Itokazu, Shimoji withdrew his candidacy 
on September 16, and Yamauchi renounced his bid on September 18. 
 
~ Weakens the Reformist Camp 
 
6. (SBU) Although all six parties support Itokazu, our contacts 
told us that many were disaffected by how she was selected.  Kin 
Town Mayor Tsuyoshi GIBU told us that the reformists' public 
image was damaged after months of deliberation failed to produce 
a unified candidate.  Further, while party heads switched to 
Itokazu at the last minute, many supporters did not. Komeito 
Chairman Tomonori ITOSU told us on September 22 that many labor 
union members still favor Yamauchi and DPJ's Kina said its 
supporters favor Shimoji. 
 
7. (SBU) The discussions also left many hurt feelings.  The 
DPJ's Kina said that he and Shimoji had received several 
critical e-mails from the far left accusing them of deliberately 
bogging down the talks.  One e-mail even went as far as to 
suggest they were CIA spies.  Further, Kina said that JCP's 
stubbornness in the talks had made him dislike the party even 
more, calling JCP "dishonest."  When asked how the DPJ planned 
to work with the JCP to come up with a unified platform, Kina 
responded that the DPJ would work with other reformist parties 
who would in turn work with JCP. 
 
8. (SBU) Some reformist worry that Itokazu lacks the credentials 
to be governor.  Ryukyu University Professor and reformist 
leader Masaaki GABE told us in April 2006 that he thought 
Itokazu was a poor candidate because she was strong on only one 
issue, anti-militarism.  He added she does not have the 
administrative experience necessary to run the OPG.  DPJ's Kina 
told us that even OSMP Chairman Masaharu Kina, whose name was 
also raised a possible candidate, was unhappy with Itokazu's 
selection because he feels she is not qualified to be governor. 
 
LDP: Itokazu Bid Worst Case Scenario 
9. (SBU) The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidate for 
governor, former Okinawa Electric Power Company Chairman 
Hirokazu NAKAIMA, and other LDP officials told us on numerous 
occasions the worst-case scenario would be for the reformist 
parties to unite behind Itokazu.  September 20 LDP Okinawa's 
Executive Director Hiroshi NAKAMATSU told us that the LDP's best 
hope is that the reformists would fail to agree on a platform. 
Nakamatsu thought that since the JCP and SDP had submitted to 
the more moderate reformists' demands for Itokazu as the 
candidate, they would insist on a hard-line platform.  However, 
the DPJ and Sozo, both of which recognize the US-Japan Security 
Treaty and support some presence of US bases in Okinawa, would 
refuse to back a platform calling to abrogate US-Japan security 
relations, in Nakamatsu's view. 
 
NAHA 00000209  003 OF 004 
 
 
10. (SBU) Nakamatsu's hopes could be realized - we hear that JCP 
and SDP are objecting to Sozo's participation in platform 
discussions.  DPJ's Kina told us that JCP felt Sozo was too 
conservative to participate in discussions and blamed the party 
for the reformists' delay in candidate selection.  Kina noted 
that Shimoji, himself, did not want to participate because of he 
felt the six party talks were too time consuming.  However, Kina 
said he planned to fight to have Sozo included because Shimoji 
was the only person who could talk to the US and formulate a 
platform with US-Japanese relations in mind. Kina noted that he 
was successful in getting Sozo included in the candidate 
selection process despite opposition from JCP, hinting he could 
get Sozo included in the platform selection process too. 
 
Comment: 
 
11. (SBU) Though the six parties have finally united behind 
Itokazu, her chances of winning in November are not certain. 
Many in the LDP have told us that an Itokazu bid was their 
worst-case scenario given her extreme popularly and high public 
reputation.  But months of rancorous debate have left hurt 
feelings in the reformist camp, and our contacts tell us that 
many are not 100 percent behind her.  Also, the reformists' 
public image was damaged by the failure to select a candidate 
for over four months and some question if the coalition can hold 
together after she's elected.  Had the reformist settled on 
Itokazu in April 2006, they might have had more time to recover 
from any friction, but with little less than two months before 
the election, time is not on their side.  In any event the 
November 19 election looks to be very close. 
 
12. (SBU) Itokazu has told the press that the "U.S. base 
problem" will be the focus of her campaign, and she is already 
on record as opposing the realignment plans agreed by the two 
governments at the Security Consultation Committee October 2005 
and May 2006.  Instead, she says the bases should be closed.  In 
our own public statements, while avoiding taking a position on 
who should be elected governor in Okinawa, we intend to point 
out that the Okinawan people should be clear on their choices 
with respect to the future of our bases here.  That is, the 
choice is between a very good plan to significantly reduce the 
burden in Okinawa (by relocating MCAS Futenma, moving 8,000 
Marines plus families to Guam, and consolidating facilities 
south of Kadena Air Base), or maintaining the status quo. 
Itokazu's idea of simply closing all bases is not one of the 
options on the table, as both governments have agreed on the 
need to maintain and enhance our alliance deterrence 
capabilities. 
 
Biography of Keiko Itokazu 
 
13. (SBU) Keiko Itokazu was born in October 11, 1947 in Yomitan 
village and graduated from Yomitan High school. From 1966 to 
1992 she worked as a bus tour guide.  Initially, the tour guide 
script provided tourists with tales of the heroic deeds of 
Japanese soldiers at WWII battle sites in Okinawa.  However, 
after Itokazu learned of her own mother's horrific war 
experiences from her aunts, including the loss of a newborn 
 
NAHA 00000209  004 OF 004 
 
 
daughter on the battlefield and a three year old son to 
malnutrition and malaria, Itokazu began a campaign to change the 
tour script to include stories of Okinawan civilians ground 
between two military forces, of Korean forced laborers, and of 
"comfort women."  She and colleagues also organized a study 
group on Okinawans' experiences and the Japanese military's 
behavior during the war. 
 
14. (SBU) In 1992, Itokazu was elected to the Okinawa 
Prefectural Assembly(OPA).  Following the 1995 rape of a 12-year 
old Okinawan girl by three US service members, Itokazu joined 
the newly formed Okinawan Women Act against Military Violence 
peace activist group.  In 1996, as the group's co-chair, she 
visited the United States to meet with US Congresswomen and 
women's rights and human rights activist groups.  The group 
characterized sexual violence committed by US service members as 
"not merely ~ crimes committed by individual soldiers, but as 
crimes produced by the military system." 
 
15. (SBU) In 2000, Itokazu was a signing member of the joint 
statement from the East Asia-US Women's Network Against 
Militarism which called for, among other things: halting plans 
for new or replacement bases in Okinawa and the ultimate removal 
of all military from the island; revising the Status of Forces 
Agreement; opposing US-Japan Defense Guidelines requiring Japan 
to provide facilities and personnel to support US military 
activities in East Asia; and eliminating Japan's "sympathy 
budget" supporting the US military in Japan. 
 
16. (SBU) Itokazu remained with OPA until 2004 when she won 
election to the upper house of the national Diet in a decisive 
victory over her conservative challenger, Masatoshi ONAGA. 
Itokazu won 58 percent of the votes cast, making her Okinawa's 
number four vote-getter since reversion in 1972, according to 
press reports and statistics provided by Governor Keiichi 
Inamine.  In 2005, Itokazu made her second visit to the United 
States to lobby for the immediate closure of Marine Corps Air 
Station (MCAS) Futenma, saying that would be "the first step of 
a visible reduction of the burden shouldered by Okinawa."  She 
also asked for cancellation of the plan to relocate MCAS Futenma 
to Camp Schwab.  In an April 2005 press statement Itokazu said, 
"we must never allow them to change our beautiful ocean into a 
military base." 
 
17. (SBU) Itokazu's husband works as her political secretary. 
Her hobbies include Haiku (Japanese poetry.)  Her favorite 
saying is ichigoichie, a phrase connected with Japanese tea 
ceremony and other traditional arts that roughly translates as 
"Treasure every meeting for it will never reoccur."  Itokazu 
speaks very little English but appears to be able to understand 
some. 
MAHER