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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2116, NICARAGUA ELECTIONS UPDATE: WHERE WE ARE NOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2116 2006-09-26 18:49 2011-06-01 08:00 SECRET Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0048
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2116/01 2691849
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261849Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7679
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T MANAGUA 002116 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA ELECTIONS UPDATE: WHERE WE ARE NOW 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 2065 
     B. MANAGUA 2044 
     C. MANAGUA 1960 
     D. MANAGUA 1795 
     E. MANAGUA 1388 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Sandinista Front (FSLN) candidate Daniel 
Ortega remains stagnant in the polls, though within striking 
distance of victory (using fraudulent means), while the 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) under Eduardo Montealegre 
and the Sandinista Renovation Movement's (MRS) Edmundo 
Jarquin continue a slow climb, leaving the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) in fourth place.  The USG's 
support for Nicaraguan democracy has enabled the reformist 
parties to compete with entrenched and corrupt traditional 
political forces.  Post has promoted, and will continue to 
promote, democratic continuity in Nicaragua by motivating 
citizens to vote, ensuring suffrage for eligible voters, 
informing the public, ensuring fairness, and encouraging 
support for democratic parties, and highlighting the value of 
Nicaragua's relationship with the U.S.  For a more detailed 
description of Nicaraguan political history, the candidates, 
post strategies, and USG assistance, please see reftels.  End 
Summary. 
 
Ortega Within Striking Distance of Victory 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) Although approximately two-thirds of Nicaraguans 
reject FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega, he could still win the 
November 5 election as a candidate can claim victory with 
only 35 percent of the valid votes, with a margin of 5 
percent or greater over the next closest competitor. 
Contacts indicate that the FSLN has the ability to "steal" 
several percentage points using their control of the CSE and 
other fraudulent means.  Although Ortega has yet to show over 
35% in national polls, the ongoing Liberal division has 
prevented Montealegre from reaching that magic number. 
 
3. (C) Recent polls suggest the following range of support 
for the candidates: Ortega 27%-31%; Montealegre: 21%-28%; PLC 
candidate Jose Rizo and MRS candidate Edmundo Jarquin: 
12%-17%; AC candidate Eden Pastora: 1%-2%.  The latest 
survey, and internal MRS poll (please protect) by Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner, reveals the following breakdown among 746 
likely voters: Ortega: 32%; Montealegre: 27%; Jarquin: 20%; 
Rizo: 18%. 
 
USG Strategies to Promote Democratic Continuity and Fair 
Elections 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - 
 
4. (C) Although Nicaraguans traditionally enjoy a high 
participation rate in national elections, anecdotal evidence 
suggests some measure of disillusionment with the democratic 
system caused by persistent corruption in the major political 
parties and government institutions and a perceived lack of 
economic advancement.  The FSLN, with a highly motivated and 
organized group of core supporters, would likely benefit most 
from a high abstention rate.  Consequently, post is focusing 
on the following strategies to encouraged high voter turnout 
and support for the democratic parties: 
 
5. (SBU) Motivating Citizens to Vote: Post is working, 
through the CEPPS partners, to promote voter participation by 
funding media public information campaigns, "Rock the Vote" 
concerts, and a grassroots door-to-door "get out the vote" 
campaign, including comprehensive coverage of the Atlantic 
Coast.  Public Affairs is sponsoring local NGOs to promote 
voter education and civic responsibility and has also 
sponsored a traveling theater group to educate rural voters. 
Education efforts have focused on youth and rural voters, who 
are estimated to comprise 60-70 percent of the voting 
population.  We have also encouraged individual political 
parties to persuade citizens to vote and make sure that 
supporters can reach polling stations. 
 
6. (U) Ensuring Suffrage for Eligible Voters: Through the 
political parties, CEPPS partners, and local NGOs, we 
coordinated a major effort to promote the solicitation and 
distribution of national/voter ID cards (cedulas).  We have 
also sponsored major studies of the voter list (padron) to 
identify problems and help voters locate their cedulas and 
polling stations.  Through IFES, we have provided resources 
to the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to produce and 
distribute cedulas and modify polling stations to accommodate 
handicapped voters.  Other partners conducted a study of the 
cedula application and distribution process to identify 
weaknesses and make recommendations to expedite cedula 
dissemination. 
 
7. (U) Informing the Public: Working with local NGOs, post 
has promoted candidate debates and provided training to 
political parties on the formation of party platforms.  NGO 
partners have targeted specific populations -- women, youth, 
and minorities -- with voter awareness campaigns.  Post 
recently organized a seminar to link and publicize party 
policies regarding the Nicaraguan Defense White Paper and a 
series of workshops for local journalists to train them on 
elections reporting.  In addition, USAID organized a 
political party finance conference to educate the public on 
the need for parties to disclose financing mechanisms. 
 
8. (C) Ensuring Fairness: Post is working very closely with 
the OAS and local civil society groups to monitor CSE 
activities and intervene when the CSE makes decisions to 
favor specific political parties or interests.  We have 
worked with the CEPPS partners and NGOs to thoroughly analyze 
CSE regulations regarding the elections process (and 
encourage change in some areas), especially regarding the 
processes used to nullify voting results.  We have provided 
resources to train poll officials and party poll watchers. 
The USG is funding a large OAS observer mission -- one of the 
largest ever conducted -- and post is fielding a separate 
observation team to provide the widest coverage possible. 
Through our domestic observation program, we will have near 
universal coverage of the polling stations (almost 11,000), 
which will enable us to conduct quick counts of both the 
presidential and legislative races.  NDI will also field a 
team of lawyers trained in electoral law to respond 
immediately to polling stations that experience 
irregularities. 
 
9. (S) Encouraging Support for Democratic Parties: Ambassador 
and other senior USG officials have made clear statements to 
the Nicaraguan public that, while they are of course free to 
chose their political leaders, their choice will have a 
positive or negative impact on relations with the U.S. 
Specifically, we have been clear that an administration lead 
by FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega could damage Nicaragua's 
economy if Ortega, as he has stated, attempts to manipulate 
the market economy, the system of remittances, and the 
DR-CAFTA framework.  We have also encouraged the widespread 
publication of Ortega's and the FSLN's crimes perpetrated 
during the 1980s and will distribute a film of interviews of 
historical figures discussing the FSLN's and Ortega's 
failures. 
 
10. (C) Unification of Non-Corrupt Democratic Forces: We have 
also made a concerted effort over the past year to create a 
united front of the non-Alemanista, anti-Pact democratic 
forces in Nicaragua.  Post encouraged and assisted the 
Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN), a non-partisan anti-Pact 
civil society group, from its inception.  MpN helped 
enormously in opening up the democratic space and facing down 
the Pact forces that threatened to bring down the Presidency 
several times in 2005.  Beginning with the mission of Special 
Envoy Garza in July, 2005, we sought to break Aleman's 
stranglehold on the PLC.  Those efforts were followed by a 
visit of Deputy Secretary Zoellick in October 2005 to try to 
bring Montealegre, Rizo, and current PLC vice presidential 
candidate Jose Antonio Alvarado together.  Since then, 
Ambassador Trivelli and emboffs have worked persistently to 
convince decent Liberal leaders at all levels to take control 
of the party and sideline Aleman.  While many Liberal leaders 
have in fact defected to the ALN, considerably weakening the 
PLC, the party unfortunately remains firmly in control of 
Aleman and his cohorts.  As the elections draw near, it has 
become increasingly clear that Rizo and Alvarado have become 
powerless stooges of Aleman.  Repeated proposals by 
Ambassador Trivelli, Montealegre, the business community, and 
others to convince Rizo and Alvarado to join Montealegre have 
failed due to Aleman's power and control over the candidates. 
 After initially accepting the concept of primaries in 
March-April 2006, Rizo turned down the proposal made by 
Ambassador Trivelli to have our CEPPS partners organize and 
conduct multi-party primaries.  Later, after initially 
accepting the idea of conducting a poll to determine the 
strongest Liberal candidate, Rizo again backed down.  At one 
point in April, Montealegre even accepted the PLC vice 
presidential candidacy in exchange for a certain number of 
deputy candidate slots and some key portfolios in the 
government -- and again Rizo refused.  At this stage in the 
game and given previous results, it appears unlikely that 
unification of the non-Alemanista Liberal forces can/will 
take place. 
 
11. (S) Likewise, the Ambassador and other senior USG 
officials have reiterated on numerous occasions that we would 
have difficulty with a PLC administration under the 
domination of convicted ex-President Arnoldo Aleman.  We 
have, to the extent possible, assisted investigations against 
Aleman and his family in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and 
the U.S.  News of proceedings against Aleman and his 
associates has further damaged his credibility.  Emboffs have 
supported efforts within the PLC and FSLN to cross vote for 
democratic candidates or abstain from voting rather than 
return corrupt officials to power.  Specifically, post is 
supporting efforts within the PLC to draw local officials 
away from Aleman and possibly defect to the ALN.  The 
Ambassador and emboffs have conducted several trips to all 
areas of Nicaragua to meet with local officials to covey our 
message directly -- efforts that have resulted in notably 
increased support for the ALN and MRS in these areas. 
 
12. (C) Highlighting the Value of Nicaragua's Relationship 
with the U.S.: Nicaragua has enjoyed recent visits from 
several senior USG officials representing USAID, MCC, State, 
and Congress, who have highlighted the benefit of a positive 
relationship with the U.S.  Specifically, these visitors have 
explained the benefits of DR-CAFTA on economic growth as well 
as specific projects undertaken by USAID and MCC.  The 
Ambassador has attended and spoken at dozens of events 
spotlighting USG assistance from education and health to 
humanitarian relief and funds for demining activities and 
assistance for mine victims.  Focus group studies reveal that 
most Nicaraguans hold a positive view of the U.S. largely due 
to these activities. 
 
Comment: Planning for a Close Election 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
13. (S) While post has been successful employing elections 
funding to open a space for new political parties to contest 
the entrenched and coordinated interests of the FSLN and PLC, 
the election will likely be close, with Daniel Ortega 
capturing the largest number of votes in the first round.  We 
are working with the international and local observer groups 
to discuss scenarios and responses should the FSLN declare a 
first-round victory by fraudulently widening the margin of 
votes between Ortega and his second closest competitor 
(probably Montealegre).  Knowing that Ortega has a strong 
chance of losing in the second round, the FSLN will make a 
concerted effort to ensure a first round win for their 
candidate, or possibly attempt to disqualify Montealegre by 
using the FSLN-PLC dominated courts to convict him of 
wrongdoing in the CENIs (debt bond) case. 
 
14. (S) The role of the OAS observation mission will be key 
in this regard.  In meetings last week with OAS 
Undersecretary Dante Caputo and mission leader Gustavo 
Fernandez, Ambassador Trivelli stressed the need for the OAS 
to step in and defend against any FSLN/CSE attempts to 
disqualify and/or steal votes to obtain the margin of 
victory.  Caputo and Fernandez were clearly cognizant of 
their responsibility in this regard, and appeared prepared to 
do what they can to prevent such occurrences, but it would 
nonetheless be useful for WHA and USOAS to continue to 
impress upon the OAS team (as we will) the important and 
proactive role they will have to play should this scenario 
come to pass. 
TRIVELLI