Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2044, NICARAGUA: ENSURING DEMOCRATIC CONTINUITY IN THE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANAGUA2044.
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #2044/01 2611945
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181945Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7585
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0762
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAGUA 002044
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS, NSC FOR DAN FISK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: ENSURING DEMOCRATIC CONTINUITY IN THE
NOVEMBER ELECTIONS
REF: MANAGUA 0433
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (S) INTRODUCTION: Our election priorities in Nicaragua
have not changed since our February 24 update (Ref. D):
support clean, fair, credible, and inclusive national
elections; keep Nicaragua on the democratic path; and, end
the Ortega-Aleman pact's control of the political system.
Our four-point strategy to achieve these objectives -- unite
the democratic opposition; point out the past and present
shortcomings of both Ortega and Aleman; use our voice and
assistance to ensure fair elections; and, convince
Nicaraguans of the positive value of the bilateral
relationship -- has met with mixed results. An assessment
follows of the current political arena, efforts to achieve
our objectives, as well as recommendations to remedy
weaknesses in our strategy. END INTRODUCTION.
STATUS QUO AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL FAVOR ORTEGA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (S) Polls still show that most Nicaraguans seek political
change and reject the current leadership of Nicaragua's two
dominant political parties. Early polls pegged Nicaraguan
Liberal Alliance (ALN) candidate Eduardo Montealegre and
Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) leader Herty Lewites as
the clear front-runners. However, since then, a fifth
presidential candidate, Alternative for Change (AC) candidate
Eden Pastora, entered the race; MRS candidate Herty Lewites
passed away, replaced by relatively unknown Edmundo Jarquin;
and, Sandinista Front (FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega pulled
ahead in the polls. Recent polls suggest the following range
of support for the candidates: Ortega: 27%-31%; Montealegre
21%-28%; Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose
Rizo and Jarquin vie for third place with 12%-17%; and,
Pastora 1%-2%.
¶3. (SBU) According to an M and R poll released September 11
(poll conducted on September 7-8, sample size 802 nationwide,
3.5% error), 35.2% of the respondents believe Montealegre
will be the next president of Nicaragua; 22.3% think Ortega
will win; 18.6% are uncertain or did not respond; 12.5%
believe Jarquin will win; 11.1% think Rizo will be the next
president; and, only .1% think Pastora has a chance.
Regarding voter preference, Montealegre gained 36.2%, Jarquin
19.2%, Ortega 16.7%, Rizo 11.1% and Pastora .1%.
Undecided/no response totaled 16.2%. (COMMENT:
Historically, voters' views on who will win an election in
Nicaragua tend to track more closely with electoral outcomes
than voter intentions, which most polls measure. However,
this particular M and R poll did not reach truly rural voters
and thus does not reflect the inclinations of that segment of
the population.)
¶4. (S) Even though approximately 70% of Nicaraguans reject
Ortega, he could still win the November 5 election because a
candidate can claim victory win with only 35% of valid votes,
with a margin of 5% or greater above the closest competitor.
While we expect Jarquin to shave off some traditionally
Sandinista voters, the difference might not suffice to
prevent a first-round Ortega victory -- especially
considering the real possibility that Ortega will attempt to
steal up to 5% of the first-round votes, as he knows well he
would likely lose a second round, except perhaps to Rizo.
The FSLN dominates the electoral and judicial branches of
government and will not hesitate to use its control to tilt
the election outcome in Ortega's favor. CSE cabinet director
Rodrigo Barreto, who privately claims he favors Montealegre,
has told us that the CSE leadership -- meaning CSE VP Emmet
Lang (FSLN), the real power behind the CSE -- has not
budgeted for a second round "because Ortega will win on the
first round."
¶5. (C) Low voter turnout is likely to favor Ortega and his
disciplined mass of Sandinista militants; high turnout is
more likely to favor the anti-FSLN vote, and the
anti-caudillo vote more generally. According to polls and
what we know from voter patterns in previous elections, most
independent voters reject Ortega and tend to vote for the
candidate they believe can beat him. Vigorous international
monitoring, combined with robust Nicaraguan observation can
minimize pact-driven fraud. Even with observation, we expect
the FSLN and PLC will use their influence in the CSE to
attempt to commit fraud, especially to in the selection of
Assembly deputies.
LIBERALS IN DISARRAY, "BORN-AGAIN" ORTEGA ABOVE THE STORM
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- -
¶6. (S) Convincing Liberals to unite behind a single
candidate has not been possible, in large part because PLC
leader Arnoldo Aleman still controls the party; PLC candidate
Rizo's blind ambition prevents him from acknowledging he
cannot beat FSLN rival Ortega; and, the PLC's smear campaign
against rival Montealegre has so far spoiled the efforts of
moderates to forge an alliance. On September 7, the lid blew
off on an FSLN-PLC cabal to besmirch Eduardo Montealegre so
that he would withdraw from the race or cave to Rizo and
rejoin the PLC. Norlan Moncada (Assembly Deputy Oscar
Moncada's nephew), who was involved in a PLC scheme, with
apparent FSLN collusion, denounced the plot a press
conference, mentioning the direct threats he received from
those involved when they realized he would speak out.
¶7. (S) According to Moncada, Carlos Ulvert, Gilberto Wong,
and Alvaro Somoza (all three PLC/Rizo supporters), and
Francisco Mayorga (FSLN sympathizer loosely associated with
the PLC and owner of one of the failed banks) created a
foundation (Pro-Verdad, or "for truth") to smear Montealegre,
falsely accusing him of wrongdoing in the CENIs case (debt
bonds to resolve the failed banks' debt). The "Pro-Verdad"
plan also included circulating false rumors that Rizo is
polling right behind Ortega while Montealegre has slipped.
The PLC and FSLN were hoping that the CENIs scandal would so
weaken Montealegre that a poll (reportedly to be fielded via
an Argentine firm connected with Rizo's Argentine campaign
adviser Felipe Noguera) would "demonstrate" that Rizo is the
only option capable of beating Ortega. Moncada drafted a
full sworn statement and provided copies to Embassy and the
Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH).
¶8. (S) The CENIs confabulation represents a microcosm of how
the PLC-FSLN Pact works, and demonstrates clear connections
between the Rizo camp, Aleman, and the Sandinistas (in
addition to Mayorga, FSLN Contralor Montenegro was involved).
What were the motives? Ortega probably believes his chances
of winning the election are improved if his opponents remain
divided; besmirching Montealegre could help lower the support
for his closest competitor. While there is much speculation
regarding his accord with Ortega, Aleman appears to be
willing to let Ortega win the election in exchange for his
freedom and Assembly seats for his party hacks. Rizo's
motive is likely his blind ambition to don the presidential
sash.
¶9. (S) At this juncture, we believe Rizo and his running
mate Jose Antonio Alvarado (who in late May decided to cast
his fate with Rizo rather than Montealegre) should be pressed
to withdraw from the race and admit that their allegations of
corruption against Montealegre are unfounded. With Rizo out
of the picture, support for the PLC would further erode, and
Montealegre could emerge as the Liberal option best poised to
beat Ortega. Further, independent and undecided voters, who
largely reject the Ortega-Aleman pact, are more likely to
back Montealegre once it is clear that Rizo has broken with
the PLC and left the political stage. Montealegre's
anti-pact focus will then resonate more with voters who were
confused about talk of an eventual PLC-ALN alliance.
¶10. (S) One possible way to convince Rizo to resign and to
encourage a broader Liberal unity is through a poll that
would determine whether Montealegre or Rizo is best poised to
beat Ortega. According to President Bolanos' chief of staff
Leonardo Somarriba and senior political adviser Frank Arana,
President Bolanos has convinced candidates Eduardo
Montealegre and Jose Rizo to participate in such a poll.
However, the candidates have yet to iron out the details,
including what "benefits" will be accorded to the loser. The
poll would poll roughly 2,000 people in each of Nicaragua's
17 departments. (Note: We understand that the Taiwanese are
backing the poll effort, expected to cost around $200,000).
MODEST SUCCESS IN EXPOSING ALEMAN AND ORTEGA SHORTCOMINGS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (S) Our efforts to erode Aleman have not sufficed to
convince him to cede his hegemony over the PLC -- even though
we have convinced some PLC militants to leave the party and
endorse Montealegre. Other efforts:
--When Norlan Moncada approached the Embassy in early
September with his denouncement against the PLC-FSLN CENIs
scam, we encouraged him to do the right thing for his
country. The PLC's fingerprints are on the scam.
--The Embassy has distributed its "rap sheet" on Aleman's
corruption and continues to engage PLC militants and
lawmakers on the damaging effects of Aleman's undemocratic
leadership.
--The Embassy continues to engage, with mixed success,
Nicaraguan and third country financiers to disassociate
themselves from Aleman. Our embassies in neighboring
countries furthered President Bolanos' efforts to persuade
the presidents and capital of these countries to distance
themselves from Aleman and support Montealegre. Montealegre
is now receiving some financial backing from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.
-- Progress on the case against Aleman in Panama has eroded
his reputation; however, concrete progress on the U.S.
criminal indictment against Aleman - likely the most powerful
tool in convincing Aleman followers to leave his side -- has
not materialized. Nor has there been progress in the
Dominican Republic case against Aleman.
-- The RLA is working with our Customs and Border Inspection
office in Panama to request that the U.S. Attorney's office
in Southern Florida file a criminal complaint against
Aleman's wife Maria Fernanda for failing to appear for a
border inspection regarding her U.S. permanent residency
status. The last time she entered the United States, Maria
Fernanda was flagged for inspection to determine whether or
not she was still a lawful permanent resident. The
inspection was deferred and she was given a date to appear,
but she did not.
ORTEGA'S "BORN-AGAIN" IMAGE CHALLENGES EFFORTS TO REVEAL
HIS SINISTER PAST AND PRESENT PERSONA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶12. (S) We have met with modest success in our efforts to
reveal Ortega's abysmal human rights record. Ortega's
"born-again Catholic" image, and his ability to stay removed
from the media's harsh scrutiny -- preferring instead to
undertake "pilgrimages" to convert voters to his "peace, love
and reconciliation" campaign -- has complicated somewhat the
efforts to challenge him. An update of our efforts:
--Embassy continues to support Nicaragua's Permanent Human
Rights Commission (CPDH) work to help the Miskito Indians
document and submit FSLN era human rights abuse cases before
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and other
international organizations. DRL funds were granted to help
CPDH (via Creative Associates) to continue the work and
computerize and publicize its extensive archives on
Sandinista abuses throughout the country in the 1980s. CPDH
has submitted over 100 cases before the Nicaraguan judicial
system for review (given the dominance of the FSLN and PLC in
the judiciary, predictably, no decision has been issued).
CPDH has held press conferences denouncing the abuses and a
public forum on genocide. It will hold another forum in
October, featuring a number of the Ortega-era victims and
will issue a bulletin containing their testimonies. The CPDH
is also preparing cases to present before the IAHRC and a
Spanish court.
--Embassy arranged for a Miskito survivor of the Leimus
massacre to receive an artificial limb through the OAS
demining program in Managua.
--Embassy helped facilitate Ortega's stepdaughter Zoilamerica
Narvaez's trip to Washington in June, where she discussed her
case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, met
with State Department officials, contacted pro bono lawyers'
associations who might be able to help her advance her sexual
abuse case against her stepfather, and interviewed with
Univision in Miami. The release of part of her Univision
interview was scheduled for late August in Miami and via
Channel 10 in Managua; however, Ortega reportedly "persuaded"
Channel 10 to quash the interview. Ortega's efforts to
censure Zoilamerica stirred up a public outcry and drew
criticism from the ALN and MRS. Center-right daily La Prensa
printed the text of the interview; bootleg copies of the
interview are now circulating, and the IAHRC has expressed
concern to Zoilamerica over Ortega's censorship. We are
helping facilitate private sector support for Zoilamerica to
travel to Washington in October for her IAHRC hearing.
--Embassy updated and disseminated "rap sheets" on the
excesses and failures of the Sandinista Era and Ortega to
share with appropriate audiences. Embassy successfully
encouraged MRS leadership -- FSLN-dissident Herty Lewites and
successor Edmundo Jarquin -- to maintain their independence
from Ortega. Jarquin has made it one of his key objectives
to publicly slam Ortega, as has Lewites' widow Carmen, who
recently rebuffed Ortega's referring to Lewites as a
"brother."
--Embassy is investigating probable links between the FSLN
and narcotrafficking on the Atlantic Coast, specifically
Yatama candidates running on the FSLN ticket and
FSLN-affiliated judges who release suspected narcotraffickers.
ENSURING FAIR ELECTIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) Our outreach to ensure a fair election outcome and
to strengthen Nicaragua's democracy continues to be robust
and unequivocal. The Ambassador and other senior officials
employ every opportunity available in Managua and during
frequent trips throughout the country to highlight our policy
interests, feature our programs, and to speak out clearly and
forcefully on behalf of the legitimate, democratic
aspirations of the Nicaraguan people. While the FSLN and PLC
have criticized the Ambassador's role because it hits a raw
nerve, the ALN and MRS have largely supported his words and
actions. And, while polls suggest that Nicaraguans are
divided in their views regarding outside interference in
Nicaragua's internal affairs, most Nicaraguans, especially
rural voters, appear to expect the U.S. to speak its mind.
Ironically, rural voters are those who still are most
inclined to back Arnoldo Aleman, as they are far removed from
exposure to his pact with Ortega and how it has hurt the
country's development.
¶14. (U) A summary of our use of over $12 million for
election technical assistance, outreach, and observation
(much of it channeled through the CEPPS IRI, NDI, and IFES
agreement and their local partners) follows:
--CSE support (technical assistance, training, and material
assistance): USD 2.9 million
--Domestic observation (March 2006 Atlantic Coast elections,
November national elections, possible run-off election
observation, and related studies): USD 3.1 million
--Civic education and vote promotion (Get out the Vote,
secondary school civic education, and citizen attention
centers): USD: 3.4 million
--Political party poll watcher (fiscales) training and
manuals: USD 600,000
--International observation (OAS Election Observation Mission
(EOM): USD 2 million
¶15. (C) We also draw on our weekly elections working group
sessions and regular Donor's Group meetings to coordinate our
efforts, maximizing limited resources, and developing
milestones and criteria in the electoral process required for
valid election results. We continue to press the group to
issue a joint communique calling on the CSE to ensure free,
fair, inclusive, and credible elections on November 5. Thus
far, the Canadians are on board, and the Europeans may be
willing to sign closer to the election.
THE VALUE OF A POSITIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶16. (C) We continue to appeal to the desire for most
Nicaraguans, including many Sandinistas, to maintain close
ties with the United States -- highlighting over $45 million
in USAID funding for FY 2006 and $175 million in Millennium
Challenge Account funds; IFIs and bilateral donors reliance
on our assessments; the sizable Nicaraguan population
(250,000-500,000, including over 4,500 benefiting from
Temporary Protective Status (TPS) in the United States, who
send over $500 million/yr. in remittances. The Ambassador's
message that these opportunities could disappear if Nicaragua
elects an undemocratic leader appears to have resonated.
WHAT MORE MUST WE ACCOMPLISH?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶17. (S) Restrictions on funding uses have affected what we
can do an certain fronts, namely leveling the uneven
political playing field that pits a well-funded Ortega -- who
enjoys the backing and money of Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez and of Nicaragua's lucrative FSLN-controlled court
system -- against Jarquin's cashless MRS and Montealegre's
under-funded ALN -- which is also constantly under attack by
the PLC. As the final stretch nears, a full court press is
in order:
--Clinch the Aleman indictment in the United States and a
decision on the civil case for forfeitures of at least some
of the Aleman family CDs.
--Announce/reveal the narco, and possibly terrorism-related,
money laundering indictment of Supreme Court Justices (U.S.
Court in Las Vegas) involved in a scam to take possession of
$609,000 in cash confiscated from a narcotrafficker connected
to Colombian and Mexican cartels.
--Encourage Nicaraguan and regional private sectors to
consider backing Eduardo Montealegre as the democratic
alternative that can beat Daniel Ortega. He tells us that at
this late date, the Nicaraguan private sector is still not
providing sufficient funds. The lack of funds has especially
hurt the ALN's campaign efforts in rural areas of the country
as campaigners to not have campaign materials to deliver nor
transportation to deliver them. Montealegre has visited El
Salvador and is considering visiting other neighboring
countries to seek additional campaign funds. U.S. embassies
could help facilitate meetings between Montealegre and the
local private sector, as Embassy El Salvador has done.
--Encourage Jarquin to remain in the race and continue our
public statements that the U.S. considers the MRS a viable
democratic alternative. The MRS has told us that they are
severely cash-strapped. Jarquin estimates he can shave off
several points from Ortega, but his lack of funds limits his
ability to do so. (NOTE: We believe Jarquin could but draw
at least 5-6% of the FSLN vote -- enough to make a
difference.) Herty Lewites' nephew Israel is considering
traveling to the United States to seek funds from the Jewish
community with whom Herty maintained contact.
--Draw on Republicans who maintained close ties with the PLC
starting in the 1980's to talk to the PLC camp and tell them
their game is over, that Montealegre is clearly the best
democratic choice to beat Ortega. If, as we expect,
Montealegre leads Rizo in a joint poll, use the information
to convince Rizo and his followers that it is clear he cannot
win the election.
--Ensure the OAS stays on top of the CSE, and quickly snuffs
out any/all attempts at chicanery. The latest concern
involves the new regulations that allow fiscales and voting
table (JRV) officials to annul the results of voting tables
with one missing signature. Encourage the OAS to make
statements responding firmly to Daniel Ortega's sharp
criticism of the OAS Election Observation Mission.
--Encourage/support a "remembrance campaign," combined with
reminders/tangible indicators of all the opportunities and
benefits that come from their close association with the
United States (CAFTA, MCC, remittances, Free Trade Zone jobs,
tourism), the risks of losing them if Ortega wins.
--Revoke the visas of FSLN/Yatama candidates/judges found
engaged in, or benefiting from, narcotrafficking activities;
show links between FSLN and narcotrafficking.
--Step up engagement with department capitals and rural
voters, especially those in the departments of Jinotega and
Matagalpa, who still revere Aleman and are unaware of his
alliance with Ortega and how it has hurt the country and
their welfare.
--Continue to encourage PLC mayors and other local leaders to
challenge Aleman's control of the party and encourage them to
withdraw in support of Eduardo Montealegre as the only viable
option to beat Ortega.
TRIVELLI