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Viewing cable 06LIMA3693, REGIONAL ELECTIONS: FRAGMENTED FIELD FAVORS LOCAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA3693 2006-09-15 22:12 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ1190
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #3693/01 2582212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 152212Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2325
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1525
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3907
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6985
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2585
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9786
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ SEP QUITO 0693
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0854
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
UNCLAS LIMA 003693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV INR PE
SUBJECT: REGIONAL ELECTIONS: FRAGMENTED FIELD FAVORS LOCAL 
CANDIDATES AND APRA 
 
REF: A. LIMA 3579 
 
     B. LIMA 2927 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified. Please handle accordingly. 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (SBU) A fragmented field of multiple contenders -- an 
average of nine candidates for each regional presidency -- 
favors both independent local candidates and the established 
APRA party in Peru's upcoming regional and municipal 
elections.  Schisms and other problems in the Ollanta Humala 
camp (refs) have diminished the prospect of a Peruvian 
Nationalist Party (PNP) sweep in the south and the sierra. 
(The PNP has not presented a candidate in Cuzco, where Humala 
took 73 percent in June.)  The APRA Government's targeted 
programs and promises to distribute more authority and 
resources to the regions are likely to help APRA candidates. 
Such electoral fragmentation could undermine long-term 
governability even as it leaves Humala weakened and APRA 
alone as a party with nation-wide reach. End Summary. 
 
Plethora of Weak Parties 
------------------------ 
2. (U) Peruvian voters will elect regional presidents, 
mayors, and city council members ("regidores") on November 
19.  There is an average of nine candidates for each of the 
25 regional presidencies, and 16 regions have more than nine 
candidates -- with Huancavelica topping the list at 13.  The 
municipal races have similarly large numbers of candidates. 
(Note: The numbers may drop if candidates are ruled 
ineligible by the National Elections Board (JNE). End Note.) 
 
3. (U) While national parties represent two-thirds of the 
candidates, they have a weak penetration in the provinces. 
Only four are competing in 12 or more regional campaigns: 
APRA and Ollanta Humala's Nationalist Party (PNP) in 23 
regions; Humala's former ally the Union por el Peru (UPP) in 
19; and the Si Cumple (Fujimorista) party in 16.  (Note: The 
Fujimoristas have reclaimed the popular party name of "Si 
Cumple" (He Delivers) from former President Fujimori's past 
campaigns. End Note.)  The Unidad Nacional alliance (under 
which Lourdes Flores ran for president) is only running 
candidates in 9 regions and forming alliances in 3 others, 
underscoring the weakness of national parties. 
 
4. (U) This leaves a vacuum which local candidates 
representing regional groupings focused on regional issues 
are filling.  The proliferation of parties, local 
organizations and candidates has fragmented the political 
landscape.  If past patterns hold, these local candidates 
will get significant support, but few if any will gain a 
majority.  For example, in 2002, two-thirds of the winning 
candidates for regional president scored less than 30 percent 
of the vote.  At that time, the fragmentation helped APRA 
secure 12 (of 25) regional presidencies.  Even if APRA does 
less well this time, it should still emerge as the only party 
with significant nation-wide representation. 
 
5. (SBU) The probable scenario of regional presidencies 
elected without majority backing could pose governability 
problems.  This challenge could be further complicated by the 
election of many unaligned regional movements that win 
regional presidencies.  The APRA government would be 
hard-pressed to generate a coherent global plan to deal with 
this challenge, but rather find itself addressing an 
explosion of narrow regional and local demands on myriad 
fronts. 
 
Humala's Party Vulnerable 
------------------------- 
6. (SBU) Despite Humala's dominance in the sierras and the 
south in Peru's presidential race, the PNP is vulnerable in 
these same areas.  (Note: In the presidential run-off Humala 
won the popular vote in 15 regions, in 10 of those with more 
than 60 percent. End Note.)  Humala's candidates will split 
some of the vote with those of his former UPP party, which 
has registered a separate list of candidates for the local 
 
and regional elections.  In addition, his own party (PNP) is 
divided in Congress, Humala faces a human rights trial that 
limits his travel, and he has little to offer his party's 
candidates by way of material inducements or support. 
Consequently, many regional and local candidates that rallied 
behind Humala in the presidential elections are going on 
their own for the November elections (Ref B).  Cuzco presents 
the most graphic example of Humala's political 
ineffectiveness.  Although he won 73 percent of the vote in 
June, infighting has resulted in his PNP party failing even 
to register a candidate this time around. 
 
Lima elections 
-------------- 
7. (U) In spite of his high popularity, Lima mayor Luis 
Castaneda of the Unidad Nacional alliance faces a similar 
situation, i.e., 10 competitors representing a range of 
groups.  And most observers acknowledge that it is 
Castaneda's personal appeal rather than UN party affiliation 
that explain his popular support.  Humberto Lay, the 
(embattled) evangelical leader of the Restauracion Nacional 
party currently places a distant second in polls.  Other 
candidates are Benedicto Jimenez of APRA, a retired colonel 
and former chief of the anti-terrorism police, and Gino Costa 
of the Somos Peru party, a former Minister of Interior. 
Humala's former Vice Presidential candidate, Gonzalo Garcia 
Nunez, is running on the PNP ticket. 
 
Government Largesse to Regions 
----------------------------- 
8. (SBU) The APRA Government's targeted programs (Sierra 
Exportadora) and promises to distribute more authority and 
resources from Lima (decentralize) are likely to help APRA 
candidates.  While the Garcia Administration has made 
decentralization and targeted assistance programs a 
first-tier priority, some observers believe this also has a 
clear political dimension, and could be used to encourage 
favor-seeking voters to choose APRA candidates who are seen 
as better able to leverage central government resources for 
the benefit of their regions or localities. 
 
Comment: Proliferation Breeds Ingovernability 
--------------------------------------------- 
9.  (SBU) The proliferation of parties, local organizations 
and candidates fragments the political landscape, and will 
make it difficult for an elected leader to obtain a clear 
mandate.  This could undermine long-term governability even 
as it leaves Humala weakened and APRA alone as the party with 
nation-wide reach.  At the moment, the scenario suggests a 
heightening of 2002 trends, when local candidates and APRA 
dominated, but most victors won without an absolute majority. 
STRUBLE