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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2167, DARFUR - CONTINGENCY PLANNING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2167 2006-09-10 07:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6041
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2167/01 2530755
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100755Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4459
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00002167  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  In July and August, insecurity for humanitarian actors has 
increased causing USAID to engage non-governmental organization 
(NGO) and UN partners in discussions on their plans to continue to 
implement USAID-funded programs and evacuate staff under 
deteriorating security conditions.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
USAID Organizes Contingency Planning Workshops 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  On August 28, USAID held contingency planning meetings in 
Khartoum with NGO and UN agencies followed by field-level meetings 
in El Fasher, North Darfur.  The following organizations 
participated in the contingency planning workshops:  the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN World Food 
Program, the UN Joint Logistics Centre, the UN Children's Fund, 
CARE, Relief International, International Rescue Committee, CHF 
International, Development Alternatives, Inc., and GOAL. 
 
------------------- 
Summary of Findings 
------------------- 
 
3.  In the meetings, both UN agencies and NGOs affirmed that 
contingency and evacuation plans already existed, and stated that 
they were reviewing plans in light of the current security situation 
in Darfur.  UN agencies and NGOs have well trained and competent 
Sudanese staff working in Khartoum and in Darfur.  Khartoum-based 
and El Fasher-based staff generally agreed that they would have the 
ability to continue humanitarian work using their Sudanese staff. 
Some NGOs expressed concern that if all NGOs were to withdraw their 
expatriate staff from North Darfur, Sudanese staff would face 
harassment, intimidation, and may even be prevented from working 
with the affected populations.  Many USAID-supported NGO projects 
are community-based and can easily be transferred to communities 
given the strong relationships and capacity already built, which is 
a strength for USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA) programs in Darfur.  Additionally, NGOs stressed the 
importance of donor diversification in order to mitigate funding 
uncertainties and achieve better program flexibility. 
 
4.  Lack of adequate communications equipment for many NGOs and 
inconsistency of the communications network and notification system 
leaves USAID partners vulnerable.  NGOs and UN agencies reported 
that their relationships with the UN Department of Safety and 
Security are based on personal contacts rather than 
institutionalized systems, which is a matter of concern for USAID. 
An additional concern is that the high turnover of staff compounded 
by the tendency to deploy first-tour staff without experience in 
complex emergencies leaves a vacuum of leadership and experience on 
the ground and contributes to organizational and personal 
vulnerability.  Evacuation plans exist, but only one agency noted 
that it had practiced it.  NGOs with protection programs noted that 
these programs increase their vulnerability due to the sensitive 
nature of their work. 
 
5.  USAID partners strongly recommended maximum flexibility across 
regions and sectors in future awards to ensure they can adjust 
rapidly to changing conditions.  NGOs and UN agencies see their 
strong relationships with USAID as an asset and highlighted the 
benefit of USAID/OFDA's field-based presence.  The institutional 
memory of USAID/OFDA has improved with the deployment of long-term 
staff to North Darfur, but it was also mentioned that the past high 
turnover of staff was a drain on the relationships with implementing 
partners.  USAID partners noted that the operational mechanisms of 
USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) with local 
partners and the small-grants program are an asset in dealing with 
the volatility in North Darfur.  UN agencies and NGOs expressed that 
funding uncertainty is a major constraint. 
 
-------- 
Concerns 
-------- 
 
6.  USAID is concerned that if NGOs evacuate Sudan, their 
re-admittance by the Government of National Unity (GNU) is unlikely. 
 Additionally, if NGOs evacuate, many of the gains made in Darfur 
over the past two years may be lost and there will be no 
 
KHARTOUM 00002167  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
international witnesses to subsequent events. 
 
7.  USAID staff and partners share concern that the UN Security 
Council resolution 1706 will have short and long-term ramifications 
for the humanitarian space in Darfur. 
 
----------------- 
Follow-Up Actions 
----------------- 
 
8.  The USAID Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) is compiling a report 
and will distribute the results from the North Darfur contingency 
planning meetings to all of the contributing organizations.  USAID 
has also asked NGOs to submit solutions to mitigate their 
organization's vulnerabilities. 
 
9.  The USAID/DFO intends to replicate the planning process for 
South and West Darfur in September. 
 
10.  USAID's goal is to have comprehensive strategies prepared by 
NGO and UN partners to address beneficiary needs and provide 
humanitarian services in all of these three scenarios:  status quo, 
evacuation to El Fasher, or evacuation to Khartoum.  The USAID staff 
in the field will continue to monitor the security situation in all 
three Darfur states, as well as work with the implementing partners 
to assist them in developing strategies to maximize their capacity 
to conduct life-saving humanitarian services under changing security 
situations. 
 
HUME