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Viewing cable 06ISLAMABAD17768, SEPTEMBER 9 F-16 SIGNING DOUBTFUL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ISLAMABAD17768 2006-09-07 02:26 2011-05-30 02:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Islamabad
Appears in these articles:
http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/wikileaks-us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem/201017
http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem-108985
VZCZCXRO3176
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHIL #7768/01 2500226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070226Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9826
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9589
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1097
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3793
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0899
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1627
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6138
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7034
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9217
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 1781
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5761
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 017768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR P, EUR, NEA, PM, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 
TAGS: PK PREL MOPS UN MARR
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 9 F-16 SIGNING DOUBTFUL 
 
Classified By: CDA Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4  (b) and (d) 
 
1.    (C)  Summary:  GOP sources told Office of Defense 
Representatives Pakistan (ODRP) September 6 that 
the scheduled September 9 signing of the F-16 LOA 
would not happen.  The same day, MODP 
(Ministry of Defense Production) sent ODRP a memo 
requiring an unspecified per-plane price cut; significant 
(USD 800-900) off-sets; better financing terms via 
the USG; and changes in the payment schedule.  MG 
Helmly met with senior PAF and MOD officials September 5. 
He impressed upon his interlocutors the importance of 
meeting the September 15 signing deadline.  End Summary 
 
2.  (C)  On September 5, post learned that the planned 
September 9 signing of the LOA for Pakistan's purchase 
of eighteen F-16s was in peril.  MG Helmly, ODRP, 
promptly met with Air Chief Marshall Tanvir, who 
told him that the PAF still wanted to go forward 
with the F-16 purchase but that "the ball was in MODP's 
(MOD Purchase's) court."  Tanvir noted it was 
increasingly unlikely the LOA would 
be signed by the contracted September 15 offer 
expiration date. On September 6,MODP verbally 
informed ODRP that the ceremony would not occur 
on September 9th.  It also sent a written request for an 
extension of the September 15 offer expiration date to 
December 31 2006. 
 
3.  (C) In its September 6 written request to 
ODRP, MODP requested unspecified per-plane price 
reductions.  It also asked for offsets from Lockheed 
Martin equaling USD 800-900 million - 30 percent of 
the value of the program.  During his September 5 meetings, 
MG Helmly had noted that the contract 
had been negotiated at a very low per-plane cost. 
LM had not planned for major off-sets or financing 
challenges.  He also reminded interlocutors that MOD/P had 
been represented at the contract negotiations with LM. 
 
4.  (C)  MODP also requested improved 
terms of financing and changes in payment schedules. 
The PAF separately told ODRP it would seek "assurances" 
on matters such as delivery schedules and security 
requirements. 
 
5.  (C)  MG Helmly stressed that timing was crucial. 
If the GOP did not sign the LOA by September 15, 
the USAF could not complete contract negotiations 
with LM by 30 November, which in turn would force 
LM to shut down F-16 production due to lack of 
orders.  At the very least, the GOP would then face 
a USD 39 million increase in contract price. 
 
6.  (C)  Interlocutors told MG Helmly that President 
Musharraf had promised the Finance Ministry to raise 
the F-16 issue with President Bush during their 
upcoming bilateral.  ODRP notes that MODP is aware 
that  the USG cannot fund off-sets, as they involve 
an agreement between the vendor and the GOP to which 
the USG is not a party.  A Lockheed 
Martin VP arrived in Islamabad September 6 to meet 
with GOP officials. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment:  The GOP's recent experiences 
with procurement deadlines might lead them to 
believe that all deadlines are flexible.  We have 
repeatedly explained that missing the September 15 
offer expiration date (OED) will result in significant 
added costs for the GOP -- costs which the USG 
is unable to cover. We believe that the Ministry of 
Defense Production has not understood the 
limitations of Lockheed Martin's price flexibility 
nor the constraints on the USG's ability to 
influence the final price or offset any additional 
costs caused by the GOP's indecision. ODRP is meeting 
with MODP on September 7 to reinforce the importance of 
the September 15 date. 
 
ISLAMABAD 00017768  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
 
 
BODDE