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Viewing cable 06HOCHIMINHCITY1050, ETHNIC MINORITY NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND MIGRATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HOCHIMINHCITY1050 2006-09-14 09:20 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO2826
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #1050/01 2570920
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140920Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1459
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1022
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0012
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1528
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV KIRF PREF VM
SUBJECT: ETHNIC MINORITY NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND MIGRATION: 
ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
 
REF: EAP/MLS 9/12 EMAIL; B) HCMC 917; C) HCMC 72; D) HCMC 760; E) HCMC 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001050  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Ref A reported allegations about conditions in the 
Central Highlands made by ethnic minority advocacy groups to 
Department officials on September 11.  The advocates asserted 
that ethnic minority individuals are not fleeing for economic 
reasons, but because of severe human rights and religious 
persecution in the Highlands; that Mission officials cannot 
ascertain the true conditions in the Central Highlands because 
of GVN controls and intimidation; and that the GVN harasses and 
seizes remittances from Visas-93 (family reunification) 
beneficiaries.  This message provides our analysis of factors at 
play in the Central Highlands and refutes the assertions of 
systematic persecution of ethnic minorities in general and 
Visas-93 beneficiaries in particular. 
 
Triangulating and Vetting Information 
------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) ConGen and Embassy officers regularly visit the Central 
Highlands.  In addition to our visits, we are in frequent 
contact with independent sources in the Catholic Church and 
Protestant community operating in the area.  Over the past year, 
we have also conducted dozens of private discussions with ethnic 
minority Visas-93 beneficiaries in HCMC, as well as private 
meetings with ethnic minority returnees and their families and 
other ethnic minority individuals in the Central Highlands.  Our 
sources frequently debunk allegations of mass arrests, lockdowns 
of entire villages or severe harassment of Visas-93 (family 
reunification) beneficiaries.  However, we have been able to 
document cases of serious abuse (Refs B and C), despite official 
attempts to "prepare" villagers in advance of our visits. 
Furthermore, official "escorts" have not deterred ethnic 
minority individuals from speaking frankly with us.  For 
example, some ethnic minority returnees were very plain spoken 
about their belief in ethnic separatism in front of provincial 
government and security officials (Refs D and E). 
No Generalized Harassment of Visas-93 Beneficiaries 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
3. (SBU) Our information -- including numerous private 
interviews with Visas-93 beneficiaries in HCMC -- does not/not 
support claims that the authorities in the Central Highlands 
currently have a policy of retaliation against the families of 
Visas-93 petitioners.   The beneficiaries tell us that, 
following initial police scrutiny after the flight of their 
spouses, they have been able to go about their business without 
harassment.  Detentions or harassment of particular VISAS-93 
beneficiaries appears to be in response to actions by those 
beneficiaries, such as attempting to follow the spouse to 
Cambodia or clandestine support for family members wanted by 
police for questioning.  With a handful of exceptions, 
beneficiaries have not had remittances from family members in 
the United States seized or withheld.  They also have not been 
asked to pay bribes to travel to HCMC or to obtain documents and 
passports.  Some have told us that local officials have helped 
them fill out their various application forms to expedite the 
migration process (these applicants were illiterate).  Over 70 
percent of our current Visas-93 caseload has been interviewed 
and processed in HCMC, with over half having already left for 
the United States.  Additionally, there are indications that 
some beneficiary families do not wish to leave the Central 
Highlands. 
Poverty a Factor in Migration 
----------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Our interviews with returnees from Cambodia and our 
private meetings with Visas-93 beneficiaries indicate that 
economics is an important factor driving cross border migration 
to Cambodia.  Our Visas-93 beneficiary interviews also appear to 
show that some ethnic minority individuals in Cambodia 
exaggerated or distorted their circumstances in Vietnam to make 
the best possible case for refugee status.  For example, per Ref 
F, one ethnic minority refugee seeker told interviewing 
officials in Cambodia that his land was taken by the government. 
 His wife told us that they were given five acres.  The 
demographics of the border crossers also highlight economics as 
a driver of migration:  many migrants are young, male, single 
and terribly uneducated; they have little or no land; and, their 
economic future in Vietnam is marginal at best.  Few of these 
migrants were born when the Vietnam War ended.  (Ironically, one 
of the more successful ethnic minority individuals we have met 
in the Central Highlands province of Gia Lai is a former soldier 
in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the current deacon of 
the Protestant church in his village.) 
Dega:  Why in the Central Highlands? 
------------------------------------ 
 5. (SBU) Ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands have 
suffered from land dislocation, poverty and discrimination for 
at least five decades.  This, however, is no different from 
other ethnic minority groups and, for that matter, ethnic Kinh 
(Vietnamese) peasants elsewhere in Vietnam.  In fact, compared 
to other ethnic minority groups elsewhere in HCMC's consular 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001050  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
district, the ethnic communities in the Central Highlands are 
more prosperous and appear to receive more government 
assistance.  For example, many Visas-93 beneficiaries tell us 
that their villages are connected to the power grid, have 
potable water and see some government efforts to develop their 
villages. 
6. (SBU) The concept of ethnic minority identity -- Dega -- is 
much more pronounced in the Central Highlands than in other 
ethnic minority areas of the south.   As reported Ref G, the 
ethnic minority national movement in the Central Highlands -- 
FULRO -- did not end in 1975.  FULRO continued an armed anti-GVN 
ethnic minority insurgency in the Central Highlands until 1992. 
Although the armed resistance that FULRO mounted never 
threatened Vietnamese control of the Central Highlands, the 
resistance complicated reconstruction and helped cement negative 
attitudes of the new provincial leaders towards some ethnic 
minorities.  Moreover, despite the collapse of the FULRO 
insurgency, the idea of ethnic minority, "Dega" nationalism 
continues to resonate among some in the ethnic Ede, Jarai and 
Mnong communities in the Central Highlands.  Continued economic 
and social grievances in the Central Highlands create fertile 
ground for the Dega movement to attract sympathizers.  Other 
ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands and elsewhere in 
Vietnam do not have these nationalist aspirations. 
 
Religion and Dega 
----------------- 
7. (SBU) Protestantism appears to be the dominant religion among 
the ethnic minority communities that have had the greatest 
involvement in the Dega movement.  GVN arrests and repression 
there do not represent an animus against Protestantism per se, 
but are principally a response to security concerns over 
separatism.  The emergence of the "Dega Protestant Church" in 
the late 1990s led the GVN to classify all Protestants in the 
Central Highlands as Dega sympathizers.  As far as local 
authorities are concerned, the "Dega Protestant Church" is 
continuation of the FULRO movement by other means.  The presence 
of Dega nationalists in Protestant religious organizations in 
the Central Highlands -- including the GVN-recognized Southern 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam -- has complicated and slowed the 
process of registration and recognition of churches and 
congregations.  However, over the past two years, Protestant 
religious organizations operating in the Central Highlands that 
do not have a nationalist/separatist overlay have been given far 
more leeway to operate. 
8. (SBU) It is unclear to what extent the current efforts of 
Dega activists would be considered protected speech in the 
United States.  However, any whiff of separatism is intolerable 
to the GVN. 
9. (SBU) The Vietnamese intelligence services are thorough. 
They attempt to monitor all communications to and from the 
Central Highlands, especially with the United States (Ref H). 
They are convinced -- and some of our sources independently 
corroborate -- that groups in the United States are continuing 
to fan ethnic minority separatism through the Dega Church and 
other activities.  These actors also reportedly encourage flight 
to Cambodia.  By doing so, these U.S.-based groups are putting 
ethnic minority communities in the Central Highlands at risk. 
Additionally, the resettlement of economic migrants to the 
United States via Cambodia creates a pull factor that only 
encourages other poor, ethnic minority individuals to "try their 
luck," intensifying the knee-jerk GVN security effort to secure 
its borders against illegal migration to Cambodia. 
WINNICK