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Viewing cable 06HOCHIMINHCITY1009, POPULAR ANGER OVER LAND DISPUTES; PROTESTS IN HCMC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HOCHIMINHCITY1009 2006-09-06 10:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO2115
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #1009/01 2491000
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061000Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1411
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0990
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1480
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM SOCI KJUS EAID ECON PREL KIRF PGOV VM
SUBJECT: POPULAR ANGER OVER LAND DISPUTES; PROTESTS IN HCMC 
 
REF: HCMC 936 AND PREVIOUS 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001009  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Over the past few months, ConGen has observed 
a steady stream of small, peaceful protests over land, 
representing disgruntled groups from the Mekong Delta and the 
HCMC region.  HCMC media contacts tell us of popular 
dissatisfaction over land expropriation policy and associated 
official corruption in the South.  The protests in HCMC appear 
to reflect the frustration of Vietnam's urban and rural poor, 
who believe they have no transparent legal or political outlet 
to defend their interests.  We have been able to document at 
least two land disputes involving ethnic minority groups in Binh 
Phuoc province.  As reported reftel, political activists have 
sought to highlight the protests in their anti-Communist Party 
websites and, in some cases, have become advocates for citizens 
with land disputes.  Thus far, police have not blocked the 
protests, although they have prevented anyone from approaching. 
 In HCMC alone, some 55,000 households need to be relocated to 
move ahead with some of the city's ambitious urban and 
infrastructure development plans.  End Summary. 
 
Uptick in Public Protests on Land Disputes 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Over the past few months, ConGen has observed an 
increasing number of small, peaceful protests over land 
disputes.  The protest groups range from 20 to 50 persons, 
usually all older women.  They appear to represent rural and 
urban poor from HCMC, its environs, and provinces in the Mekong 
Delta.  The protestors take well-defined routes, from the 
Presidential palace to the HCMC People's Committee or to the 
Southern Offices of the GVN.  (The latter route takes protestors 
past the Consulate.)  Despite a GVN ban on unauthorized 
gathering by any group of more than five persons in public 
places, police usually allow the protestors to sit silently 
across from Government offices.  Police prevent anyone from 
approaching the protestors or taking pictures. 
 
3. (SBU)  For example, on September 1, approximately 20 women 
from the Mekong Delta province of Ben Tre marched in HCMC 
carrying signs accusing the People's Committee Chairman and 
Vice-Chairmen of illegally expropriating land and of corruption 
in land deals.  In August, another group from HCMC protested 
government development plans in Chinatown (District Five).  In 
July protestors from Ben Tre, Binh Duong and Long An provinces 
condemned government policies on land expropriation.  A number 
of protestors carried signs decrying expropriation from the 
"widows of war heroes."  The People's Committee Chairman of Ben 
Tre was attending our Fourth of July reception while a group of 
protestors from his province was filing by outside.  At the 
reception, the Chairman did not raise the protest per se, but 
noted that he had read our Vietnamese translation of "The Lexus 
and the Olive Tree" on the challenges of globalization three 
times. 
 
The Price of Progress? 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) According to newspaper reports, in HCMC alone, from 
2000 to 2004, the city approved 412 development projects, 
requiring the expropriation of 6,000 hectares (15,000 acres) and 
affecting at least 53,000 households.  In 2004 and 2005, the 
city approved another 365 projects, requiring another 1,000 
hectares (2,500 acres) of land.  HCMC press reports that in 
HCMC's District 9 5,500 households are to be compensated and 
relocated for redevelopment, but only 742 households have been 
resettled thus far.  HCMC officials have asserted to us in 
private that providing full compensation for all affected 
households in HCMC would make many projects commercially 
unfeasible. 
 
5. (SBU) Details of land disputes in the provinces outside HCMC 
are sketchy, but contacts in the media tell us that they are 
commonplace.  Many of these cases involve local Communist Party 
and government malfeasance in the process of rezoning or 
reapportioning of farm land.  In April 2005, district-level 
officials in rural Binh Phuoc province reportedly evicted 50 
ethnic Stieng farmers from 220 hectares (550 acres) of land they 
had been cultivating since 1998.  The district reportedly 
allocated the land to a state-owned, rubber plantation, but 
allegedly some of the land was transferred into other, private 
interests.  At least some of the ethnic Stieng were affiliated 
with the Inter-Evangelistic Movement Protestant house church. 
Eight protestors were detained during the eviction.  In a second 
case in 2006, local-level officials ordered the transfer of 50 
hectares (125 acres) of land from a dozen ethnic Mnong families 
to a state-owned rubber producer.  In June, district-level 
officials temporarily halted the transfer following an appeal 
from the group that at least some of the land was improperly 
distributed to local government and Communist Party cadre.  A 
HCMC police contact told us recently that police in rural areas 
routinely are allocated "government"  land as part of their 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001009  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
compensation package to make up for low wages. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment:  Although there have been land protests in 
HCMC in the past, they have tended to be few in number and local 
in character.  The convergence of groups from provinces 
surrounding HCMC is a new phenomenon; it may reflect the 
increasing pace of development throughout southern Vietnam. 
Protestors may hold out some hope that the Central Government 
might intervene where provincial- and lower-level government 
does not.  The GVN recently opened a southern branch of its 
national complaints office in HCMC to deal with the growing 
workload in the southern half of the country.  They also may 
head to HCMC because they believe that police are less inclined 
to take action against them there than in their local communes. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment Continued:  Nonetheless, public protest remains 
a brave and desperate act for Vietnamese -- even in HCMC.  It 
reflects the frustration of Vietnam's urban and rural poor, who 
believe they have no effective legal or political outlet to 
challenge official decisions or to obtain fair compensation. 
Their anger is compounded by corruption within the system; all 
too often the Party and Government officials ruling on a land 
case are the ones that are benefiting -- directly or indirectly 
-- from the distribution, onward sale or rezoning of that land. 
In the process, even "cleaner" development projects get 
tarnished.  How HCMC officials deal with this sensitive subject 
will help determine the pace of planned large-scale clearance 
and re-development of neighborhoods in HCMC, including the 
development of a new satellite city and convention center. 
Political dissident groups have been publicizing land protests 
on anti-GVN websites.  One group has been working with 
disgruntled citizens to organize and file complaints with the 
GVN (reftel). 
 
8. (SBU) Comment continued:  These same land disputes often 
become even thornier when they involve ethnic minority groups, 
who often do not have full legal title to the land they occupy. 
In Binh Phuoc and in the Central Highlands, these disputes 
quickly become conflated with charges of ethnic or religious 
discrimination.  End Comment. 
WINNICK