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Viewing cable 06DHAKA5933, IMF PRGF REVIEW TEAM GENERALLY POSITIVE,BUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DHAKA5933 2006-09-20 01:35 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKA #5933/01 2630135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200135Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1688
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 7837
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 8687
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9335
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 2491
UNCLAS DHAKA 005933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON IMF BG BD
SUBJECT: IMF PRGF REVIEW TEAM GENERALLY POSITIVE,BUT 
FRUSTRATED WITH OIL PRICE SUPPORTS AND PACE OF REVENUE 
COLLECTION 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY.  An IMF team met with BDG officials and 
with donor countries in preparation for Executive Board 
review of the next $71 Million tranche under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).  The tone of the IMF 
team's meeting and informal discussions with donor countries 
was generally positive, but expressed frustration over three 
key points:  revenue collection, infrastructure and 
development spending, and BDG oil price supports.  The 
overall macroeconomic picture they painted was, however, 
generally favorable and progress was noted in some of the 
areas of frustration. 
 
2.  (SBU)  The following major points were developed through 
both the informal presentation by the IMF team and the 
question and answer period with donor country representatives 
that followed: 
 
- GDP Growth.  Strong and sustained generally, but a slight 
dip is expected this year due to the effect of the mild 
drought on the agriculture sector. 
 
- Poverty reduction.  New numbers are reportedly coming out 
soon, but early opinions are that they will show poverty 
reduction over the past five years. 
 
- Monetary policy.  In a big step towards accountability and 
transparency, the central bank is now publishing semi-annual 
reports on policy, available online at 
www.bangladesh-bank.org. 
 
- Exchange policy.  IMF reported that its concerns are less 
now than they were a year ago.  Remittances, exports, and 
imports are all up. 
 
-  Inflation.  A little worrisome for IMF, it is around 7% 
with money and credit growth above IMF's target range.  IMF 
reports that BDG policies are gradually tightening, so as 
long as BDG continues existing policies, this is acceptable. 
 
- Fiscal policy.  The deficit is not perceived to be the 
problem; instead, revenue collection is IMF's chief concern. 
Bangladesh ranks very low in revenue collection, even among 
similarly situated developing nations.  It is currently 
collecting around 10.5% of GDP, and in five years only plans 
an increase to 13% of GDP.  IMF targets for countries like 
Bangladesh would be 15% or more.  Total spending by the BDG 
seems to be under control, but some sector specific spending 
(i.e. development and infrastructure) is often below the 
budgeted amount.  This may be due to both an overly 
optimistic revenue projection, as well as over-promising on 
what the budget can deliver.  Next year, the Medium Term 
Budget Framework (MTBF) is planned to expand from the current 
four ministries, and IMF hopes this will improve efficiency 
in the newly covered ministries. 
 
-  Banking reform.  The restructuring of the state-owned 
non-commercial banks (NCBs) is going slower than IMF had 
hoped for, but indications in both the local press and at the 
meeting are that there will not be a break in momentum during 
the caretaker government.  One other positive sign IMF 
specifically mentioned is the offer to purchase Rupali Bank. 
The IMF team thought the price seemed correct and the process 
fit and proper.  One of the core problems discussed with 
respect to the NCBs is the mandated lending to the BDG, 
especially lending to cover the revolving credit on oil 
imports.  NOTE:  BDG has a revolving line of credit to 
purchase imported oil.  The line of credit is repaid when the 
oil is sold, however the BDG has not been efficiently passing 
along worldwide price increases to the domestic market, 
resulting in a large shortfall between the lines of credit's 
expenses versus repayments.  END NOTE 
 
-  Oil price supports.  Along with the problem noted above 
with the NCBs covering the deficit in import-wholesale 
prices, is the fact that BD is lagging behind even other 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in passing along oil price 
increases to consumers. 
 
-  Tax exemptions.  IMF denied media reports that they are 
demanding the BDG eliminate all tax exemptions and tax 
holidays.  IMF does feel there are probably too many of them, 
and that a thorough analysis of existing exemptions and 
holidays be made to come up with a real cost/benefit analysis 
to be sure they are not giving too much away unnecessarily. 
This process needs to start now, in IMF's opinion, in order 
to be in place for the next budget starting July '07. 
 
 
-  Alleged food staples price manipulation.  IMF discounted 
recent media reports alleging anti-competitive price 
manipulation by syndicates of suppliers and wholesalers of 
staples like pulses and sugar. Based on statistical analysis, 
it seems that a 7% inflation rate and a deflating currency is 
to blame for increasing prices, not a sudden market 
syndication.  IMF was quick to add that there may in fact be 
syndication in the marketplace here, but it just isn't new. 
 
3.  (SBU) COMMENT:  At this point, it is clear that raising 
fuel prices just before elections is politically unpalitable 
to the BNP lead goverment. Yet despite continuing concerns 
about fuel subsidies and revenue collections, the IMF 
assessment team's tone was generally positive. IMF's cautious 
assessment may be sufficient to bring the next PRGF tranche 
to the Executive Board at its October 2006 meeting.  Coming 
this close to the election, denying PRGF money would surely 
be grist for the political mill and the Board may board may 
choose to avoid the political fallout from denying PRGF when 
there are at least some positive accomplishments that they 
can point towards.  The boards decision is important not just 
for the PRGF funds, but also because the World Bank often 
looks at IMF's macro-economic assessment and decision on 
release of PRGF funds as an important factor in its own 
decision whether to release Development Support Credit funds. 
BUTENIS