Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1978, ARGENTINA: OPPOSITION UCR PARTY CONVENTION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BUENOSAIRES1978.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BUENOSAIRES1978 2006-09-01 17:39 2011-03-13 07:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Buenos Aires
Appears in these articles:
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1357063-eeuu-veia-una-oposicion-cercana-a-la-irrelevancia
VZCZCXRO3476
PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBU #1978/01 2441739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011739Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5747
INFO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1710
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 001978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO 
NSC FOR DAN FISK 
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: OPPOSITION UCR PARTY CONVENTION 
HIGHLIGHTS PARTY WEAKNESS 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 01901 
 
Classified By: CDA, a.i., Michael Matera, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Although the August 25-26 national 
convention of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) confirmed that 
the UCR would remain an opposition party, it also 
demonstrated the UCR's weakened state because the most 
significant party leaders failed to attend.  Calls by UCR 
Congressman Federico Storani to expel the Radicales K from 
the party were rejected by other party leaders -- so it 
appears that there will not be a formal split for the time 
being -- although the convention solidified the de facto 
division of the party.  Other elements in the party are 
opposed to former President Raul Alfonsin and other party 
leaders' proposal for the UCR to support former Economy 
Minister Roberto Lavagna for President next year.  Party 
leaders did not decide on candidates for the 2007 elections 
at the convention, but did grant UCR Party President Roberto 
Iglesias the power to negotiate electoral accords with 
Lavagna and other political parties.  In the days since the 
convention, GOA and UCR leaders have exchanged sharp public 
criticism.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) Although the August 25-26 national convention of 
the Radical Civic Union (UCR) confirmed that the UCR would 
remain an opposition party, it also demonstrated the UCR's 
weakened state because the most significant party leaders 
failed to attend.  (For more on the current state of the UCR, 
see reftel.)  National UCR party leaders at the convention in 
the city of Rosario rejected President Kirchner's call to 
join his ""concertacion"" and stated that the UCR would remain 
an opposition force.  However, the show of unity was 
overshadowed by the absence of the most important UCR 
leaders, most notably the Radicales K -- comprising the 
majority of the UCR Governors and the most important UCR 
Mayors -- who avoided the gathering on Kirchner's orders. 
Calls by UCR Congressman Federico Storani to expel the 
Radicales K from the party were rejected by other party 
leaders, so it appears that the party will not formally split 
for the time being, although the convention solidified the de 
facto division of the party.  Socialist Congressmen Hermes 
Binner and Ruben Giustiniani, who are in alliance with the 
UCR in Santa Fe province, attended the convention, although 
other Socialist leaders subsequently publicly stated that 
their attendance did not signify that the Socialist Party 
(PS) has an alliance with the UCR on a national level. 
 
3.  (SBU) On the other side of the party, National Senator 
Rodolfo Terragno refused to attend because of his opposition 
to former President Raul Alfonsin and other party leaders' 
proposal for the UCR to support former Economy Minister 
Roberto Lavagna for President next year.  Both Terragno and 
UCR General Secretary Margarita Stolbizer advocate developing 
a new party platform before endorsing candidates and favor 
endorsing a UCR member for President, rather than a Peronist 
opposition candidate like Lavagna.  Party leaders did not 
decide on candidates for the 2007 elections at the 
convention, but did grant UCR Party President Roberto 
Iglesias the power to negotiate electoral accords with 
Lavagna and other political parties. 
 
4.  (SBU) In the days since the convention, GOA and UCR 
leaders have exchanged sharp public criticism.  Kirchner held 
a public event with Mendoza Governor and leading Radicales K 
member Julio Cobos and portrayed the UCR leaders still in the 
opposition as representing negative aspects of Argentina's 
past.  Alfonsin countered Kirchner's attacks by contrasting 
Alfonsin's record fighting for human rights during the 
military dictatorship to Kirchner's support for Menem's 
reelection and now-much-criticized privatization campaign in 
the mid-1990s. 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT: The Rosario convention marked what looks 
like the beginning of the end of the UCR as a national 
political force.  In theory, the end of Argentina's 
traditional party system provides the opportunity for a more 
 
BUENOS AIR 00001978  002 OF 002 
 
 
rational political system to develop.  Both of the 
traditional parties -- the UCR and the Peronist Party (PJ) -- 
have practiced a clientelistic-style of politics that has 
prevented new parties from consolidating since the return to 
democracy in 1983.  Third parties that gained traction for a 
short period of time, such as the UcDe in the 1980s and 
Frepaso in the 1990s, largely disappeared after being coaxed 
into alliances with one of the traditional parties.  The 
traditional parties have lacked ideological coherence, as 
left-wing and right-wing elements have coexisted under the 
same party logo.  However, despite President Kirchner's 
rhetoric to the contrary, Argentina does not appear to be any 
closer to developing a rational system of center-right and 
center-left parties.  Kirchner's poaching of the UCR and 
other minor parties have netted him both left-wing and 
right-wing leaders, and the remaining opposition is spread 
across the ideological spectrum.  The health of Argentina's 
democratic system is the main loser in this political 
development, as the opposition has become even weaker as a 
result.  END COMMENT. 
 
MATERA