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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA2410, AU MILITARY STAFF QUESTIONS PLAN FOR IGASOM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA2410 2006-09-05 16:11 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO1423
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2410/01 2481611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051611Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2310
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO AU
SUBJECT: AU MILITARY STAFF QUESTIONS PLAN FOR IGASOM 
DEPLOYMENT TO SOMALIA 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 2389 (NOTAL) 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT.  On August 28, the African 
Union's Military Staff Committee (MSC), comprised of defense 
attaches or other military representatives of each of the 15 
members of the AU Peace and Security Council, reviewed the 
proposed deployment plan for an IGAD peace support operation 
(IGASOM) in Somalia.  The MSC's review followed the 
presentation of the plan to AU PSC permreps on August 25 by 
Kenyan PermRep to the AU Ambassador Francis Espilla (reftel). 
 In a written report, a copy of which was obtained by the 
Embassy of Sweden, the MSC highlights a number of concerns, 
including: 
-- the proposed mission's mandate is "scanty and ambiguous," 
as it remains unclear whether IGASOM would focus on 
aggressive peace enforcement (e.g., as under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter) or on more passive peace-keeping; 
-- the concept of operations (CONOPS) calls for deploying 4 
infantry battalions in Baidoa, and another 4 battalions in 
Mogadishu, but none to any other areas in Somalia, raising 
concerns about force protection and "an open flank for the 
ICU to exploit;" 
-- the proposed mission structure lacks details (e.g., 
currently does not include any military observers or civilian 
police); 
-- the proposed USD 196 million budget lacks detailed 
justification. 
 
2. (SBU) The MSC's frank observations suggest that AU members 
are applying lessons learned from the beleagured AU Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS), as the MSC calls for the establishment of a 
joint operations center for effective coordination of mission 
components; suggests that "the substantial part of the force 
and funding should be secured" prior to initial deployment;" 
and advises that "lessons should be drawn from ... past 
missions and operations").  The MSC's report concludes that 
the deployment plan "requires to be redrafted."  END SUMMARY 
AND COMMENT. 
 
3. (U) BEGIN TEXT. 
 
REPORT BY THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE ON IGASOM DEPLOYMENT 
PLAN HELD ON 28 AUGUST 2006 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
1.  The Military Staff Committee (MSC) held a meeting on 
Monday, 28 August 2006, to discuss the IGASOM Deployment Plan 
that was presented to the Peace and Security Council on 25 
August 2006 by Mr. Francis Espilla, the Kenyan Ambassador to 
the AU, with the view to providing the PSC with the requisite 
technical advice to enable the Council (to) make informed 
decisions on the deployment plan.  Representatives of IGAD 
who took part in the preparation of the plan, were invited to 
present the plan and also to shed more light on certain 
areas, but were unable to attend the meeting.  The MSC 
therefore went ahead to discuss the plan without any further 
input from IGAD. 
 
2.  The MSC took note of the time and effort put in by IGAD 
in drafting the deployment plan, as well as its political 
will and enthusiasm to deploy IGASOM at the earliest possible 
time.  The Committee was particularly happy to note that much 
effort had been made since the last meeting of the IGAD 
Chiefs of Defense Staff, to operationalise the Command and 
Control Structure of the Mission, at both the strategic and 
operational levels.  However, the MSC argued that the plan 
lacks depth in some areas and contains some inconsistencies 
that will make it unworkable. 
 
AIM 
--- 
 
3.  The aim of this report is to determine the feasibility, 
risks and implications as well to identify major unclear 
areas of the deployment plan that are likely to affect its 
usefulness for implementation. 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002410  002 OF 003 
 
 
MAJOR OBSERVATIONS 
------------------ 
 
4.  The Mission Mandate.  It was noted that the statement of 
the mission mandate was scanty and ambiguous.  There is need 
to expand it and also to indicate clearly whether it is a 
Peacekeeping or a Peace Enforcement Mission.  This may 
resolve the inconsistencies between the mandate and the 
concept of operation. 
 
5.  Current Situation.  The current situation paragraph needs 
to be reviewed to reflect the situation in Somalia at the 
time of preparing the deployment plan. 
 
6.  Assumptions. 
 
a.  The assumption that 'Deployment of IGASOM will be based 
on consensus in Somalia' downplays the concerns of the ICU, 
which is one of the two parties identified in the Somali 
conflict. 
 
b.  The assumption that the mission will be funded appears to 
be hanging.  It may be recast to read "The international 
community will support and fund the mission'. 
 
7.  Concept of Operation.  The concept of operations 
envisages an 8 (eight) infantry battalion operation in a 
2-Phase Deployment.  Phase I covers the deployment of 4 
reinforced infantry battalions in the Baidoa area, one 
battalion at a time.  There is no indication of the duration 
between the deployment of these battalions.  Phase II covers 
the deployment of 4 additional battalions into the Mogadishu 
area.  The deployment is thus restricted to only some 
portions of Southern Somalia.  The concept does not also put 
the transition of IGASOM to an AU mission into perspective. 
The implications here are that: 
 
a.  Troops stand the chance of being defeated piece meal. 
They may not be able to defend themselves in the face of 
hostilities. 
 
b.  Troops deployed during Phase I may not be effective on 
the ground, thus complicating security issues and making 
subsequent Phases difficult to undertake. 
 
c.  The AU may be pressurized (sic) to supplement the force 
during Phase I if that force is to survive and make a 
meaningful impact on the ground. 
 
d.  Deployment only to Southern Somalia will leave an open 
flank for the ICU to exploit, further complicating security 
issues. 
 
e.  It would be difficult for the AU to determine its 
responsibilities and make adequate preparations, especially 
in terms of force generation, if the issue of the transition 
is not clarified.  This is likely to create an operational 
gap. 
 
8.  Use of Force and Rules of Engagement.  It has been 
provided for under the Use of force and Rules of engagement 
that 'Force will also be used in carrying out the mandate'. 
This underscores the need to deploy, particularly in Phase I, 
in strength and in force. 
 
9.  The Mission Structure.  While the Mission Structure at 
Annex K has omitted some components, it also lacks details in 
some aspects.  The structure needs to be expanded to include: 
 
a.  Military Observers. 
 
b.  The structure under the command of the CIVPOL 
Commissioner. 
 
c.  A Joint Operations Centre for effective coordination of 
the mission components and efficient use of scarce resources. 
 
d.  Appendices indicating details/strength of personnel under 
each component/sub-component and also the structure and 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002410  003 OF 003 
 
 
details of a generic battalion are needed. 
 
10.  The Budget. 
 
a.  The plan does not contain sufficient details to justify a 
budget of USD 196m. 
 
b.  Multiplying the cost of deployment and maintenance of one 
battalion by the total number of battalions to be deployed in 
Phase I is quite unrealistic, as not all the battalions will 
be deployed at the same time. 
 
c.  The request of USD 18.5m 'Priority Fund' requires 
justification. 
 
11.  Deployment Time Line.  The deployment time line does not 
seem achievable under the circumstances.  This requires to be 
reviewed. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
12.  The Committee recommends that: 
 
a.  The MSC in principle supports the deployment plan, 
however it requires to be redrafted, taking into 
consideration the observations made in the report from 
paragraph 4 to 11. 
 
b.  The substantial part of the force and funding should be 
secured before Phase I deployment in order to avoid issues of 
insufficient funds in the middle of operations. 
 
c.  The Committee is of the view that lessons should be drawn 
from the past missions and operations, with the special 
emphasis from the Darfur Mission. 
 
END TEXT. 
WILGUS