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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK1438, NHLAPO BRIEFS SECURITY COUNCIL ON LRA AND NORTHERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1438 2006-08-01 15:55 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1438/01 2131555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011555Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9714
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0931
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0244
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0323
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0911
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0671
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0788
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8842
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UG UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: NHLAPO BRIEFS SECURITY COUNCIL ON LRA AND NORTHERN 
UGANDA 
 
REF: USUN NEW YORK 1404 
 
1. (SBU) On July 28, the Director of the Africa I Division 
in the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Welile 
Nhlapo, updated the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the threat 
of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda.  He 
noted that the progress of peace talks in Juba, Southern 
Sudan, between the Government of Uganda (GOU) and the LRA, is 
slow and suggested the deployment of a Special Envoy to 
facilitate dialogue and reconciliation.  Members had 
divergent views on the issue of deploying an Envoy: the U.S. 
was skeptical about the need for an Envoy, the UK emphasized 
that an Envoy is essential to gaining the support of the 
international community, and others, including African 
members, made it clear that their support was contingent on 
the success of the next round of talks in Juba.  Nhlapo also 
discussed the possibility of expanding the mandates of the UN 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and UN Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to address the LRA 
threat, noting that UNMIS was not configured or equipped to 
take on additional responsibilities.  He also brought up the 
need for further discussions about the funding sources of the 
LRA.  UK Ambassador Jones Parry expressed support for the 
imposition of sanctions against those who provide financial 
and logistical resources to the LRA.  Jones Parry, along with 
the representatives from France and Denmark, also supported 
the idea of convening an experts meeting as soon as possible 
to discuss incorporating these issues into a forthcoming 
resolution (text contained reftel).  END SUMMARY. 
 
ADDRESSING WAYS TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS DURING JUBA TALKS 
 
2. (SBU) Director Nhlapo characterized the recent talks in 
Juba as a 'promise' from the GOU and the LRA that they would 
continue to work towards addressing the crisis in northern 
Uganda, and he called for confidence-building measures to 
support the process.  Nhlapo noted that some positive 
progress had been made on the humanitarian front, including 
the relocation of 40,000 IDPs to decongestion camps and the 
increase in humanitarian aid access in the region.  Nhlapo 
pointed out the strides made on the issue of child 
protection, noting the accomplishments made by Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed 
Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, during her June 3 meeting 
with President Museveni, where she secured Museveni's 
commitment for increased engagement with UNICEF.  Nhlapo 
pointed out that, despite this progress, much remains to be 
done to ensure security in the region.  He lamented the 
infrequent meetings of the Joint Monitoring Commission, which 
needs greater GOU commitment to succeed. 
 
3. (SBU) Ghanaian Ambassador Effah-Apenteng suggested 
conducting broader Council discussions about enhancing the 
role of the Joint Monitoring Committee, which in its first 
meeting, neglected to address issues such as cessation of 
hostilities, IDP return and resettlement, funding and 
participation of local Ugandan authorities and NGOs.  Nhlapo 
stressed that the only way for long-term success to prevail 
is not through a military solution but through the GOU's 
attention to the root causes of the conflict and through the 
solicitation of support from regional actors and the 
international community.  Several members, including the 
representatives from China, Russia, and Qatar, stressed that 
the GOU bears the primary responsibility for addressing the 
LRA problem, protecting its civilians, and holding 
perpetrators accountable. 
 
EXPANSION OF UNMIS AND MONUC MANDATES HAS MIXED SUPPORT 
 
4. (SBU) Nhlapo addressed the possibility of expanding UNMIS 
and MONUC mandates to include provisions for dealing with the 
LRA threat in the region.  He stressed, however, that both 
operations are fully engaged in carrying out their current 
mandates, especially MONUC, whose 17,000 troops have the 
hefty task of monitoring the elections in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) on July 30 and in subsequent rounds. 
He went on to say that current UNMIS forces do not have the 
resources or capacities to take on another role in addition 
to their work in southern Sudan.  Ambassador Jones Parry of 
the UK disagreed, saying that a coordinated effort is needed 
to disarm and demobilize the LRA.  He pointed out that UNMIS 
could provide an extra source of protection and support 
against LRA incursions and suggested that the UNSC consider 
mandate expansions after the elections in the DRC have taken 
place.  Greek Ambassador Vassiliakis noted that expanding 
UNMIS' and MONUC's mandates would mean increasing their 
resources, and stated that his delegation is ready to support 
both.  Ambassador Wang of China said that, while he 
encourages further discussions about an expansion, the 
peacekeeping operations should not attempt to replace the 
regional governments and that the UNSC should be accordingly 
careful.  POL Mins-Couns noted that the U.S. sees the role of 
UNMIS and MONUC as less operational and more geared towards 
encouraging the responsibility and coordination of regional 
states in efforts to counter the LRA threat. 
 
HESITATIONS REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL ENVOY 
 
5. (SBU) Nhlapo reiterated SYG Annan's support of deploying a 
Special Envoy to monitor and facilitate the peace talks and 
encourage the progress made thus far in Juba.  Nhlapo 
reminded Members that, in order for the Envoy to complete his 
mission successfully, he would need a comprehensive and clear 
mandate.  UK Ambassador Jones Parry expressed his 
delegation's support of the deployment of a Special Envoy, 
stating that his office would offer its help in coordinating 
efforts to disarm and demobilize the LRA.  Ambassador Loj of 
Denmark expressed support for the appointment of an Envoy but 
said that the Council must first address issues such as a 
timeline and logistics before a deployment could occur.  POL 
Mins-Couns expressed skepticism about the alleged progress 
made in Juba, noting that key LRA leadership was not present 
and that the LRA was not a legitimate political entity.  He 
also reminded Members about the role that ICC indictments of 
LRA leadership played in influencing in the talks. 
Ambassador Jones Parry acknowledged the doubts surrounding 
the talks in Juba, but stressed that it is necessary to 
encourage the process to see if it leads to a solution for 
ending the conflict.  Most delegates agreed with the comments 
from Ambassador Effah-Apenteng of Ghana, who said that it is 
necessary to wait for the outcomes of the next round of talks 
in Juba before committing to the deployment of a Special 
Envoy.  He did, however, concede that since the UN negotiated 
for the talks in Juba, it follows that it should be able to 
ensure the success of the talks. 
 
FUNDING SOURCES FOR LRA SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED 
 
6. (SBU) Several Members, including Ambassador Effah-Apenteng 
of Ghana, Congolese Ambassador Ikouebe, and the Qatari 
representative, agreed with Nhlapo's suggestion that the UNSC 
should begin examining the funding sources of the LRA. 
Ambassador Jones Parry of the UK suggested the possible 
imposition of targeted sanctions against those who provide 
financial support to LRA members, an idea seconded by Danish 
PermRep Loj. 
 
7. (SBU) Nhlapo pointed out that the GOU did not support the 
idea of appointing a panel of experts to investigate sources 
of LRA funding and equipping, since it claims to have its own 
"sufficient information" on these questions that it would be 
willing to share with an eventual Special Envoy.  Nhalpo 
added that SYG Annan hopes to encourage the GOU to share 
information on LRA supply lines.  Ambassador Jones Parry 
suggested convening an experts meeting as soon as possible to 
discuss the issues of mandate expansions, sanctions, and a 
Special Envoy in the context of a resolution.  Ambassador Loj 
and the French Deputy PermRep Duclos supported Ambassador 
Parry's suggestion to organize an experts meeting within a 
few weeks.  UKUN has proposed a meeting with USUN on August 2 
to discuss the resolution text. 
 
8. (SBU) Several Members, including Ambassador Jones Parry, 
noted their interest in receiving a follow-up report once the 
next round of talks in Juba have taken place.  Ambassador 
Jones Parry emphasized the need for the topic of northern 
Uganda to remain as a regular item on the UNSC agenda because 
of the consequences of the ongoing conflict and its effect on 
the stability of the region.  POL Mins-Couns posed the 
question to the Secretariat of whether this issue would 
appear under the rubric of northern Uganda or the LRA on the 
UNSC agenda.  After Russia expressed reservations about this 
issue, the French Presidency deferred the discussion to 
subsequent consultations expected during the Ghanaian 
Presidency in August. 
BOLTON