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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK1434, UNSC/UNMEE: MEMBERS FEAR SPREAD OF CONFLICT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1434 2006-08-01 13:58 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO7123
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUCNDT #1434/01 2131358
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011358Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9708
INFO RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0929
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0760
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0072
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0321
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0489
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL SO UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/UNMEE: MEMBERS FEAR SPREAD OF CONFLICT TO 
SOMALIA AND FURTHER UNMEE DOWNSIZING 
 
REF: SECSTATE 122495 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) Africa Division Director Titov updated the 
Security Council at July 27 consultations on the status of 
UNSCR 1681 (2006) implementation and on the situation on the 
ground between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Members looked forward 
to the August 24 meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission (EEBC), but Titov warned against expecting changes 
in the positions of either party.  Japanese Permanent 
Representative (PR) Oshima offered to host consultations with 
troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in the Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO) Working Group (which Japan chairs) in the 
run-up to UNSC consideration of the September mandate renewal 
for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).  Several 
Members appeared to have second thoughts about UNSCR 1681 
implementation, expressing concern about the 'undermining' of 
UNMEE's mandate and looking at the possibility of further 
downsizing come September mandate renewal as a worst-case 
scenario.  Members also expressed concern about the 
implications that the protracted stalemate between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea carried for the current power struggle between 
the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and militias 
of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).  END SUMMARY. 
 
GROUND SITUATION UNCHANGED, DOWNSIZING ON TRACK 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
2. (SBU) Titov noted that there were no major military 
developments in and around the Temporary Security Zone, that 
troops on both sides were in defensive positions and that no 
movement of heavy artillery had been observed.  He pointed 
out that the presence of continued restrictions on UNMEE's 
freedom of movement, especially the helicopter ban, could 
cause tensions between the sides to escalate.  Titov lamented 
the continued detention of ten UNMEE local staff members. 
 
3. (SBU) Titov prefaced his description of UNSCR 1681 
implementation by saying that the reduction of UNMEE's force 
strength to 2,300 had 'far-reaching' implications for the 
Mission.  Nevertheless, he explained, a comprehensive 
downsizing plan had been finalized and was being implemented: 
over 500 troops had been repatriated since July 14, with 
complete reduction anticipated by August 31.  Internal 
streamlining was compensating for the strain downsizing had 
placed on UNMEE capabilities: DPKO addressed the lack of 
medical evacuation capacity, for example, by upgrading 
medical facilities and re-locating a Level II hospital from 
Asmara to Axum. 
 
4. (SBU) Several Members appeared to have second thoughts 
about UNSCR 1681 implementation, expressing concern about the 
'undermining' of UNMEE's mandate and looking at the 
possibility of further downsizing come September mandate 
renewal as a worst-case scenario.  The UK Deputy PR 
recommended that UNMEE be granted sufficient time to 'settle 
in' to its new configuration before its mandate is further 
revised.  (COMMENT: UKUN was the single biggest obstacle to 
our plan to downsize UNMEE in May and is clearly setting the 
stage for the fight to come in September should we seek 
further reductions in UNMEE's size. END COMMENT.)  Both the 
Qatari and Ghanaian representatives made a plea for the 
parties to progress on border demarcation, without which the 
Council would be 'forced' to reconsider further downsizing. 
Japanese PR Oshima offered to host consultations with UNMEE 
TCCs in the PKO Working Group (which Japan chairs) in the 
run-up to consideration of UNMEE's future mandate.  (NOTE: 
The last time this group convened, Titov himself, who 
re-committed today to attend this future PKO meeting, spoke 
out against reducing UNMEE's forces. END NOTE.)  Only the 
Peruvian delegate spoke in favor of a 'realistic' approach 
toward UNMEE's numbers, arguing at length against putting too 
much faith in the August 24 EEBC meeting. 
 
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROTRACTED BORDER STALEMATE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
5. (SBU) Titov mentioned the EEBC decision to re-open its 
field offices in Asmara and Addis Ababa, with staff ready to 
re-deploy in early August.  He urged the international 
community to remain engaged in the border standoff between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, urging Members to persuade the parties 
to attend the next EEBC meeting on August 24 but warning that 
he had no indication that either party would attend or that 
their respective positions would radically change as a result 
of the meeting.  Still, Titov heralded the U.S. diplomatic 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001434  002 OF 002 
 
 
initiative as the only chance for success in the crisis, 
which was now taking on an increased regional dimension.  He 
said that while the UN could confirm neither the presence of 
up to 1,500 Ethiopian troops and civilian advisers in and 
around Baidoa nor the arrival of Ethiopian heavy-lift and 
attack helicopters at Baidoa Airport, Ethiopian support to 
the TFG would represent a 'new dynamic' in the current 
situation in Somalia.  Titov added that UNMEE and the UN 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) were preparing a shared analysis of 
regional security trends to be submitted to the Council. 
 
6. (SBU) The majority of Members jumped on Titov's mention of 
the regional aspects of the situation between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, led by Ambassador Sanders (drawing from reftel 
points) and Slovakian PR Burian.  The Argentine 
representative asked about the veracity of TFG press reports 
about Eritrea's equipping UIC militias; Titov could not 
confirm but would pass the request on to the Department of 
Political Affairs, which has the lead on Somalia issues.  The 
UK DPR urged Members to remind the parties to refrain from 
violence in Somalia, referring to the July 13 Presidential 
Statement on the issue (S/PRST/2006/31).  Danish PR Loj 
suggested the Council consider holding a broader discussion 
of sub-regional issues in the near future.  Greek PR 
Vassilakis offered to back-brief the Council on his 
forthcoming meetings with PRs of the Ethiopian and Eritrean 
Missions on committing to the EEBC process. 
BOLTON