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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3196, IRAN DOMINATES OLMERT'S DISCUSSION WITH CODELS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TELAVIV3196 2006-08-14 12:50 2011-03-15 18:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
Appears in these articles:
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Carol X Weakley  08/16/2006 04:03:37 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Carol X Weakley

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
C O N F I D E N T I A L        TEL AVIV 03196

SIPDIS
CXTelA:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   ADM AID IPSC SCI IMO CONS RES POL DCM AMB PD
            FCS

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:GCRETZ
DRAFTED: ECON:AABELL
CLEARED: POL:NOLSEN

VZCZCTVI302
OO RUEHC RUEHXK
DE RUEHTV #3196/01 2261250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141250Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5602
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003196

SIPDIS

CODEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMINATES OLMERT'S DISCUSSION WITH CODELS
MILLER AND ROYCE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4(b) and (
d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

1. (C) In an August 10 meeting, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
told CODELs Miller and Royce that the Israeli fight against
Hizballah in Lebanon was part of a larger war against Iran
and Syria. Olmert attributed Hizballah's battlefield
strength to direct Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
leadership and armament, citing as evidence the IDF claim of
Iranians among Hizballah casualties, as well as sophisticated
anti-tank and anti-ship missiles being employed against
Israeli forces. He assessed that Iran would have preferred
to save Hizballah's strength for a time when Iran itself is
directly threatened, rather than expose it now. He explained
the Israeli decision to go to war over Hizballah's July 12
attack as a decision to deal with the Hizballah problem now,
rather than merely "giving it lip service" and allowing it to
become more dangerous in the future. Finally, Olmert
expressed his preference for a political solution over a
military solution to the conflict, as long as it could
establish the conditions set forth in UNSCR 1559. End
Summary.

2. (C) On August 10, CODEL Miller and CODEL Royce met with
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in his Tel Aviv office. The
combined CODELs opened the meeting by formally presenting the
Prime Minister with a copy of a House Resolution supporting
Israel's right to defend itself against aggression from
Hizballah in Lebanon, and condemning Syria and Iran for their
support of Hizballah. The Prime Minister gratefully accepted
the resolution and emphasized the importance of American
moral support for Israel during such a difficult time.

--------------------------------
WEAKENING IRAN'S "STRATEGIC ARM"
--------------------------------

3. (C) Olmert next told the CODEL that the current
hostilities in Lebanon were part of a greater war against
Iran and Syria, and not just a fight with Hizballah
guerillas. He suggested that the Iranians had been surprised
by Israel's strong reaction to Hizballah's July 12
cross-border attack. Calling Hizballah a "strategic arm" of
the Iranian government, he said that Iran would have
preferred to save Hizballah's strength for a time when Iran
itself is directly threatened, rather than exposing it now.
He explained the Israeli decision to go to war over the July
12 attack as a decision to deal with the Hizballah problem
now, rather than merely "giving it lip service" and allowing
it to become more dangerous in the future.

--------------------------------
EVIDENCE OF THE IRANIAN PRESENCE
--------------------------------

4. (C) The Prime Minister claimed that the IDF had proof that
high-ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
officers were planning Hizballah operations and commanding
Hizballah units in the field. He said that the IDF had found
Iranian government identification cards on the bodies of some
Hizballah casualties in Lebanon. Olmert also asserted that
IRGC operatives, and not Hizballah fighters, had fired the
Iranian C802 anti-ship missile that had damaged the Israeli
warship off the coast of Beirut. He remarked that no
guerilla army in history had been armed with as sophisticated
weapons as those that Hizballah is employing in Lebanon,
including cutting-edge, Russian-made, anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGM) that have been responsible for the majority
of Israeli combat casualties.

----------------------------
A COMPARISON TO OCTOBER 1962
----------------------------

5. (C) Recalling his own memories of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, Olmert commented that even without nuclear missiles,
Iran had already been able to alter the lives of one million
Israelis by making them refugees within their own country.
He said that over 3,500 Hizballah rockets had landed inside
Israel over the past month, causing over one billion USD in
damage to Israeli infrastructure. He further suggested that
the start of the Israeli school year, scheduled for September
1, might be delayed due to the mass evacuations from northern
Israel. Olmert highlighted the recent public comments of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad in Malaysia, who again declared
that wiping the Jewish state off the map was the solution to
conflict in the Middle East. He underscored the difference
between Israel and Hizballah by saying that while Israel
considers civilian casualties a failure, Hizballah considers
dead civilians a measure of success. Rep. Shaw asked the
Prime Minister how much longer Israel and the U.S. should
continue to fight Iran's surrogates before taking direct
action against Iran itself. The Prime Minister responded by
saying that, "I've been talking with President Bush and Vice
President Cheney about that very issue."

--------------------------------------------- --
MAKING UNSCR 1559 A REALITY, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER
--------------------------------------------- --

6. (C) Olmert told the CODEL that he would prefer a political
solution over a military solution to establish the conditions
set forth in UNSCR 1559, but that those conditions must
become a reality one way or another. Olmert indicated his
support for the deployment of the Lebanese Army to the
Israeli bordner, but stressed that the Lebanese Army would
require assistance from an international force comprised of
combat units from "capable countries" that could actually
enforce UNSCR 1559. Olmert confided that he had been
restraining IDF generals from pursuing more aggressive
operations thus far, but if a political solution took much
longer he would soon be forced to approve the beginning of a
"major operation" to "complete the job" in Lebanon.

---------------------------------
GOI MUST IMPROVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
---------------------------------

7. (C) Rep. Royce and Rep. Johnson warned the Prime Minister
that the GOI was currently losing the propaganda war with
Hizballah in the media, and encouraged him to make public
diplomacy a higher priority of his administration. Olmert
agreed that Israel had not done an effective job stating its
case in the court of international public opinion. He
suggested that the media had not covered the suffering of the
Israeli population because the GOI took care of its displaced
citizens rather than begging for international help.

8. (U) Participants:
ISRAEL
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Shalom Tourgeman
Assistant Foreign Policy Advisor Ari Varon
MFA Deputy Director General Ambassador Yoram Ben Zeev
MFA Counselor Eyal Sela

U.S.A.
Rep. Jeff Miller (R-FL)
Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-CT)
Rep. Clay Shaw (R-FL)
Rep. Don Sherwood (R-PA)
Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA)
Mrs. Marie Royce
The Ambassador
Professional Staffer Doug Roach
Econoff (Notetaker)

9. (U) The CODELs did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable before departing post.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
CRETZ