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Viewing cable 06SANSALVADOR2008, EL SALVADOR: FMLN'S LAST MODERATE REFLECTS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SANSALVADOR2008 2006-08-14 20:12 2011-06-07 14:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy San Salvador
Appears in these articles:
http://www.wikileaks.elfaro.net/es/201106/notas/4335/
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #2008/01 2262012
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 142012Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3423
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 002008

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: ES PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR:  FMLN'S LAST MODERATE REFLECTS ON
PARTY'S FUTURE

REF: A. 2005 SAN SALVADOR 3259
     B. SAN SALVADOR 1736
     C. SAN SALVADOR 1849

Classified By: CDA Michael A. Butler, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C)  SUMMARY:  In a wide-ranging discussion with poloff,
moderate FMLN Legislative Assembly Deputy Hugo Martinez
commented on the deadly July 5 violence tied to the FMLN
(reftel B), and speculated on his party's prospects for the
2009 presidential elections.  The conciliatory tone of
Martinez's message, likely coordinated beforehand with the
party's orthodox leadership, appeared to be an effort at
mending relations with the Embassy, which have been strained
recently by the July 5 events and in the face of FMLN
opposition to CAFTA, the International Law Enforcement
Academy (ILEA), and the proposed Millennium Challenge Account
(MCA) project for El Salvador.  Martinez's longterm future in
the FMLN remains uncertain at best, but his Legislative
Assembly seat appears secure until at least 2009.  END
SUMMARY.

Background
----------

2. (C)  During the 2003-2006 Legislative Assembly, seven
moderate FMLN Legislative Assembly deputies (of the party's
total delegation of 31) were either expelled or departed
voluntarily, and went on to form the new Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR).  (Note:  None of the seven won
reelection in March, although the FDR party has been granted
official status by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), and
remains active.  End note.)  Moderate--and
highly-popular--mayors such as San Salvador Mayor Carlos
Rivas Zamora, Santa Ana Mayor Orlando Mena, and Nejapa Mayor
Rene Canjura likewise departed the FMLN either voluntarily or
otherwise since 2004.  In the wake of all these purges,
38-year-old Deputy Hugo Martinez remains perhaps the
highest-profile moderate in a party where voices of dissent
are almost extinct.

FMLN "Reflection" In the Wake of July 5 Violence
--------------------------------------------- ---

3. (C)  Martinez immediately broached the subject of the July
5 riots at the University of El Salvador, during which a
sniper with close ties to the FMLN killed two policemen and
wounded at least 10 others, in what clearly appeared to be a
premeditated ambush (see reftel B).  Martinez lamented the
week-long lapse between the killings and any expressions of
condemnation or condolences by his party's leadership, and
confirmed that this was primarily due to ongoing internal
struggles among several hardliner factions.  He added, almost
contritely, that the police killings had led to serious
reflection and self-examination within the party, and
outlined how he had boldly proclaimed to the party leadership
that if there were any who contemplated a return to an armed
struggle for power such as the nation experienced from 1980
until 1992, he would not be accompanying the FMLN in any such
effort.  (Note:  These sentiments regarding July 5 were
likely in response to the Ambassador's criticism of possible
FMLN complicity in the killings, which was made clear to the
FMLN leadership during a July 12 luncheon.  See reftel C.
End note.)

Looking Ahead to 2009
---------------------

4. (C)  Turning to 2009, when for the first time since 1994,
elections will be held simultaneously for president, the
Legislative Assembly, and all 262 mayoralties, Martinez
outlined that factions are already forming within the FMLN in
support of various alternate strategies.  Asked about popular
Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz's recent overtures regarding a
possible presidential candidacy, Martinez hewed to his
party's official line that any such unilateral declarations
are perhaps premature, and he admitted that chilly relations
now exist between Ortiz and the FMLN leadership.  He pointed
out that San Salvador Mayor Violeta Menjivar remained an
obvious possible presidential candidate.  Perhaps most
interestingly, he described how a number of influential women
within the party, including Political Commission members
Norma Guevara, Lilian Coto, and Deputy Blanca Flor Bonilla,
consider party outsiders such as television commentators
Mauricio Funes and Arturo Zablah as being most electable, but
that others fear that any such candidate might lack
discipline and political reliability.  Martinez laughed off a
question regarding his own possible candidacy, simply saying
that he was regarded as too "independent" to merit serious
consideration as a candidate.  Lastly, in speculating as to
whom an FMLN presidential candidate might face in 2009,

Martinez disclosed that he had heard credible accounts that
charismatic and widely-admired former Foreign Minister
(1999-2004) Maria Eugenia "Mayu" Brizuela de Avila had
already declined an offer from ARENA's executive committee
(COENA), citing the sacrifices that her term as foreign
minister had entailed for her family.

5. (C)  Martinez was surprisingly critical of Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, whom he characterized as a bombastic
autocrat who uses a hypothetical invasion of Venezuela by the
U.S. to manipulate public opinion and silence dissent.  He
conceded that certain high-ranking FMLN officials maintained
close ties with Chavez, although he pleaded ignorance as to
the details of any such relationships.  (Note:  The powerful
but shadowy FMLN strategist Jose Luis Merino is widely
believed to be funneling Venezuelan funds to the FMLN through
an elaborate international network of bank accounts and small
businesses; see reftel A.  End note.)  When asked about the
polarized and uncooperative atmosphere prevalent in the
Assembly, Martinez offhandedly suggested that the ruling
ARENA party would succeed in passing a federal budget by
employing a technicality to avoid the two-thirds vote needed
for assumption of external debt, which would require three or
more FMLN deputies.  He foresees the administration incurring
further debt by guaranteeing needed loans with public pension
funds, and he speculated that any FMLN appeal to the Supreme
Court as to the constitutionality of such a measure would
fail.

6. (C)  COMMENT:  Martinez's comments appeared carefully
crafted to reach out to the Embassy.  Although Martinez will
almost certainly serve out his full term in the Legislative
Assembly, his longer-term fortunes in the now
lockstep-orthodox FMLN remain unclear.  His mentor, Fabio
Castillo, a stalwart party caudillo and close ally of late
party strongman Schafik Handal, had heretofore inoculated
Martinez from attacks by hardliners, but with Handal gone and
Castillo retired from active political life, Martinez now
lacks such protection.  Given the departure of other FMLN
moderates and the loss of his most important defenders,
Martinez's political staying power is little short of
remarkable.
Butler