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Viewing cable 06PRETORIA3422, ENTICED BY AFRICA'S MANIFOLD RICHES, AMERICANS AND CHINESE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PRETORIA3422 2006-08-21 08:34 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO5585
PP RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #3422/01 2330834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210834Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5182
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 003422 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EFIN EINV EAID EIND KDEM CH XA SF
SUBJECT:  ENTICED BY AFRICA'S MANIFOLD RICHES, AMERICANS AND CHINESE 
SEEK TO WORK TOGETHER TO HELP THE CONTINENT DEVELOP 
 
(U) This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified.  Not for Internet 
distribution. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: About 30 government, academic and business leaders 
-- including several former senior State Department officials -- 
held a groundbreaking dialogue to explore how China and the U.S. 
could work with Africa to spur development on the continent. 
Discussions centered on energy, trade and investment, conflict 
resolution and good governance. Some areas of shared interest, such 
as promoting peace and stability, were identified, yet so too were a 
number of hurdles to meaningful collaboration. These included the 
need for greater clarity from Africa in defining its priorities and 
the often stark differences between Chinese and U.S. foreign-policy 
principles. The group plans two more meetings next year to flesh out 
its as-yet amorphous ideas and to issue a report. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) The Africa-China-U.S. Dialogue held at a private resort in 
South Africa from August 4-6 was organized by three think tanks -- 
the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) and South Africa-based The Brenthurst Foundation -- 
to spur discussion on how Africa could benefit from collaboration 
with the two global powers that many believe loom largest in the 
continent's future. The timing of this first of three planned 
meetings comes amid growing global interest in Africa's oil and 
other natural resources, particularly from China. 
 
3. (U) Among U.S. participants were several former State Department 
officials: Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs from 1981-89; Princeton Lyman, former Ambassador to South 
Africa and Nigeria; Thomas Pickering, former Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs; former U.S. Ambassador to China J. 
Stapleton Roy; and Witney Schneidman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs during the Clinton Administration. China's 
delegation was split between officials from its embassy in Pretoria 
and CASS academics, while participating Africans included 
businessmen, academics, Botswana's Minister of Trade and Industry 
and the King of Lesotho. There were no government representatives 
from the continent's two sub-Saharan powerhouses of South Africa and 
Nigeria. 
 
4. (SBU) Participants quickly agreed with virtually no discussion 
that no strategic conflict existed between the U.S. and China in 
Africa despite the scramble for oil and other natural resources, 
thereby making collaboration possible. Yet despite a few 
broad-themed presentations and comments by African delegates 
outlining their views of the continent's priorities, several 
participants said at the end of the conference they remained 
uncertain what Africa really wants from the two powers. Roy, who 
chaired the meeting's closing session, said he had "no clear sense" 
of what Africa desired, while Pickering acknowledged he found it 
hard "to crystallize African views." 
 
5. (SBU) Perhaps an even greater hurdle to effective collaboration 
was the wide divergence between China's traditional foreign-policy 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
countries, which often is seen in the West as a cover for dealing 
with corrupt or rogue regimes, and U.S. promotion of good governance 
and democracy. China's non-interference policy was robustly defended 
by Minister Counselor Zhou Yuxiao, the top diplomat at the Chinese 
Embassy in Pretoria, despite American and African participants' 
insistence that the policy runs counter to broad African support for 
democracy. One African delegate suggested the U.S. and China work 
together to promote democratic reform, which left others puzzling 
over what role China might play given its own lack of experience 
with and enthusiasm for elections. 
 
6. (SBU) Despite these obstacles, some possible areas of 
collaboration were discussed. Several Americans suggested a 
pan-Africa version of the Sullivan principles, which were drafted to 
ensure that U.S. corporate behavior in South Africa during apartheid 
supported economic, social and political justice. They also argued 
that China and the U.S. should work together to bring peace to 
Sudan. The Chinese delegates neither explicitly endorsed nor ruled 
out such proposals. Yu Yongding, an influential CASS academic, said 
that China should change its non-interference principle to provide 
leeway for action to, for example, respond to genocide. 
 
7. (SBU) Zhou suggested that the U.S. and China could work together 
on country-specific development projects such as the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) and its Joint 
Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), South African 
government programs in which he said China planned to invest $20 
million. He said China and the U.S. also could work through the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), while Yu expressed 
support for collaboration through the United Nations and the African 
Union. 
 
PRETORIA 00003422  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Inevitably discussions at this first of three 
meetings focused on generalities and on participants' exploring 
where coordinated action to help Africa development might work and 
where it would be impracticable. If the group is to have any impact, 
it will have to devote the next two meetings to developing concrete 
proposals for governments to consider. In addition to thinking about 
how the two powers could work together on intractable issues such as 
the Sudan crisis, where the prospects of meaningful collaboration 
are uncertain at best, the group also should focus on how the U.S. 
and China can cooperate in areas where both already are actively 
assisting Africa, such as health, agriculture and infrastructure. 
Ambassador Lyman, for one, wants to focus on these areas at 
subsequent meetings. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment continued: China, with its inclusion of three 
Pretoria-based diplomats in the South Africa meeting, clearly has 
signaled its interest in the dialogue. In the subsequent two 
meetings, the State Department also should ensure it has appropriate 
representation - perhaps the Ambassador and/or one or two diplomats 
from Embassy Beijing's political section at the China meeting and 
representatives from the Africa Bureau at the Washington meeting. 
Even if the dialogue does not meet its ambitious goal of drafting a 
workable blueprint for U.S.-China collaboration to help Africa 
develop, such participation can provide a valuable window into 
China's thinking on its role in the continent's future. End 
Comment. 
 
BOST