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Viewing cable 06PORTAUPRINCE1407, HAITI: A/S SHANNON'S MEETING WITH MINUSTAH SRSG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PORTAUPRINCE1407 2006-08-02 19:01 2011-06-29 14:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Port Au Prince
Appears in these articles:
www.haitiliberte.com
VZCZCXRO8600
OO RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #1407/01 2141901
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021901Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3683
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1163
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1005
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 0540
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0963
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS EAID HA
SUBJECT: HAITI: A/S SHANNON'S MEETING WITH MINUSTAH SRSG 
 
REF: A. PAP 1393 
     B. PAP 1386 
 
PORT AU PR 00001407  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
1. (C) Summary: UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) Edmond Mulet warned A/S Shannon on July 25 
that provocations by former president Aristide and his 
supporters could erode Haiti's post-electoral stability. 
Mulet said that President Preval's public silence about 
security problems and inability to decide on a strategy have 
made it difficult for MINUSTAH to take concrete measures to 
improve security.  Over the long term, Mulet feared Latin 
troop-contributors' military commitment to Haiti could wane, 
and he encouraged the U.S. to weigh-in with them in favor of 
a continued presence.  Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on 
Haiti, saying it would call for a one-year extension of the 
mandate and a more active MINUSTAH role on justice and 
security issues.  To improve the security situation, Mulet 
asked the U.S. to expand its drug interdiction efforts in 
Haiti and ease the U.S. embargo on weapons and ammunition for 
the Haitian National Police and UN forces.  A/S Shannon 
assured Mulet of strong USG  support for MINUSTAH and our 
eagerness to see its stabilization mission succeed.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U) Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon and Ambassador 
Sanderson, along with A/DCM and WHA/CAR Director Brian 
Nichols, met for an hour-long conversation with MINUSTAH SRSG 
Edmond Mulet, on the margins of the July 25 Haiti Donors' 
Conference. 
 
GOH does not Control Provinces 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) Mulet described the difficulties facing MINUSTAH and 
the Haitian government.  He rued the "complete lack of the 
state" in Haiti, especially outside the capital, where the 
GOH has been unable to enforce the rule of law.  For example, 
he explained that leaders in the northern town of Ouanaminthe 
have created their own criminal fiefdom.  As a result, drug 
trafficking has become an increasingly alarming problem, 
which is difficult to combat, in part because of the drug 
ties within the Haitian Government.  In this connection, he 
mentioned Senate leader Joseph Lambert and Security 
Commission Chair Youri Latortue -- describing the latter as a 
"drug dealer."  Mulet continued that the judicial system 
could not impose the rule of law, because the Haitian 
National Police (HNP) lacked investigation skills and the few 
judges who have not been corrupted feared ruling against 
drug-related criminals.  Without the basic rule of law, 
MINUSTAH's progress and development work in Haiti have been 
severely limited. 
 
Aristide Movement Must be Stopped 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (C) Mulet also worried that former president Jean Bertrand 
Aristide's influence could continue to disrupt government and 
UN progress in Haiti.  Mulet claimed Aristide has sent agents 
to Haiti to rally support for his return.  These instigators 
have stoked public fear and warned of a new round of violence 
in Port-au-Prince.  Mulet said that at his request, on the 
margins of last month's African Union summit, UNSYG Annan had 
urged South African President Mbeki to ensure that Aristide 
remained in South Africa.  Mbeki reportedly replied that 
Aristide's presence cost the Mbeki government financially 
through security and housing expenses and prompted 
significant political criticism from the opposition.  Judging 
Aristide's continued tenure in South Africa uncertain, Mulet 
urged U.S. legal action against Aristide to prevent the 
former president from gaining more traction with the Haitian 
population and returning to Haiti. 
 
GOH Unsure on Security 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) Mulet said he meets nearly daily with Preval and Prime 
Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis on the situation in Haiti. 
Preval frequently has a clear plan of action that he wants 
MINUSTAH to pursue.  However, when MINUSTAH develops 
operational plans based on Preval's wishes, the President 
then changes his mind and proposes an entirely different 
approach.  Preval's indecision has left MINUSTAH planners and 
troops unable to develop a coordinated strategy with the GOH 
in response to the security situation.  Publicly, Preval has 
accompanied his indecision by complete silence, which is 
working to erode his government's credibility.  Mulet said 
that when he encouraged Preval to speak out, the President 
replied that "silence is my best ally." 
 
Renewed Mandate to Focus on Rule of Law 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (C) Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on Haiti, stating 
that the report would recommend that the 
Security Council extend MINUSTAH's mandate for one-year and 
focus its efforts towards security and the rule of law.  He 
continued that he had initially sought an "executive 
mandate," with greater powers under Chapter VII, the UNSYG 
had encouraged him to seek a more focused force configuration 
within the current mandate.  To achieve that, Mulet said 
MINUSTAH planned to add anti-kidnapping experts, Honduran 
SWAT units, and Peruvian special forces that will allow it to 
take on gangs and crime directly.  Mulet said increased 
MINUSTAH effectiveness in support of democratic institutions 
and economic development will hinge on the ability of the 
donor countries to coordinate their assistance programs.  He 
cited the HNP as an example of the international community's 
failure to work in concert.  Each donor country has pushed 
its own policing model and donor efforts contradicted one 
another.  Mulet suggested that police donors offer a seminar 
for the GOH that explains the various policing models and 
lets the GOH choose. He regretted that the HNP reform plan 
has been "sitting on the Prime Minister's desk" for about one 
month, awaiting final signature. 
 
Elections Pose Challenge 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) In response to A/S Shannon's query, Mulet said that 
he opposed holding municipal and legislative elections later 
this fall.  Under the constitution, Haiti must hold up to 11 
elections during Preval's term, including runoffs.  For 
example, next year, one-third of the Senate will face 
election.  This will entail a nation-wide vote that will cost 
an estimated USD 30 million.  Mulet added that election of 
municipal and local governments will lead to a major 
financial burden on the government, which lacks the 
resources to sustain such a heavy administrative structure. 
Mulet has raised these concerns with Preval and suggested 
that the government amend the constitution to streamline 
these processes.  But, Preval rejected delaying local 
elections, stressing the importance of municipal and local 
government to development of the judiciary and electoral 
council under Haitian law.  Preval reportedly did not want to 
fast track changes in the constitution.  Due to a complicated 
amendment formula, it would take some nine years to effect 
constitutional change, under the existing rules. 
 
MINUSTAH Could Lose Steam Over Long Run 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (C) Over the long-term, Mulet worried that fatigue from 
MINUSTAH's military and police contributors as well as 
Venezuela's possible election to the Security Council could 
jeopardize MINUSTAH's mandate.  Mulet explained that though 
Argentina is committed through February of 2007, it has 
considered lowering its troop commitment to Haiti. 
Meanwhile, Chile has already recuperated three helicopters 
from MINUSTAH, which has significantly limited MINUSTAH's 
mobility.  Mulet reported that the seven South American troop 
contributors are planning a meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Defense in Buenos Aires on August 4 to discuss 
troop levels and the MINUSTAH mandate.  In addition, he 
worried that Venezuela's possible election to the Security 
Council could jeopardize Haiti's Chapter VII status.  Mulet 
said that the Venezuelan ambassador to Haiti had told him 
that in Caracas' view Haiti does not require a Chapter VII 
mission. 
 
Possible U.S. Roles 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (C) Mulet asked for U.S. assistance in a number of areas 
to help bolster the UN's effort in Haiti.  He said that 
increased U.S. anti-drug efforts south of Hispaniola could 
disrupt the drug trade and help Haitian authorities regain 
control in the provinces.  He also asked that the USG carve 
out exceptions for the UN and HNP in its arms embargo against 
Haiti.  While he said that some of the UN military contingents 
brought their own ammunition with them, many of them need to 
re-supply from the U.S.  Finally, he applauded U.S. efforts 
to train South American peacekeepers, which he said directly 
contributed to continued interest by countries such as 
Bolivia to contribute military contingents to Haiti.  A/S 
Shannon assured Mulet of strong USG support for MINUSTAH and 
its stabilization role.  Shannon offered -- and subsequently 
followed through (reftels A and B) -- to press Preval and 
Prime Minister Alexis to 
take more forceful action on security issues, in close 
coordination with MINUSTAH.  Shannon and Mulet agreed that, 
if MINUSTAH fails to stabilize Haiti during this period of 
opportunity, then it is likely the international community 
will have to return to Haiti with a larger and more costly 
operation in the future. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
10. (C) Mulet is an articulate and focused SRSG who has a 
good grasp of the challenges facing his mission despite being 
in his job only seven weeks.  His frustration with Preval's 
inaction and indecision is evident.  Mulet clearly wants 
MINUSTAH to take a more assertive approach to security than 
his predecessor and should enjoy greater political leeway in 
Latin capitals to do so in support of a democratically 
elected government. 
SANDERSON