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Viewing cable 06PHNOMPENH1509, CAMBODIA'S RENEGADE POLICE CHIEF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PHNOMPENH1509 2006-08-24 01:11 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO9268
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #1509/01 2360111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240111Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7196
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM  PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 001509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KJUS CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA'S RENEGADE POLICE CHIEF 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Margaret McKean, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary.  On August 2, an arrest warrant was issued 
for Heng Pov, the powerful former Phnom Penh Municipal Police 
Chief and Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of 
Interior, who reportedly was tipped off of the impending 
arrest and fled the country by the time the RGC moved to 
arrest him.  Since that time, the Cambodian media has covered 
the RGC's charges of corruption and murder against the former 
MOI official, as well as Heng Pov's counterclaims against 
Cambodia's National Police Chief Hok Lundy and Cambodian PM 
Hun Sen.  Press reports have focused on Heng Pov's colorful 
career and speculation as to whether the charges against him 
have been fabricated for political reasons.  Most agree that 
Heng Pov's abrupt fall from grace reflects a power struggle 
with Hok Lundy, who considered Pov a rival.  Reaction to Heng 
Pov's statement (issued through his lawyer) in Phnom Penh has 
elicited little more than a shrug; sources claim that Pov's 
accusations reflect what most people already considered 
common knowledge.  The PM is reportedly furious with Lundy 
for having failed to arrest Heng Pov before the renegade 
police chief revived allegations against senior RGC officials 
that Hun Sen would prefer remain dormant.  The political 
opposition, on the other hand, is enjoying the renewed 
spotlight on the unsolved politically motivated crimes over 
the past decade.  End Summary. 
 
Heng Pov:  Good Cop, Bad Cop 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Since late July, one of Cambodia's most senior 
police officials has remained outside the country in 
Singapore while the RGC frantically has tried to have him 
returned to face charges of assassination, attempted murder, 
and corruption.  Following the issuance of an arrest warrant 
on August 2, the government claimed that Heng Pov was wanted 
for the April 2003 murder of Phnom Penh judge Sok Sethamony, 
the attempted murder of a military police official (Lt. 
General Sao Sokha), illegal confinement of a female suspect, 
and attempted murder of Kim Daravuth, the Director of the 
Cambodian electricity utility.  During a search of Heng Pov's 
residence, the police confiscated over USD 300,000 (of which 
a portion -- USD 30,000 was claimed to be counterfeit USD 
money) and a range of weapons.  The police also froze a 
Canadia bank account reportedly in Hang Pov's name that 
contained roughly USD 1 million.  Heng Pov's wife explained 
that the money confiscated from the family residence was 
derived from the sale of a Phnom Penh property and operating 
funds for her import business.  (Note:  The wife is a 
well-known businesswoman who imports food products from 
Singapore for hotels in Siem Reap.  End Note.)  She claimed 
to know nothing about the counterfeit money the police 
alleged they discovered at the residence. 
 
3.  (U)  Since the story broke, the media have followed the 
RGC's attempts to have Heng Pov returned from Singapore, 
where the ex-police official retained the services of an 
Australian lawyer.  In addition, there have been lengthy 
pieces detailing Heng Pov's career as a police official, 
which date back to the 1980s, through his work as chief of 
Cambodia's anti-drug unit in the 1990s, and more recently in 
conjunction with his tenure as Phnom Penh police chief. 
Relatives and friends of Heng Pov portray him as a good cop 
who bucked the system and refused to play along with the 
corrupt regime led by Hok Lundy and the government led by PM 
Hun Sen. 
 
4.  (C)  In countering the RGC's list of alleged crimes 
committed by Heng Pov, the former MOI official issued his own 
statement in which he detailed allegations linking Hok Lundy, 
other senior MOI officials, as well as the PM to virtually 
every major unsolved political killing since the early 1990s. 
 For Hok Lundy, Heng Pov added the crimes of passport fraud, 
drug trafficking and money laundering.  Heng Pov's statement 
has been picked up by the press in Cambodia as well as the 
opposition press.  Heng Pov also provided an interview to 
L'Express, a French news organ with links to the Sam Rainsy 
Party.  (Note:  A French Embassy official confirmed that Sam 
Rainsy's wife Tioulong Saumura has a sister who works for 
L'Express, which often runs anti-RGC material.  End Note.) 
 
Fall From Grace 
--------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Heng Pov's relationship with Hok Lundy has been 
turbulent for some time, and the former police official has 
had contentious relations with other senior police officials 
in the past.  Mok Chito, the head of the penal police in 
Phnom Penh, has had a poor relationship with Heng Pov since 
the early 1990s, when Heng Pov accused Chito of killing 
 
PHNOM PENH 00001509  002 OF 003 
 
 
protesters during the lead up to and after the 1993 
elections.  In 1998, Chito accused Heng Pov of the attempted 
murder of a newspaper editor.  Heng Pov has also had a rocky 
relationship with military police commander Sao Sokha, who he 
accused of drug trafficking as well as killing FUNCINPEC 
loyalists during the 1997 coup. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The in-fighting within the MOI between Heng Pov 
and other officials, however, was never enough to keep Heng 
Pov from continuing to advance in his career.  Before he was 
removed as police chief of the Phnom Penh Municipality in 
January 2006, Heng Pov had developed a close relationship 
with Hun Sen and had become a senior advisor on security 
matters to the PM, which reportedly enraged National Police 
Commissioner Hok Lundy.  As the senior police official for 
Phnom Penh, Heng Pov placed many of his friends and 
associates in key positions, and had developed a following 
more loyal to him than to Hok Lundy -- according to a former 
international police advisor.  Although Hok Lundy succeeded 
in firing Heng Pov from the top police slot in Phnom Penh, 
the PM and DPM Sar Kheng reportedly refused Lundy's request 
to remove Heng Pov from the government.  Heng Pov received an 
Undersecretary of State position in the MOI, but had little 
authority and virtually non-existent portfolio.  He also 
retained his title as advisor to the PM. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Following Heng Pov's removal in January 2006, 
rumors circulated that Hok Lundy was preparing to develop a 
series of criminal cases against the former police chief.  In 
February, the police arrested some of Heng Pov's former 
subordinates in the Phnom Penh police; six were convicted of 
killing a female detainee held in police custody in 2005. 
Although the six officers confessed to the crime, they 
reportedly did not implicate Heng Pov in this case.  The 
warrant for Heng Pov was issued in conjunction with the 
testimony of one of the six men, who testified in court to 
having killed a Phnom Penh judge on Heng Pov's order.  (Note: 
 Interestingly, after the officer who accused Heng Pov of 
issuing the order was turned over to Prey Sar prison, he 
escaped and has disappeared.  End Note.)  Heng Pov fled the 
country shortly afterwards, and many in Phnom Penh speculate 
he was tipped off in advance by friends in the MOI. 
 
The Aftermath and Hun Sen's Ire 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  A senior MOI official told A/DCM that he and others 
discussed the Heng Pov case before the RGC issued the 
warrant, and reportedly urged DPM Sar Kheng to reconsider the 
wisdom of arresting Heng Pov.  The same official noted that 
Hok Lundy had bungled the arrest and allowed Heng Pov to 
escape.  "Who would issue an arrest warrant without knowing 
in advance where the person would be at the time the warrant 
was issued so that he could immediately be detained?" he 
wondered aloud.  A man like Heng Pov had many friends inside 
the RGC, would hear of the warrant, and had the means to 
escape quickly, he added.  Another MOI official says he just 
does his job and is keeping his head down for the moment. 
 
9.  (C)  On August 18, rumors circulated from the MOI of an 
angry phone call from the PM to Hok Lundy over the latter's 
handling of the Heng Pov case.  The Prime Minister was 
reportedly furious that Hok Lundy not only allowed Heng Pov 
to flee the country but that the National Police Commissioner 
has so far been unable to convince Singapore police 
authorities to detain Heng Pov and remove him to Cambodia. 
In the meantime, the former Cambodian police chief has 
released his statement with the list of crimes associated 
with Hok Lundy and the Cambodian PM.  Lundy had reportedly 
promised the PM that he would return from Singapore with Heng 
Pov before the latter had an opportunity to go public with 
his accusations against the RGC. 
 
10.  (U)  Embassy soundings on reaction to Heng Pov's 
statement indicate that the former police official's version 
of events is not news.  An ADHOC official commented that the 
allegations are not new and corroborate what many in civil 
society have suspected all along concerning 
politically-motivated killings in Cambodia.  Kem Sokha, 
director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), 
agreed that the contents of the statement did not divulge 
anything new, but he did not necessarily believe that 
everything was true.  He offered that the utility of the 
statement was that it should be used to spur the government 
to reopen the investigations of the cases with an eye towards 
solving them to avoid continued suspicion that RGC leaders 
were behind the actions.  Opposition leader Sam Rainsy told 
A/DCM that he received security threat information on 
occasion from Heng Pov in the past -- as Heng Pov wrote in 
the statement, and always heeded the police official's 
 
PHNOM PENH 00001509  003 OF 003 
 
 
advice.  Rainsy added that he was not in a position to assess 
the veracity of anything further in the statement, but also 
called on the RGC for a complete investigation of the 
allegations.  Finally, Rainsy warned that Heng Pov would 
"almost certainly" be killed if returned to Cambodia, as the 
RGC could not afford the spectacle of a public trial. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C)  The RGC clearly miscalculated in its handling of 
the Heng Pov case.  If the government had been prudent, they 
would have not allowed Hok Lundy's personal vendetta against 
the former police official to override a careful weighing of 
the pros and cons associated with Heng Pov's arrest and 
trial.  No matter how one examines this issue, Cambodia's 
government still looks bad when its top police officials are 
launching serious accusations and countercharges against one 
another that go back more than a decade.  At the very least, 
the RGC looks bad for having such an incompetent and 
unprofessional police force -- and not doing anything about 
it over these many years.  At this stage, the RGC remains 
focused on securing Heng Pov's return to Cambodia from 
Singapore.  As for the allegations contained in Heng Pov's 
statement, the RGC managed to ignore them in the past until 
public attention subsided, and will likely try to do the same 
now -- despite calls from civil society that the unsolved 
killings be resolved and those responsible be brought to 
justice.  End Comment. 
MUSSOMELI