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Viewing cable 06PHNOMPENH1396, CAN CAMBODIA'S DEMOCRATIC FORCES UNITE FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PHNOMPENH1396 2006-08-03 00:27 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO8752
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #1396/01 2150027
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030027Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7102
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM  PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 001396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CB
SUBJECT: CAN CAMBODIA'S DEMOCRATIC FORCES UNITE FOR 
UPCOMING ELECTIONS? 
 
 
Classified By: ADCM Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (SBU)  Summary.  On July 30, FUNCINPEC President Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh called on all parties to unite in 2008 and 
form an Alliance of Nationalists.  In practice, the weakened 
FUNCINPEC leader seeks to realign his party with the 
opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and other pro-democracy 
forces in the country to compete effectively in the 2008 
national elections.  CPP officials have dismissed the 
proposal; the SRP leadership will consider Ranariddh's 
proposal as long as the Prince steps down as FUNCINPEC 
President and agrees that Sam Rainsy lead the alliance. 
FUNCINPEC loyalists to the Prince have welcomed the 
initiative as a means to salvage the royalist party's 
following, as have other small political parties with little 
hope of capturing any seats in upcoming elections.  Civil 
society agrees that an alliance offers an opportunity for 
pro-democracy forces in 2008 -- given the 50 percent plus one 
formula, but note that Cambodia's democratic leaders have 
been unable to maintain a united front against the CPP in the 
past.  End Summary. 
 
Ranariddh Offers Proposal for Alliance 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  On July 30, FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh met with senior FUNCINPEC officials in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia and announced a proposal Alliance of 
Nationalists to compete in national elections in 2008.  While 
theoretically open to all parties, the proposal is a means to 
rekindle an alliance of pro-democracy forces along the lines 
of the Alliance of Democrats (AD) that formed after the 2003 
elections.  The AD consisted of FUNCINPEC and the SRP, as 
both parties had won seats in the national elections.  The 
CPP had won the most seats but still lacked the necessary 
two-thirds majority in order to form a government, and needed 
one of the parties to join with it as a governing partner. 
In order to leverage their respective parties' seats into a 
better power-sharing agreement for both FUNCINPEC and SRP, 
the two parties (at Rainsy's initiative) formed the AD in 
order to win greater concessions from the CPP.  In the end, 
however, Ranariddh made a deal with Hun Sen and joined the 
government, leaving the SRP in opposition on its own.  A 
similar alliance took place following 1998 parliamentary 
elections, after which FUNCINPEC deserted the SRP.  This 
time, Ranariddh is proposing that the parties join forces 
ahead of the elections, rather than afterwards. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Senior FUNCINPEC officials have welcomed the 
initiative, which offers a ray of hope that FUNCINPEC can 
maintain some of its party loyalists and compete in upcoming 
elections in a stronger position than they could in their 
current, divided and politically marginalized state.  With 
FUNCINPEC rank and file growing increasingly frustrated over 
the party's internal power struggles, the removal of 
FUNCINPEC officials from government positions, and lack of 
leadership and focus from Ranariddh, FUNCINPEC members have 
been defecting to the CPP as well as the SRP.  In order to 
halt the ongoing outflow of voters and reinvigorate 
confidence in the party, Ranariddh's proposal provides 
FUNCINPEC with hope that their party -- while unable to win a 
clear majority of seats outright in 2008 -- could get back 
into the political game with the SRP as a partner.  Serei 
Kosal, a Senior Minister in the government, claims that the 
Alliance of Nationalists is a strategy for winning the 2008 
elections if all pro-democracy forces unite. 
 
4.  (U)  Ranariddh's proposed alliance was greeted 
enthusiastically by several small political parties, 
including the newly formed Community of Nationalists 
Alliance, headed by Prince Sisowath Thomico, former personal 
secretary to ex-King Sihanouk.  Thomico, who several months 
 
SIPDIS 
earlier had told the Embassy that he planned to announce a 
new political party, opted instead to form an alliance for 
the time being with plans to transition to a political party 
in November 2006.  The nationalist Khmer Front Party, headed 
by Suth Dina, has joined Thomico's alliance, as has Khieu 
Rada, President of the Khmer Unity Party.  Thomico has told 
the media that in order to join the Alliance of Nationalists, 
FUNCINPEC should break with its current governing partnership 
with the CPP. 
 
Sam Rainsy Considering Ranariddh's Proposal 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Senior SRP officials have indicated that they would 
be willing to rejoin an alliance with FUNCINPEC but only if 
Prince Ranariddh stepped down as leader of FUNCINPEC and Sam 
Rainsy became the leader of the alliance.  Some officials 
 
PHNOM PENH 00001396  002 OF 002 
 
 
expressed skepticism over the FUNCINPEC leader's intention, 
noting that the SRP had been deceived by Ranariddh in the 
past.  In a July 31 meeting with A/DCM, Rainsy said that he 
would consider Ranariddh's proposal but would proceed 
cautiously before entering into any partnership.  He and his 
wife, Tioulong Saumura, agreed that Ranariddh's initiative 
was a last grasp at keeping the ailing royalist party afloat 
with any hopes of retaining a future political role.  Noting 
that FUNCINPEC's ability to win National Assembly seats has 
consistently declined since 1993 as the SRP has continued to 
grow in strength in the last two elections, Rainsy claimed 
that the SRP is already gathering FUNCINPEC supporters at the 
grassroots level, and may not need to enter into an alliance. 
 According to Ok Socheat, spokesperson for Prince Ranariddh, 
Sam Rainsy and Ranariddh may meet in August, as talks between 
the two parties continue. 
 
Civil Society Response 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Representatives of civil society generally believe 
that an alliance of pro-democracy forces could strengthen the 
voice of the democratic opposition in upcoming elections, but 
they too remain skeptical of Ranariddh's intentions.  Hang 
Puthear, Director of the Neutral and Impartial Committee for 
Free and Fair Elections (NIFEC) views Ranariddh's proposal as 
FUNCINPEC's last chance for political life.  Puthear believes 
that Ranariddh should reform FUNCINPEC first and rebuild the 
party before entering into an alliance with the SRP and 
others.  Kek Galabru, Director of LICADHO, added that the 
question of who will lead the alliance is key.  The two 
parties have had difficulties in maintaining their alliance 
in the past and it remains an open question if the two men 
can put behind their personal differences in the interest of 
democracy.  Kul Panha of COMFREL (Committee for Free and Fair 
Elections) believes that the 50 percent plus one formula 
gives FUNCINPEC and SRP a new opportunity to provide real 
competition to the CPP in 2008.  Human rights leader Kem 
Sokha told the Ambassador and A/DCM that he has no position 
on the alliance and does not support the agenda of any single 
party. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C)  In theory, a merging of pro-democracy forces to take 
advantage of the 50 percent plus one formula offers the best 
opportunity for democratic change in Cambodia; at the very 
least, it would give the CPP a challenge in the 2008 
elections.  The CPP's party structure remains stronger than 
either FUNCINPEC or the SRP with greater control down to the 
grassroots levels.  Both FUNCINPEC and the SRP would have to 
significantly ramp up their organizational capacity to mount 
a challenge, even if they did agree to unite.  In practice, 
however, Cambodia's democratic-minded politicians have been 
unable to keep their lingering personal animosities and egos 
in check and make the sacrifices necessary to hold an 
alliance together.  The CPP has proven adept at splintering 
the opposition, making a unified democratic front a difficult 
challenge.  We had heard proposals from FUNCINPEC and SRP 
officials for a joining of forces earlier in the year, but 
there was agreement that the formation of any alliance would 
likely be just before the 2008 elections so that the CPP 
would not have time to undermine the partnership.  FUNCINPEC 
officials will be returning shortly to Malaysia to discuss 
the SRP reaction with Ranariddh, and then come back to 
Cambodia early next week for further deliberations.  End 
Comment. 
MUSSOMELI