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Viewing cable 06OTTAWA2372, CANADA DESIRES MOVE FORWARD ON 2006 DRUG THREAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06OTTAWA2372 2006-08-08 19:35 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO4390
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2372/01 2201935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081935Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3395
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2143
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASES PASS TO DEPT FOR INL FOR ROBERT E. BROWN 
ONDCP FOR RICHARD BAUM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR CA
SUBJECT: CANADA DESIRES MOVE FORWARD ON 2006 DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: A. (A) SECSTATE 78495 
 
     B. (B) SECSTATE 67585 
 
This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified.  Note request in 
Para. 2. 
 
1.  (U)  Summary:  In a series of recent meetings, Poloff 
discussed the USG inter-agency FY 2007 certification 
procedures (reftel A) and related methamphetamine production 
issues (reftel B) with Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade's (DFAIT) Deputy Director for 
International Crime and Terrorism Jennifer Irish and Policy 
Advisor Mark Richardson.  Irish stated GOC intentions to 
revise the 2004 US-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment by 
the end of 2006, highlighted continuing U.S./Canadian 
cooperation on cross-border intelligence sharing as 
continuing evidence of Canada's commitment to tackling the 
drug problem and noted Canada's work toward voluntary 
reporting of legitimate pre-cursor chemical usage.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Canada To Revise the 2004 Drug Threat Assessment 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (SBU)  Having begun discussions about revising the 2004 
Drug Threat Assessment during her April trip to Washington, 
Irish restated Canada's commitment to updating the document 
this year.  DFAIT will coordinate an inter-agency process to 
produce a drug-focused report separate from the Organized 
Crime Threat Assessment that is being written under the 
Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP).  Work on the Drug 
Threat Assessment update is beginning this summer.  While 
acknowledging the importance of a narcotics segment in the 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment, Irish emphasized that it 
should not substitute for an updated Drug Threat Assessment. 
She pointed to the inherent value of the inter-agency 
Canadian process as well as that of working with INL 
counterparts to produce the 2004 Assessment as justification 
for the 2006 update.  Canada prefers that the scope remain 
broad, echoing the last report, and requests Washington's 
feedback concerning administration of the project, 
particularly who will be responsible for coordinating the two 
countries' drafts.  (NOTE:  In 2004, it was Canada's 
responsibility, although there was no formal understanding 
whether this job would rotate.  END NOTE)  REQUEST:  Post 
requests the name of the INL person who will be the point of 
contact for this project.  END REQUEST. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Canada Takes Aim at Pre-Cursors and MDMA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  Cross border cooperation, including persistent and 
fluid intelligence sharing between the RCMP and DEA, 
continues to produce seizures of illicit drugs, including 
those derived from synthetics, as well as associated illegal 
unreported currency both inland and at the American-Canadian 
border.  In April, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
agents in Sumas, Washington were alerted to an individual 
entering the U.S. from Canada transporting 11.65 kilos of 
Ecstasy.  The following month, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
(CBP) arrested a Canadian citizen traveling from Vancouver to 
San Francisco with 65.8 kilos of MDMA powder, 77.3 kilos of 
marijuana, 7.5 kilos of MDMA tablets and 10.6 kilos of Valium 
tablets.  The RCMP has expanded its investigative clandestine 
lab groups that work in major cities and requested training 
from U.S. authorities on clan lab handling and cleanup. 
 
4.  (SBU)  In addition to cooperative cross-border activity, 
Canadian law enforcement continues to be active domestically, 
QCanadian law enforcement continues to be active domestically, 
making several large chemical precursor, meth and MDMA 
seizures that showed no explicit indication of targeting the 
U.S. market.  In April at the Vancouver sea port, the Canada 
Border Security Agency (CBSA) seized 6,000 kilos of MDP2P and 
1,000 kilos of ephedrine from a shipping container 
originating in China.  Like the U.S., Canada is experiencing 
an easterly creep of its chemical drug problem and associated 
underground laboratories, many of which are run by Asian 
groups and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs). Evidence of this 
trend is found in a March raid in Toronto and a June bust in 
a tourist area of southwestern Ontario.  In March 2006, 
Canadian law enforcement made the first-ever seizure of an 
"addiction" (for personal use) methamphetamine lab in 
Toronto.  The two U.S. citizen suspects had rented a hotel 
room and acquired the requisite chemicals.  The lab was not 
yet operational and no finished product was seized.  In June, 
 
OTTAWA 00002372  002 OF 002 
 
 
authorities seized the largest methamphetamine lab in 
Ontario's history, netting 35 kilos of methamphetamine and 25 
kilos of ephedrine.  One Canadian and one Mexican citizen 
were arrested, raising concerns about an increasing number of 
meth "production" (for distribution and sale purposes) 
facilities in Canada. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Voluntary Reporting of Legitimate Precursor Use -- Not Yet 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Richardson stated that, subsequent to Canada's 
co-sponsorship of the CND resolution urging reporting of 
legitimate use of pre-cursor chemicals, Health Canada is the 
competent authority responsible for implementing a systematic 
annual reporting scheme.  Noting that the INCB had not yet 
made any requests for estimates of certain precursor 
chemicals for legitimate requirements, he indicated that 
Health Canada's Office of Controlled Substances plans to have 
a tracking and reporting system in place by years' end that 
will systematize an ongoing yearly submission of this type of 
material. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS