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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2038, LRA Talks: Cessation of Hostilities

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2038 2006-08-28 09:12 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2527
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2038/01 2400912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280912Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4309
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0058
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0030
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UN UG SU
SUBJECT:  LRA Talks: Cessation of Hostilities 
 
Ref:  Khartoum 2036 and previous 
 
KHARTOUM 00002038  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Using guidelines from their ceasefire workshop 
(reftel), intense negotiations between the Ugandan Government and 
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on a cessation of hostilities 
continued through the night of August 25 and into the morning of 
August 26.  Once an agreement was reached at 3:30 a.m., talks were 
adjourned waiting for approval from LRA leader Joseph Kony.  His 
approval came later that same day.  The first phase of the cessation 
of hostilities will take place at 0600Z on August 29, following 
planned public announcements from both sides.  After that time, all 
LRA troops must surface and they then have three weeks to proceed to 
one of two rally sites in Southern Sudan.  If successful, this will 
be the first time Kony and the LRA must take action based upon 
commitments made by the negotiating team at the talks.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
Details of the Agreement 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (U) Earlier discussions on a ceasefire stalled on Uganda's 
demand that only a full ceasefire was acceptable as part of a final 
package, while the LRA insisted that all fighting stop during the 
negotiations.  The compromise was a cessation of hostilities-- 
participants were very careful not to call it a ceasefire--that 
includes many of Uganda's monitoring and cantonment requirements for 
a ceasefire.  Starting on Tuesday, August 26, members of the LRA 
must publicly declare themselves and begin moving to one of two 
sites in southern Sudan, Ri-Kwangba, near Congo in western 
Equatoria, and Owiny-ki-Bul, near the Ugandan border on the east 
side of the Nile.  Residents in the two areas reportedly accepted 
the LRA's presence reluctantly and under pressure from the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). 
 
3.  (U) While at the rally points, the LRA fighters will remain 
armed and will be guarded by the SPLA.  There will be a joint 
monitoring team to investigate violations of the cessation of 
hostilities made up of representatives from the Ugandan army, the 
LRA, the SPLA and international monitors.  No organizations have 
been asked to provide monitors at this point, but the mediation team 
hopes the African Union will accept that role.  While at the rally 
points, the GoSS will provide food and humanitarian supplies to the 
LRA. 
 
4.  (U) It will be considered a ceasefire violation if any LRA 
members do not surface or are found outside the rally areas after 
the three-week period.  If the Ugandan army finds members of the LRA 
outside the rally points after the deadline, or if there are raids 
that are attributed to the LRA, the incident will be referred to the 
monitoring team to investigate the facts and determine a course of 
action. 
 
5.  (U) The agreement stipulates that if talks fail, the LRA will be 
allowed to peacefully leave the rally points.  Observers also feel 
it is significant that the preamble to the three-week timeframe 
moves beyond Uganda's previous September 12 deadline and that the 
cessation of hostilities includes a reference to a process of 
national reconciliation, something the Ugandans had previously 
refused to discuss. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Observers Put it into Perspective 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The day after agreement was reached, the Acting Consul 
General (A/CG) met with three observers to the talks including a UN 
OCHA rep; the UN's Welile Nhlapo, Director of the Africa I Division; 
and the UNMIS-provided expert on ceasefires, Anton Baare from 
Denmark.  The observers note that this is the first time that Kony 
must take real action during the talks and must follow through with 
an agreement made by his delegation.  These actions, therefore, not 
only build confidence with the Ugandan Government, but also boost 
confidence in the LRA delegation to the talks, which many worry do 
not represent LRA leadership.  Most observers also feel, however, 
that while many LRA fighters will proceed to the rally points, the 
five ICC indictees will not, and will most likely keep a small group 
of the LRA elite as insurance against the Ugandan Government 
breaking the agreement. 
 
7.  (SBU) The A/CG reiterated the United States' concern that 
impunity for LRA leaders would only encourage other rebel movements. 
 Baare pointed out that in some ways this was already happening as 
the previous amnesty law passed in Uganda was too broad and allowed 
people to request forgiveness for any act of rebellion after 1986, 
with few other specifics.  As a result, he says, several small 
rebellions were started because they thought they could always ask 
for amnesty if they failed.  In fact, he explained, there were a few 
cases where amnesty was not requested until after a person was 
arrested and just before he was sent to trial.  One of the main 
 
KHARTOUM 00002038  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
motivations for the initial request for ICC involvement, Baare 
explained, was to help close this loophole.  Baare and the two UN 
representatives again said that impunity was not a goal of the talks 
and emphasized that justice would eventually be served, one way or 
the other. 
 
8.  (SBU) With regard to humanitarian aid, the A/CG cautioned that 
no support paid for by the USG should go to the LRA, an organization 
on the Terrorist Exclusion List of the USA-PATRIOT Act.  The 
observers said all parties to the talks were aware of this problem. 
In fact, it is against most countries' laws and general humanitarian 
practice to provide support to armed soldiers.  They expressed hope 
that once the LRA was in the rally points, vulnerables could be 
separated out, disarmed, and demobilized, which would make giving 
them support much easier. 
 
9.  (SBU) Nhalpo commented that the talks were still slowed by a 
lack of sophistication from the LRA negotiation team.  He said that 
they are unwilling to make a non-binding agreement on one point in 
order to move to another, insisting on a full agreement in one area 
before moving on.  He also pointed out that after the agreement was 
made, Kony's approval was in no way assured.  Although most of the 
points of the cessation of hostilities were announced two days 
prior, the delegation had received no instructions from Kony and 
just had to hope Kony would support them. 
 
10.  (SBU) Nhalpo also said that he was not sure where the story of 
amnesty in the Central African Republic (CAR) originated as the LRA 
completely denied it.  The observers speculated that the rumor may 
have grown out of a recent interview with Kony in which he said he 
may consider going to a third country, including the CAR.  They said 
that this rumor probably took hold because the chronic instability 
in the CAR would make it hospitable to a guerilla like Kony, and 
that Kony most likely has some bases, or at least connections, in 
the CAR. 
 
HUME