Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1894, Sant'Egidio Returns From the Bush with Hope

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KHARTOUM1894.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1894 2006-08-09 13:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5246
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1894/01 2211307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091307Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4083
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0023
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: TBD 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UG SU
SUBJECT:  Sant'Egidio Returns From the Bush with Hope 
 
REF: Khartoum 01881 
 
KHARTOUM 00001894  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  While the negotiating team focuses on social 
issues and power sharing, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA) cares only about his own fate and that of his commanders, 
according to mediators from the Communita' Di Sant'Egidio (CSE). 
Returning from a trip to the LRA camp, the CSE reps said that Riek 
Machar, lead mediator and Vice President of Southern Sudan, was 
upset at the degree of disconnect between LRA leader Joseph Kony and 
the politically-oriented LRA negotiating team.  Despite this 
problem, the CSE team noted that Kony seemed eager for peace.  They 
thought an agreement could even be possible within the month if 
certain obstacles, like the ICC indictments, could be addressed. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Kony Wants Reconciliation and Personal Safety 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) During the week of July 30, Riek Machar led a group to meet 
with Kony and his commanders at the isolated LRA camp a short walk 
across the border into DR Congo from Nabanga.  The group included 
Ugandan government officials, the LRA negotiating team from Juba, 
Acholi and northern Ugandan society leaders, GoSS representatives, 
journalists, UNICEF, and CSE.  The LRA took the group to a small 
clearing that the LRA called its parliament; they subsequently 
discussed peace with Joseph Kony and his principal deputy, Vincent 
Otti. 
 
3. (SBU) Kony began by addressing the Acholi leaders, including the 
tribe's chief, with considerable deference.  Kony explained that the 
Acholi leadership had asked him to begin this rebellion 20 years 
ago, but that now he felt abandoned.  Kony said his only condition 
for peace was reconciliation and guaranteed safety and freedom for 
him and his men.  While he did not mention the atrocities in Uganda, 
he did apologize to the Southern Sudanese for what he had done. 
Kony did not discuss any of the political issues that had taken 
center stage at the talks in Juba. 
 
4. (SBU) Kony and his commanders also acknowledged the relationship 
developed with Machar, who served as one of their principal liaisons 
when he was fighting with the North.  The CSE representatives said 
this clearly made Machar uncomfortable.  Kony then briefly 
referenced the Ten Commandments and visions of the Holy Ghost, but 
did not focus on them.  Kony had previously claimed that the Holy 
Ghost had ordered him to overthrow the Ugandan government and 
replace it with one based on the Ten Commandments. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Negotiatiors Have Their Own Agenda 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) While Kony said he had appointed the mainly diaspora LRA 
negotiating team, it became clear that the divisions between them 
were even greater than anyone had expected.  According to the CSE 
team, Kony was unaware of the political demands discussed at the 
talks, and seemed unable to understand the issues.  During the 
meeting, some of the Acholi Southern Sudanese said that the LRA 
translators from the Juba team had even altered Kony's message to 
their advantage.  While there were some good people on the team, the 
CSE representatives commented that most of them were advancing their 
own political careers or just after money. 
 
6. (SBU) Annoyed by the distance between the LRA's negotiators and 
its leaders, Machar demanded that the LRA announce an immediate 
ceasefire and send Otti to the talks.  Otti suspected this ultimatum 
was a trap and refused to go to Juba while the ICC warrants were 
outstanding.  In the end, everyone agreed to continue moving forward 
with the existing delegation in Juba, starting August 7. 
 
--------------- 
The Way Forward 
--------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The CSE team said it had convinced Otti to agree to go to 
Juba, with the timeframe left open.  The reps also noted that the 
LRA had announced the unilateral ceasefire that Machar requested. 
Experienced mediators, the CSE reps said they were impressed with 
Machar's ability to broker the talks.  They did not feel additional 
international support was necessary, except perhaps for a helicopter 
to ferry delegations to the LRA camp for frequent consultations. 
They noted this would cut the 13-hour drive from Maridi to Nabanga 
to a few minutes. 
 
8. (SBU) While not willing to be optimistic, the CSE team believed 
that the negotiations were real.  Kony showed genuine deference to 
the Acholi leaders, and every LRA member, from Kony on down, had a 
the look of fear.  They think Kony refused a request to release his 
Southern Sudanese child abductees as a sign of goodwill because 
children are his main bargaining chip and the heart of his movement. 
 They noted that a negotiation based on reconciliation and security, 
 
KHARTOUM 00001894  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
while worse for the IDPs, would be much simpler.  A resolution was 
possible in less than a month, they said, well before the Ugandan's 
September 12 deadline. 
 
9. (SBU) The CSE reps said that the ICC could take credit for 
helping to bring about the talks, but now should step aside.  They 
explained that Article 53 allowed cases to be dropped in the 
interest of local justice.  Still, security guarantees would be 
difficult, as Otti repeated several times that he does not want to 
share Charles Taylor's fate.  However, the CSE believes the Ugandans 
would favor a quick and quiet resolution that would avoid a careful 
investigation into actions of the Ugandan army. 
 
HUME