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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1881, LRA Talks: UN Begins Technical Assistance

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1881 2006-08-09 04:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4721
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1881/01 2210424
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090424Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4055
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001881 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID UG UN SU
SUBJECT: LRA Talks: UN Begins Technical Assistance 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  UNICEF and UN OCHA have begun providing limited 
support to the talks between Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA), currently being mediated by Government of Southern Sudan 
(GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar.  UNICEF has sent a protection 
officer to visit the LRA camps and determine humanitarian needs, 
supplied some pediatric drugs, and advised Machar on child 
protection issues.  They have had no direct contact with the LRA or 
its delegation due to the ICC indictments and UN policy, but said 
attempts to convince the LRA to release some children as a gesture 
of goodwill had failed.  Meanwhile, UN OCHA is exploring ways to 
provide additional humanitarian technical assistance to the talks. 
The UN OCHA representatives feel strongly that these talks, and 
application of traditional reconciliation mechanisms, were a good 
chance for peace and wanted the United States and the rest of the 
international community to support the process.  End summary. 
 
OCHA Reps Pushing for Peace Process 
 
2. (SBU) On August 5, the a representative from OCHA in New York and 
the head of the OCHA sub-office in Gulu, requested a meeting with 
the Acting Consul General (A/CG) in Juba to provide an update on 
OCHA activities and discuss the USG position towards the talks.  The 
OCHA reps believed the talks were a good opportunity for peace and 
wanted to see how they could provide help to ensure their success, 
focusing on humanitarian concerns.  They feared that the talks 
should not be allowed to fail "for lack of pens and paper," and 
explained that they hoped that a UN political affairs representative 
would come to Juba soon and open the way for more direct 
involvement. 
 
Mato Oput Touted as Reconciliation Tool; ICC a Hindrance 
 
3. (SBU) The A/CG expressed fears that this may just be a stalling 
tactic to allow the weakened LRA to regroup, as had happened in past 
negotiations, and said that the United States did not support 
granting impunity for those who had committed atrocities.  The reps 
explained that, although LRA leader Joseph Kony had been erratic 
during the talks, they believed this attempt at peace was genuine 
and that the people of Northern Uganda had decided to support the 
talks because the needs of a million and a half internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) should outweigh the need to detain and prosecute five 
people.  The A/CG cautioned that exchanging justice for peace often 
led to getting neither; the OCHA reps said that the people of 
Northern Uganda were ready for peace and should be allowed to seek 
justice in their own way, through a traditional reconciliation 
process known as "mato oput."  They dismissed the idea that 
non-Acholi victims of the LRA would not accept the validity of this 
Acholi cleansing ritual.  While acknowledging that the ICC 
indictments had helped push the LRA into talks, they said the ICC 
was now a major hindrance.  Because the ICC prevented top LRA 
leaders from attending the talks in Juba, they said that the next 
round of talks may take place in the bush. 
 
4. (SBU) The A/CG explained that the United States remained focused 
on the well-being of the people of Uganda, providing humanitarian 
aid, and ensuring that atrocities would not be committed with 
impunity.  Lending international legitimacy to a process that could 
not be legitimate was dangerous, so while the USG was following the 
talks, there were no plans to get involved.  The USG would continue 
to work with the contact group in New York to determine the best way 
to help northern Uganda. 
 
UNICEF: Children are Biggest Victims 
 
5. (SBU) UNICEF has been providing technical advice at Machar's 
request since shortly after the talks began.  While they were not 
part of the drafting of the talk's agenda -- they would have pushed 
for child protection as a separate point -- they had been making 
sure children's issues remained at the fore.  Because the majority 
of LRA fighters, porters, and sex slaves are abducted children, the 
well-being and reintegration of this group was a major issue. 
UNICEF has provided pediatric drugs to the mediation team, 
administered by a nurse that accompanied Machar to the bush, and 
last week sent a child protection officer (CPO) to evaluate the 
condition of children at the camps, which are just a few miles over 
the border from Nabanga, south of Maridi. 
 
6. (SBU) According to the CPO, the health condition of the children 
from the camps was quite poor.  While the officer did not go to the 
actual camps because they would not cross the border into Congo, 
just over 100 women and children came to the border to meet with the 
CPO.  Only two of the women were allowed to speak, and no questions 
were allowed.  The children included very scared 7 year-old porters 
and 9 year-old soldiers who now only knew war as a way of life. 
When the women spoke, the CPO said it was clear that they had been 
brainwashed and programmed, like members of a cult, and each woman 
repeated the exact phrase as if Kony had hit play on a tape 
recorder.  They said they wanted to go home, but would only go if 
there was peace and they could all go together.  Attempts to get 
Kony to release some of the children as a sign of good will failed. 
The CPO said the hardest moment came as she was leaving, when one of 
the 7 year-olds broke ranks, grabbed her hand and begged her to take 
 
KHARTOUM 00001881  002 OF 002 
 
 
him with her. 
 
HUME