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Viewing cable 06KABUL3629, PRT QAL-E-NAW: WHY THERE IS NO DIAG IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL3629 2006-08-15 12:30 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2308
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3629/01 2271230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151230Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1934
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2751
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6231
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1580
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2901
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/US TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR 
STATE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD SNAR ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT QAL-E-NAW: WHY THERE IS NO DIAG IN 
BADGHIS 
 
KABUL 00003629  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The DIAG process in Badghis is 
broken.  Some of the reasons why are the same as 
elsewhere in Afghanistan: weak local authorities, 
powerful former commanders and limited reach of 
government authority.  However, while in southern 
provinces the program struggles in the face of 
security threats that represent a real disincentive to 
disarm, Badghis is one of the quietest, most secure 
provinces in the country.  Under these conditions, the 
failure of the DIAG process can be strongly attributed 
to a lack of local political will and the limited 
power of the central government to set a provincial 
agenda.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Badghis province is one of the quietest, 
safest provinces in Afghanistan.  With the exception 
of three high profile killings of medical personnel in 
the last two years and the occasional tribal skirmish 
(reftel) there are few security problems.  In 
comparison with other provinces, Badghis also has very 
few illegally armed groups, and local commanders, 
while they do exist, maintain a relatively low 
profile. 
 
3. (SBU) The provinces DIAG committee meets weekly 
under the leadership of the Governor and includes the 
participation of the PRT.  Though members of the 
committee profess commitment to the program, these 
meetings can only be described as a farce. 
Participants often call in suspects, generally very 
old men, or poor, illiterate villagers, to accuse them 
of possessing illegal arms.  Invariably, the subjects 
insist that they have no arms and are let go after a 
few minutes of harassment. 
 
4. (SBU) According to official records, during the 
last year (June 2005 to June 2006) 2,156 arms and 83 
tons of ammunition were collected through the program 
in Badghis.  However, as elsewhere, most of these 
weapons are antiques or nonfunctioning.  Officials 
report that there are more than 10,000 illegal arms 
(undoubtedly an underestimate) yet to be relinquished 
present in the province.  Not one significant 
commander has been disarmed. 
 
5. (SBU) Provincial authorities are not oblivious to 
the unsuccessful nature of the program, and frequently 
DIAG committee meetings turn to the question of whose 
e 
fault it is.  The provincial National Directorate of 
Security (NDS) chief typically complains that he has 
no influence over the districts, whose district 
administrators are in some cases commanders 
themselves.  Officials from the Governors office 
report that district officials do not answer 
correspondence requesting reports on DIAG progress in 
their districts, and many of them, such as the 
prosecutors never even show up to work, let alone 
promote DIAG. 
 
6. (SBU) The head of the Information and Culture 
Department criticizes the police and the NSD for their 
unwillingness to approach commanders, preferring 
instead to hassle ordinary citizens.  He also blames 
the mullahs for not promoting DIAG as a religious duty 
and usually finishes his rant with a call to disband 
the weekly DIAG meeting altogether as a waste of time. 
The chief of the DIAG committee usually attributes the 
 
KABUL 00003629  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
lack of progress to a lack of resources, and 
specifically, the need for metal detectors and a car. 
r. 
He also frequently reminds the committee that 
provincial DIAG is still in Stage Two  negotiated, 
rather than obligatory relinquishment - which 
according to him means all local authorities can do 
is, ask nicely. 
 
7. (SBU) After one particularly fruitless meeting, 
PRTOff reminded Acting Governor Azizullah that GOA 
President Karzai had just returned from a trip to 
Japan where he reaffirmed the central governments 
commitment to the DIAG program and raised millions in 
new funds to support it. 
Azizullah shrugged his shoulders and professed himself 
powerless to push harder for progress absent, 
stronger support from the central government.  When 
asked what additional support he is looking for, 
Azizullah stated that, if this is a central 
government priority, they should send some officials 
up here to work on it. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT: Though the usual suspects of weak 
local authorities, powerful former commanders and 
limited reach of government authorities are 
s are 
contributing to the failure of DIAG in Badghis 
province, the bigger issue is lack of local political 
will.  In the absence of backup from Kabul, no 
provincial authority wants to tussle with local 
commanders who in many cases enjoy popular support in 
their communities.  Given that Badghis security 
environment is so permissive, this may not bode well 
for the future of the program anywhere in the country. 
While in southern provinces officials struggle to 
convince citizens to give up arms in the face of real 
security threats, in Badghis, no such excuse exists. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  What is also worrisome is 
the inability of the central government to extend its 
policy of adherence to DIAG to the provinces.  Badghis 
officials were only vaguely aware of Karzais trip to 
Japan, and seemed to draw no connection between his 
renewed commitments on a national level to the DIAG 
process at the provincial one.  Local officials seem 
to believe that if the program were truly important to 
o 
the central government, representatives from Kabul 
would come to the province and run it themselves. 
 
NEUMANN