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Viewing cable 06HELSINKI854, FINNS TELL SYRIA TO HONOR UNSCR 1701; SYRIANS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HELSINKI854 2006-08-24 13:50 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0029
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0854/01 2361350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241350Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2361
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV MARR FI SY LE
SUBJECT: FINNS TELL SYRIA TO HONOR UNSCR 1701; SYRIANS 
REJECT DISARMING OF HEZBOLLAH 
 
REF: A. HELSINKI 842 
     B. STATE 136196 
 
Classified By: PolChief Gregory Thome, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On Aug. 23 in Helsinki, Finnish FM Tuomioja 
told Syrian FM Al-Moallem that the EU expected the Government 
of Syria (GOS) to support the ceasefire in Lebanon and wider 
peace in the Middle East by respecting all provisions of 
UNSCR 1701; by honoring the arms embargo in Lebanon; and by 
toning down its "belligerent" public rhetoric.  The Syrian FM 
responded that the GOS supports 1701 and could support an 
expanded UNIFIL -- but only if the UN does not give UNIFIL a 
"peace enforcement" mandate, does not call for disarming 
Hezbollah, and does not place UNIFIL on Syria's borders.  He 
also said that Syria already proved its willingness to 
support the peace process by not entering the war, and warned 
that "by isolating Syria, the EU is isolating itself." 
Tuomioja told Al-Moallem that the international community 
would not view such demands as realistic and that it would 
watch Syrian actions carefully, urging Syria not to be a 
"spoiler" of the fragile peace in the region.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Finnish Foreign Minister Errki Tuomioja met with 
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem in Helsinki August 
23.  On August 24, PolChief and Poloff obtained a read-out on 
the meeting from MFA Regional Manager for Israel, Lebanon and 
Syria Sofie From-Emmesberger, who had served as note-taker. 
As noted reftel a, the GOF was not acting unilaterally, but 
rather in response to conclusions adopted at the Aug. 1 
extraordinarly GAERC on Lebanon.  The GOF emphasized that the 
meeting did not represent an upgrading of EU-Syrian 
relations, produced no commitments, and was intended to 
deliver a message to the Syrians demanding that they support 
the ceasefire in Lebanon and wider peace in the Middle East 
by respecting all provisions of UNSCR 1701.  Tuomioja held a 
low-profile press conference Aug. 23 from which Al-Moallem 
was excluded. There, he downplayed the nature of the meeting 
while emphazising EU expectations that Syria needed to play a 
positive role in the region. 
 
SYRIA AS POTENTIAL "SPOILER" 
---------------------------- 
3. (C) From-Emmesberger said that Tuomioja opened the meeting 
by emphasizing that a fragile peace had been reached in 
Lebanon, but that the "ball was now in Syria's court" to help 
ensure that peace endured.  He noted that Syria had a choice: 
it could play a constructive role, or it could be "the 
spoiler."  Tuomioja said that the EU expected Syria to 
support the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1701 and, in 
particular, to honor the strict embargo on the shipment of 
arms to Lebanon.  He also asked that Syria remain politically 
supportive of the Lebanese government's efforts to gain 
control its territory and that it accept the presence and 
role of an enhanced UNIFIL in Lebanon. 
 
4. (C) Al-Moallem responded by saying that Syria supported 
UNSCR 1701, although he complained that the resolution did 
nothing to solve other regional problems, including those in 
the Golan Heights, the Palestinian territories, or at Shebaa 
Farms.  The Syrian also stated that his government accepted 
the deployment of the Lebanese army into Southern Lebanon and 
a larger UNIFIL.  However, From-Emmesberger said, Al-Moallem 
insisted that UNIFIL's mission should be "peace keeping, not 
peace enforcement."  Syria would not accept a UN mandate that 
granted UNIFIL Chapter 7 authority or called upon it to 
disarm Hezbollah, he said, noting also that if UNIFIL 
deployed along the Syrian border, the GOS would view this as 
"an act of aggression."  Al-Moallem also stated unabashedly 
that if UNIFIL's mandate were purely peace-keeping and 
humanitarian assistance, "Syria could gaurantee UNIFIL will 
be respected by Hezbollah." 
 
UNREALISTIC DEMANDS 
------------------- 
5. (C) As for Syria's own role, Al-Moallem argued that Syria 
had already played a positive role by not "entering the war 
and opening a third front."  President Assad took a lot of 
heat domestically for this decision, he continued, and the EU 
should see this decision as a positive.  He also said that 
the EU must be careful not to press Syria into a corner, 
noting that "by isolating Syria, the EU is isolating itself" 
because Syria can always turn to "other partners in the East 
or in Latin America" -- a formulation From-Emmesberger 
interpreted to mean, among others, Iran and Venezuela. 
 
6. (C) Tuomioja responded that while the international 
community desired Syria's cooperation, it would view many of 
these demands as unrealistic.  Regarding UNIFIL's mandate, 
Tuomioja said that specifics were still being negotiated but 
that the UN had already (in UNSCR 1559) made clear that 
 
disarming the militias in Lebanon was a key to the process. 
He urged Al-Moallem not to mis-interpret UNIFIL's presence as 
a threat, and cautioned in general against "belligerent" 
public statements out of the GOS that served only to 
exacerbate tensions and potentially undermine the peace 
process -- this being a specific reference to President 
Assad's terrible mid-August speech, which forced the German 
FM to cancel his trip to Damascus.  According to 
From-Emmesberger, Tuomioja totally rejected Al-Moallem's 
other arguments, saying that threats about turning to "other 
partners" would only deepen Syria's own isolation, and that 
Syria's decision not to enter the war was simply the very 
minimum the EU would expect -- certainly not something it 
would "reward." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
7. (C) Comment: From-Emmesberger's read-out appears to 
indicate that Tuomioja delivered as tough a message as might 
be expected.  At a minimum, he put the Syrians on notice that 
the world is watching and, as we has requested (ref b), he 
delivered a hard message on 1701 and the need for Syria to 
respect the arms embargo.  Depending on how Syria behaves in 
the coming weeks, Germany may be the next to initiate contact 
with Damascus; this will be the subject of discussion at the 
Sept. 1-2 GYMNICH.  End Comment. 
WARE