Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06HANOI2179, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING WTO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06HANOI2179.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI2179 2006-08-25 10:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO0948
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #2179/01 2371030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251030Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3185
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1705
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA SZ 1108
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZU/APEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND EB/TPP/BTA/ANA 
STATE PASS USTR DAVID BISBEE 
USDOC FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OPB/VLC/HPPHO 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD WTRO VM
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING WTO 
COMMITMENTS 
 
 
HANOI 00002179  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SENSITIVE - DO NOT POST ON INTERNET 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Vietnamese National Assembly (NA) is making 
plans for its fall session, in which the first order of business 
will be to ratify Vietnam's WTO Accession Protocol.  The NA has not 
yet received detailed instructions from the Vietnamese government on 
changes in specific laws that would be needed in order to implement 
WTO commitments.  In anticipation of making such changes, however, 
the NA initially considered two options:  attaching an annex to the 
ratification resolution with a list of laws that the NA promises to 
amend in the 2007 spring session, or making the Accession Protocol 
self-enforcing.  Neither of these options would fully satisfy the 
concerns of the United States or others.  Now however, the NA 
leaders are considering passage of specific legal changes either in 
an omnibus law or as an appendix to the resolution ratifying the 
Accession Protocol.  End summary. 
 
NA Fall Session - First Business to Ratify WTO Accession 
---------------------------- --------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The National Assembly is seized with the issue of how to 
harmonize Vietnamese law with new commitments under WTO.  At one 
point there was some talk of calling a special National Assembly 
session to pass WTO-related legislation.  Given that multilateral 
discussions have not yet concluded and that the GVN has not yet 
submitted any concrete proposals to the National Assembly, a special 
session is now not considered practicable.  According to NA 
officials, the NA fall session is likely to last from October 17 to 
November 10, then break for ten days for APEC, and then reconvene 
from November 21 to December 5.  (Note: In Vietnam's legal system, 
the State President has full authority to ratify international 
agreements.  However, in about four or five cases, including the 
U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, former President Tran Duc 
Luong chose to transfer this authority to the NA.  Our contacts 
expect, with 95 percent confidence, that current President Nguyen 
Minh Triet will choose to do so with the WTO Accession Protocol. 
End Note.) 
 
Options for Implementing WTO Commitments 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) NA leaders are trying to determine how to best handle any 
changes in laws needed to comply with the final Protocol.  They have 
not yet been given detailed suggestions on this matter by the 
government.  In the absence of direction, they anticipate that the 
first order of business will be approval for a "Resolution to 
Ratify" the WTO Accession Protocol.  This may be passed as early as 
October 19, if the current schedule holds.  This resolution, with 
the Protocol attached, would commit Vietnam to making all legal 
changes needed to implement the terms of the Protocol. 
 
4.  (SBU) NA leaders anticipate that changes to specific laws will 
be necessary, thus the NA's work will need to extend beyond merely 
ratifying the Protocol.  Initially fearing that there would not be 
enough time to develop and consider language for actual amendments 
in the upcoming session, NA leaders were considering two options: 
 
-- Option 1:  Attach an annex to the Resolution with a list of laws 
that the NA promises to amend in the 2007 spring session, after the 
NA and the GVN have had time to develop and consider specific 
language for the amendments. 
 
-- Option 2:  Make the Accession Protocol self-enforcing in line 
with the new Treaties Law, which would mean that the Protocol, or 
designated specific parts, would become Vietnamese law. 
 
5. (SBU) We understand that the NA leaders' thinking has since 
evolved.  They now consider that specific legal changes will be best 
made at the time of ratification.  Therefore, they are considering 
whether to: (a) append to the "Resolution on Ratification" a list of 
changes in specific laws; or (b) pass an omnibus law containing the 
actual changes.  Either alternative would be legally binding.  As 
noted above, NA leaders have still not received details from the 
government on specific legal changes required, but their 
understanding is that the number of changes that will have to be 
made will be relatively small and that there will be enough time for 
 
HANOI 00002179  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
the government to draft new language and explain the needed changes 
to the NA. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) NA leaders want to express their strong political support 
for WTO accession through legislative action, but our contacts 
remains confused and somewhat concerned that they will not have time 
to do their part.  Multilateral discussions continue, which helps 
explain why the government has yet to start working with the NA on 
necessary changes.  This leaves the NA leaders to debate option and 
discuss process, and we will continue to track that debate.  It is 
encouraging that NA leaders now recognize the shortcomings of 
limiting their initial legislative moves to making promises of 
future actions over coming sessions. 
 
MARINE