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Viewing cable 06HANOI2148, EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR PROTESTANTS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI2148 2006-08-23 06:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO8266
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #2148/01 2350648
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230648Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3143
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1676
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KIRF PREL PGOV VM
SUBJECT: EMBASSY ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR PROTESTANTS IN 
NORTHERN VIETNAM 
 
REF: A) JENSEN-ADAMSON DRL/IRF E-MAIL 8/8/06; B) HANOI 894; C) HANOI 
 
1466 and previous 
 
HANOI 00002148  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The GVN appears to be fighting an uphill battle to 
force northern provincial officials to change their approach to 
religion.  Suspicions that Protestants are agents of the United 
States are still deeply ingrained in the region, and some local 
officials find it hard to take seriously disorganized groups of 
believers.  Natural tensions between followers of traditional ethnic 
minority beliefs and Protestants are often exacerbated by local 
officials who are themselves ethnic minorities.  Other leaders 
simply seek to avoid any controversy that might draw the 
international community's attention, while steering clear of any 
decisions that might be seen as too radical by the GVN.  Most 
officials thus try to delay Protestant requests to register.  The 
GVN is slowly raising the costs associated with stalling tactics, 
and many officials seem to recognize that their careers are now 
threatened by bad publicity, but the full import of these pressures 
will take time to sink in at the local level.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) This message expands upon Ref A analysis of why GVN 
officials in the north, especially those in the Northwest Highlands 
region, lag behind the rest of Vietnam in implementing the GVN's new 
framework for religious freedom, particularly with regard to 
registration of house church congregations affiliated with the 
Evangelical Church of Vietnam-North (ECVN). 
 
3. (SBU) We assess that the main reason there have been so few (and 
possibly no) ECVN registrations to date in northern Vietnam is that 
Hanoi-based GVN officials are fighting an uphill battle to force 
provincial officials (especially security personnel) to change their 
approach to religion.  In the north, suspicions that Protestants are 
agents of the United States are still deeply ingrained. 
Undoubtedly, many of the senior northern provincial party and 
security officials established their early reputations by rooting 
out religious or other "subversive" groups in the 1980's and 1990's, 
and the institutional instinct to repress such groups remains 
strong.  Outside attention often serves to reinforce this reaction. 
 
 
4. (SBU) It is important to note that ECVN groups in the northwest 
provinces tend to be very disorganized.  Most leaders lack any 
face-to-face training with qualified pastors, and many believers 
have only a rudimentary idea of their religion at best.  Some local 
officials find it hard to take such groups seriously.  In addition, 
there is a natural tension that arises between followers of 
traditional ethnic minority beliefs and new ethnic minority 
Protestants in these traditional communities.  These tensions can be 
exacerbated by local officials who themselves are usually ethnic 
minorities. 
 
5. (SBU) Our impression from conversations with many officials in 
the remoter districts of the Northwest Highlands is that their main 
motivation is to avoid any controversy that might draw the 
international community's attention.  In their view, the worst crime 
any citizen could commit is to call attention to the officials' 
performance by accepting ideas from the outside and challenging the 
accepted social order (and the officials' professional reputations), 
especially if those ideas are associated with the United States. 
Thus, in some places, our direct investigation of (or intervention 
in) conditions for specific Protestant groups seems to have actually 
worsened these suspicions, at least initially. 
 
6. (SBU) Another aspect of this same problem is that most provincial 
and local officials in these areas seem loathe to take any action 
that might be seen as unconventional.  Official "radicalism" is 
dangerous to their careers for the same reasons that it is 
unacceptable for local groups to upset the social order in their 
communities.  Conversely, the safest path for a minor apparatchik is 
to do nothing, or even to remain hard-line, on the issue of 
religion. 
 
7. (SBU) In short, few local leaders are willing to stick their 
necks out to advance religious freedom because "it's the right thing 
to do," and most have resorted to dragging their heels.  That said, 
ECVN has told us before that at least 200 ECVN congregations have 
developed informal modi vivendi with local officials who are either 
apathetic about religion or content to let groups do what they want 
so long as the Protestants do not call attention to themselves (Ref 
B).  Many of these groups have opted not to submit applications to 
register for fear of upsetting this tolerable, if not entirely 
satisfactory, situation. 
 
8. (SBU) This state of affairs is changing as the central government 
has brought more pressure, through the Committee on Religious 
Affairs (CRA) and the Ministry of Public Security, on local 
officials to fully implement the registration policy.  The central 
government is also slowly raising the costs associated with local 
 
HANOI 00002148  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
stalling tactics.  For example, in a recent provincial leaders' 
conference, a former deputy prime minister publicly berated northern 
officials for failing to implement the ordinance on religion.  This 
process appears to be mainly one of negotiation, however, as 
provincial officials seem to retain considerable latitude to 
interpret national policy even when given strict implementing 
instructions. 
 
9. (SBU) One other important development that has raised the costs 
for intransigent local officials is the apparent realization among 
many of them that it is becoming nearly impossible to keep news of 
incidents involving religious groups from reaching outsiders and 
hence the international community.  Many of the officials have 
clearly started to understand that their careers are now threatened 
by bad publicity just as they are by "social disorder."  This more 
than anything else may be decisive in the long run in changing 
provincial officials' approach to social issues like religion, but 
the full import of this change will take time to sink in across the 
institutions of local government.  In fact, some areas probably 
won't change until more hard-line officials are replaced in the 
GVN's normal personnel cycle. 
 
10. (SBU) In sum, we assess that the reason there have been only six 
(unconfirmed) registrations in the last 18 months in the north is 
that the GVN must first change the official mindset of the region. 
The CRA's apparent success to get most provinces to allow 
Protestants to worship without much official harassment was the 
first major hurtle in this process, but not the last.  The process 
of registration is actually empowerment of believers in the face of 
local officialdom, and most will look for ways to delay this while 
the numbers of Protestants remain relatively small.  The CRA argues 
that once their pilot registrations have been accomplished in Lai 
Chau, Lao Cai and Ha Giang (Ref C), the process will pick up steam 
across the region, but that remains unproved. 
 
MARINE