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Viewing cable 06HANOI2004, VIETNAM'S POPULATION POLICY IN 2006

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI2004 2006-08-08 01:53 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO3306
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #2004/01 2200153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080153Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2987
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1613
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/IRF, PRM/ANE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SOCI PREL KIRF PHUM PGOV HUMANR VM KPOP
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S POPULATION POLICY IN 2006 
 
REF: A) 04 HANOI 64; B) 05 HANOI 1818; C) 03 HANOI 2047 
 
HANOI 00002004  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) While Vietnam officially no longer restricts the number of 
children couples may have, GVN propaganda campaigns still strongly 
encourage individuals to practice family planning (FP) and keep 
family size to at most two children.  Fines or administrative 
sanctions for larger families are rare and seem to apply mostly to 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) officials.  There is no evidence of 
more coercive measures to enforce this informal policy.  While the 
GVN remains focused on limiting population growth, it does not 
completely fund FP programs in remote and isolated areas where they 
are needed the most.  Although the recent midterm review of 
Vietnam's Population Strategy highlights the GVN's desired decline 
in the country's fertility rate, flawed statistics raise doubts 
about Vietnam's real progress in this area.  This may mean that 
Hanoi will be forced to lower its long-term goals.  Vietnam has both 
a high abortion rate and gender imbalance problems.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Pol intern investigated the current state of Vietnam's 
population policy and discussed the country's latest developments FP 
practices with various Vietnamese and international officials. 
Three main conclusions emerged in these discussions: 1) Vietnam has 
abandoned its two-child policy while still promoting smaller 
families; 2) the GVN's overall Population Strategy has not been as 
effective as originally hoped; and, 3) the problems of sex-selective 
abortions and the resulting gender imbalance appear static. 
 
"Encouraging" Two-child Families 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Although Vietnam officially no longer regulates the number 
of children individuals may have, in practice the GVN still 
vigorously promotes small families and a lower birthrate.  While the 
2003 Ordinance on Population (Population Ordinance) allows couples 
to "decide the timing, number and spacing of births," it also 
stipulates that citizens "must practice FP for the development of a 
small-sized family" and "respect the interests of the State in 
regulating population size."  The Ordinance's Implementing Decree 
further specifies that couples are obligated to have "few children," 
which it specifically defines as "one child or two children." 
Although numerous GVN officials have claimed that no administrative 
sanctions or financial penalties are imposed for having larger 
families (reftels), the GVN and CPV continue to "educate" families 
to practice FP (Ref A) and admonish Party members and State 
officials for having three or more children (Ref B). 
 
4. (SBU) A mid-level official at the GVN's Committee on Population, 
Family and Children's (CPFC) Population Department, stressed that 
Vietnam no longer interferes with couples' FP choices.  He justified 
the contradiction between the Population Ordinance's permissive 
article about individual choice and the Implementing Decree's strict 
obligation to have "few children" by claiming that the principle of 
individual choice formalized in the Ordinance is "too general" and 
people with different education levels have different understandings 
of what a small-sized family means.  However, the Decree only serves 
as a guideline and "families with more than two children are never 
punished."  Nevertheless, the GVN continues to promote the concept 
of smaller families through extensive awareness campaigns, with 
slogans that are "advisory encouragements" and act as "motivation 
for the people." 
 
5. (SBU) The CPFC official later admitted that local authorities in 
rural areas may have fined couples with more than two children in 
the past, but these practices have become "extremely rare." 
Regarding those who work for the GVN, CPV or State-owned 
enterprises, there are no clearly defined policies, and practices 
differ among State agencies.  For example, Resolution 47 issued by 
the Politburo in 2005 calls for "each couple to have two children on 
average" and recommends sanctions for violators (Ref B, Paragraph 
6).  While this measure does not apply to private individuals, but 
only to high-level Party members, "the policy was very controversial 
and is fading," he revealed.  Instead, discriminatory measures 
mostly originate in the private sector, where employers often 
condition employment on strict FP practice to minimize business 
costs.  (Note: Under Vietnamese law, women are entitled to 
four-month paid maternity leave, and employers are also required to 
grant paid "sick leave" to parents whenever they need to care for 
their children.  End Note.)  The CPFC is unable to prevent this 
phenomenon because "we cannot interfere with private contracts and 
consensual agreements," he asserted. 
 
No Evidence of Forced Abortions 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Asked about any continuing instances of forced abortion, 
contraception or sterilization -- during the 1990s and until 2002, 
 
HANOI 00002004  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
several media outlets and international NGOs reported that local 
authorities in rural areas compelled women to strictly abide by the 
two-child policy -- all of our Vietnamese interlocutors dismissed 
the allegation and claimed that such practices have never existed. 
A United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) representative stated that 
there are no indications Vietnam maintains a formal or informal 
two-child policy, and said that he has never heard of enforcement of 
such a policy by Vietnamese authorities.  Since the Population 
Ordinance brought the country in line with the Program of Action of 
the United Nations' 1994 Cairo International Conference on 
Population and Development (which prohibits abortion as a method of 
contraception), the GVN has "faithfully abided by its international 
obligations," he said. 
 
Low GVN Funding Hinders Implementation of Population Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
7. (U) In 2000, the CPFC introduced a Population Strategy for 
2001-2010, which promotes voluntary FP but also emphasizes the 
benefits of small family size.  The strategy outlines specific 
objectives to be achieved by 2010: reaching replacement-level 
fertility rate (i.e. 2.1 percent) nationwide; lowering the natural 
growth rate to 1.1 percent; capping population at 88 million; and, 
reducing the abortion rate by 50 percent.  Unlike the previous 
Population Strategy (1993-2000), the current plan focuses on 
reaching these goals in remote and isolated regions and specifies 
two implementing periods.  During the first stage (2001-2005), 
efforts were aimed at attaining replacement-level fertility rate at 
the national level through awareness campaigns designed to change 
reproductive behaviors.  During the second stage (2006-2010), the 
focus is to achieve the targets in remote and poor regions with 
higher birthrates by enhancing reproductive health (RH) and FP 
services. 
 
8. (SBU) A Senior Expert at the Vietnam Women's Union's (VWU) 
Department of Family and Social Affairs acknowledged that "achieving 
the Population Strategy objectives will be challenging and will take 
time."  Particularly in mountainous regions, people prefer large 
families and women lack the education to resist peer pressure.  She 
pointed out that "the low quality of counseling and medical services 
remains the main source of ongoing problems in remote areas."  The 
VWU currently works on raising awareness and disseminating 
information about women's rights, but without adequate facilities 
and trained personnel.  She further hinted that implementing the 
second phase of the Population Strategy will require "great 
efforts."  A high-level representative of the Vietnam Family 
Planning Association (VINAFPA) confirmed these sentiments and 
revealed that "the Government is not doing a great job in remote and 
isolated regions."  Blaming the insufficient State budget, she 
complained that "low funding and investment aggravate the problem" 
and the GVN effectively outsourced FP and RH services to the VINAFPA 
and its programs.  She also mentioned that "people in rural areas do 
not use standard contraception methods and resort to abortion 
instead," even though it is a dangerous procedure in remote areas. 
 
9. (SBU) The CPFC official downplayed criticisms and argued that 
while RH and FP services in remote regions are "not as good as" 
other parts of the country, the problem remains mostly limited to 
"the problem of access."  He maintained that "existing facilities 
are not fully utilized;" therefore, the CPFC plans to invest in more 
mobile RH and FP facilities and services.  Refusing to discuss 
funding issues, he raised doubts about the reliability of abortion 
rate figures and stated that 93 percent of all reported abortions 
performed in Vietnam are actually "menstrual regulation."  This 
procedure allows women to end a pregnancy during the first trimester 
by artificially triggering withdrawal bleeding.  Some 20 percent of 
women undergoing this procedure are actually not pregnant and just 
"want to be on the safe side," he said.  Therefore, the CPFC only 
considers mid- or late-term abortion cases to be "real abortions" 
and has allocated funding to try to reduce the number of these 
cases, which account for seven percent of the reported abortions. 
 
Midterm Review: Is Vietnam Really on the Right Track? 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
10. (U) At a conference for the midterm review of the Population 
Strategy on April 5, the CPFC announced that Vietnam lowered its 
fertility rate to 2.11 percent and its natural growth rate to 1.33 
percent, short of the expected 1.16 percent.  Vietnam's population 
reached 83.1 million, exceeding the first stage's target of the 
Population Strategy by 700,000.  While there was no mention of 
progress on abortion reduction, and despite the GVN's apparent 
setback on limiting population growth, then-Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai commended the decline of the fertility rate and reaffirmed the 
necessity of achieving all objectives set forth in the Population 
Strategy by 2010. 
 
11. (SBU) The UNFPA representative praised the accomplishments of 
Vietnam's population policy and suggested that UNFPA programs played 
 
HANOI 00002004  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
a large part in achieving some of the first stage's objectives. 
Regarding the second phase of the plan, he optimistically declared 
that "Vietnam will be on target" and noted that some of the 
CPFC-UNFPA joint projects in the Central Highlands provinces will 
now focus on increasing the availability of contraception other than 
sterilization and intrauterine devices.  A second UNFPA official 
added that "Vietnamese already prefer a two-child family and do not 
want to have more."  The real challenge during the second stage of 
the Population Strategy will be to offer broader contraception 
choices.  "Most people already recognize the value and economic 
benefits of practicing FP," she claimed, and the UNFPA will 
concentrate on family health by increasing its educational campaigns 
and access to RH services. 
 
12. (SBU) The CPFC official was more cautious in his assessment of 
the midterm success of the Population Strategy and cited possible 
flaws in the data provided by the GVN's General Statistics Office 
(GSO), which he attributed to the limited sample size when the GSO 
designed its surveys.  (Note: In 2004, the UNFPA representative also 
raised doubts about the accuracy of GSO figures announcing a 
population surge.  To corroborate the data, UNFPA conducted its own 
study, which contradicted GSO survey results - Ref B, paragraphs 10 
and 11.  End Note.)  He expressed disappointment that Vietnam was 
not able to reach its birthrate reduction goals.  "We are successful 
in terms of fertility reduction," he said, "but we wish that the 
birthrate slowed further and faster." 
 
Sex-selection and Gender Ratio Problems 
--------------------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) The CPFC has acknowledged in the past a slight gender 
imbalance, but maintained that the problem was not as pervasive as 
in China or South Korea (Ref B, Paragraph 9).  Validating these 
claims to Pol intern, the CPFC official stated that "there are few 
signs indicating an imbalance" and, unlike other Confucian-culture 
countries, he claimed that no cases of abandoned girls have been 
reported in the country.  CPFC figures have not changed during the 
past year, and Vietnam's male-to-female ratio still remains at 107 
to 100, which he did not deem as a serious concern for the moment. 
He nonetheless admitted that "this may be an emerging issue," and 
the CPFC advised the Ministry of Health to ban prenatal ultrasound 
services for sex selection.  "We will review the statistics next 
year and see if there is a reverse trend," he assured.  Recognizing 
that the Vietnamese public and local officials are ill-informed 
about this issue, he said that a joint CPFC-UNFPA conference on 
sex-selection this November will help the GVN develop better 
policies. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) While State and Party propaganda continues to encourage 
Vietnamese couples to have less than two children, Vietnam's 
population policy comes nowhere near approaching policies adopted in 
China in their impact on personal choice.  While there may still be 
a few instances of administrative or financial penalties imposed on 
couples with more than two children in certain rural localities, the 
main evidence of an "official two-child policy" is now limited to 
signs located throughout the country, stating "Girl or Boy, Two is 
Enough."  The latest policy to relax encouragement of a two-child 
standard is likely due to the positive results announced at the 
midterm review of the Population Strategy. 
 
15. (SBU) Comment, cont'd: Nevertheless, the questionable accuracy 
of GVN statistics casts serious doubts on the actual success to date 
of the GVN's population policy.  The GVN is not much concerned about 
gender disparity problems, so it is likely that Vietnam's population 
policy will continue to focus on limiting population growth for the 
time being.  It appears doubtful that the objectives of the 
Population Strategy will be fulfilled by 2010, and some media have 
already reported that the GVN is revising its initial goals.  End 
Comment. 
 
MARINE