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Viewing cable 06DILI424, REDUCED VIOLENCE IN DILI, BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI424 2006-08-21 02:44 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO5414
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0424/01 2330244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210244Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2895
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0650
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0723
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0639
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0477
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0503
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0577
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0371
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2226
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PHUM ASEC AU TTPGOV CASC PREF KJUS TT
SUBJECT: REDUCED VIOLENCE IN DILI, BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN 
 
REF: DILI 404 
 
DILI 00000424  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: During the last week there was a significant 
reduction in the gang-related incidents reported in reftel, but 
late last week there were several serious incidents and the 
potential for renewed gang activity remains.  Although some of 
the factors contributing to the resumption of gang violence seen 
in early August were one-time occurrences, more important 
underlying factors have not been eliminated or even effectively 
reduced.  These include the continued displacement of much of 
the population of Dili, the complicated community tensions that 
prevent their easy return, and the phenomenon of youth gangs 
with a seemingly endless appetite for confrontation.  Several 
key developments appear to have reined in the gang disturbances: 
community-level reconciliation and negotiation efforts have 
reduced conflict in some areas; the President and others have 
engaged the primary gang leaders and convinced them to suspend 
the violence for the time being; and international police have 
adjusted their tactics to  respond more effectively to gang 
incidents.  However, the current reprieve is fragile and a 
number of potential flash points, such as developments in 
high-profile legal cases, could lead to a resumption of these 
kinds of disturbances.  End summary. 
 
Significant reduction in gang activity, but problems continue 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
2. (U) There was a significant reduction of gang activity in 
Dili over the last week, until late last week when there were 
several large-scale incidents.  At a security briefing early in 
the week, international forces reported that the weekend was the 
calmest they had seen in some time.  The most recent situation 
report from the Australian Federal Police noted that "things 
have remained relatively calm over the last twenty four hours." 
Nonetheless, flare-ups continued during the week, particularly 
in several chronic problem neighborhoods.  Specific 
neighborhoods identified as continually problematic include: 
Comoro, Bebonuk, Quintal Boot, Fatu Hada and Surik Mas.  In 
addition, while districts remain stable for the most part, there 
was a clash between fringe group Colimau 2000 and a martial arts 
group, Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate (PSHT, also colloquially 
known as SH or "seti hati") in Ermera district over the weekend 
that reportedly resulted in up to four deaths.  This incident is 
still being confirmed.  This followed a clash between the same 
two groups in Covalima district about two weeks ago that 
resulted in one death. 
 
3. (U) Last Thursday afternoon, August 17, the security 
situation appeared to take a turn for the worse when a large 
group of young men waged a sustained stone-throwing attack on 
the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp adjacent to Obrigado 
Barracks, the headquarters of the United Nations Office in 
Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).  UNOTIL personnel called the Joint Task 
Force (JTF) which sent a number of military and police personnel 
to the camp.  The attackers fled and the international forces 
remained for several hours.  However, Friday morning at about 5 
a.m. there was another attack on the camp, involving not only 
stones but also several plastic bottles filled with gasoline. 
Finally, there were numerous reports Thursday night of 
disturbances in the vicinity of an IDP camp adjacent to the Dili 
port.  These incidents reportedly involved youths from within 
the camp throwing rocks at passing cars and pedestrians. 
Similar events have been reported at this camp for several 
weeks, but they had reportedly subsided until these most recent 
incidents. 
 
4. (U) According to Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General (SRSG) Sukehiro Hasegawa, about 2000 of the 7000 
Obrigado camp residents left as a result of the attacks on the 
camp. Some of these reportedly left even before the first 
attack, apparently because they had advance warning.  A Catholic 
nun who runs one of the largest IDP camps in Dili told 
Ambassador on Friday (August 18) that her seriously overcrowded 
camp had received many new families last night, most of whom had 
moved from the Obrigado camp or the camp adjacent to the port. 
 
DILI 00000424  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
5. (U) Despite these incidents, international police continue to 
describe the security situation in Dili as stable on the whole. 
In conversations with Emboff on Friday, Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) and Portuguese Republican National Guard (GNR) 
sources emphasized that this does not translate to an absence of 
incidents, but rather to a reduced overall number.  Moreover, 
they note that the incidents in the last day or so do not 
exhibit the coordination seen earlier this month when multiple 
incidents occurred nearly simultaneously. 
 
Increased understanding of underlying causes 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The early August resumption of high levels of gang 
violence in Dili prompted a renewed effort on the part of 
international security forces and others to examine and address 
the underlying causes both of  this recent spike and of the 
long-term phenomenon of gang violence.  Our current analysis 
highlights the following factors as being particularly important: 
 
-- The early August spike in violence corresponded with the 
initial period during which international police took on full 
responsibility for Dili security operations, including the key 
night-time hours previously covered by the military. 
International police sources believe that the transition was 
seen as a window of opportunity and that some gangs wanted to 
test the readiness of the international police.  Tactics used 
included staging a large number of disturbances in one area to 
draw police resources away from another area, as well as drawing 
patrol cars into a neighborhood and then surrounding and 
targeting the police. 
 
-- The arrest of dissident military police leader Major Alfredo 
Reinado continued to be a motivating factor among the explicitly 
Loromonu (western) oriented gangs.  As reported in septels, 
Reinado has gained a certain status as a "hero of the West". 
His detention while a range of other actors remain free is 
viewed by many Timorese, including some youth gang elements, as 
fundamentally one-sided and unjust. 
 
-- Contacts working in the IDP camps, as well as international 
police, report that a significant number of people from the East 
(Lorosa'e), including gang elements, have returned to Dili in 
recent weeks.  Many have taken up residence in existing IDP 
camps, including but not limited to the camp in the port area, 
and a large number of the recent incidents were initiated by 
gangs operating out of the camps. 
 
-- The youth gang phenomenon is one that many Embassy sources 
argue should be receiving greater attention.  A significant 
proportion of male youth (generally defined as anyone who grew 
up under the 1975-1999 Indonesian occupation) are affiliated 
with some kind of gang organization, whether one of the many 
martial arts groups or other groups, typically organized around 
a charismatic leader.  Many of the active gang members are 
unemployed and easily mobilized toward gang pursuits.  Some of 
the gangs are explicitly Loromonu or Lorosa'e (western or 
eastern) but many, especially the more established ones, have no 
such orientation.  While the gangs are not a new phenomenon, the 
current situation has created more space within which they can 
operate, jockey for influence, and settle old scores.  Sources 
who have followed the gang phenomenon closely observe that their 
recent activities were highly organized and that the key leaders 
retain the ability both to initiate and to suspend gang 
violence. 
 
-- Although the overall improvement in security since June is 
significant, many underlying issues remain substantially 
unaddressed.  These include the continued displacement of over 
half of the city's population; the widespread existence of 
conflicting land and property claims that have emerged as a 
major factor in community conflict; uncertainty about what 
security arrangements will be in place at the local level; a 
 
DILI 00000424  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
widespread perception that perpetrators of violence are able to 
act with impunity as many are released within hours or days if 
arrested at all; and the continued lack of economic opportunity 
that is believed to make gang membership so attractive to many 
young men. 
 
Explaining the reduction in violence 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) Explanations of the tapering off of gang activity that 
we have seen over the last week vary, but the most significant 
developments appear to be as follows: 
 
--  An increase in community reconciliation efforts in a number 
of neighborhoods in Dili  has had some impact on reducing 
tensions.  This has included reconciliation meetings initiated 
by government officials, by civil society organizations, and in 
some cases by community members themselves.  In one area of 
Comoro, an Embassy staff member described ongoing discussions 
involving village chiefs and local youth coordinators that have 
resulted in a significant reduction of tensions.  The Ministries 
of Labor and Interior have also initiated a series of dialogues 
at the aldeia (hamlet) level.  In a conversation with Emboff, 
the Malaysian police commander noted his pleasant surprise that 
these meetings, while seemingly not substantive, were followed 
by significantly reduced incidents. 
 
-- Initiatives to engage the leaders of gangs involved in the 
violence appear to have, at least in the short term, convinced 
many to suspend their campaigns of intimidation and violence. 
This has included efforts by some of the international forces to 
open lines of communication with gang leaders.  However, perhaps 
most influential have been efforts made by President Xanana 
Gusmao to engage the leaders, who see themselves not just as 
gang leaders but as leaders of a broader youth demographic that 
has been marginalized both politically and economically.  Gusmao 
has met with a number of the "youth leaders" over the past 
weeks.  After a meeting last week between the President and a 
number of these "leaders" one of those most prominently 
associated with recent incidents, Joao Becora, appeared on 
television to appeal to the youth to unite and resist being 
politically motivated to commit violence. 
 
-- International police have adjusted their tactics to respond 
more effectively to the gang disturbances.  For example, 
following an incident in which a patrol car was surrounded and 
had to be extracted, incident response teams now generally 
comprise at least two vehicles and six to eight officers, 
including one or two with long-barreled weapons.  In addition, 
military patrols have been brought back into use as a deterrent 
measure in certain hotspot areas, especially IDP camps that have 
been the site of repeated incidents.  However, contacts in the 
international forces admit that their actions are only getting 
at the surface issues.  Our sources note that adjusted police 
tactics do not explain the reduced violence.  In fact, we 
continue to see evidence that the Dili gangs do not view the 
presence of international forces, whether military or police, as 
a serious deterrent to their activities.  Rather, it is a 
reality to which they adjust their tactics. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: While there is optimism that community 
dialogues and engagement of youth gang leaders can continue to 
contribute to reduced violence, the organizations and 
capabilities remain in place.  Both leaders and members have 
demonstrated that they are generally short-sighted in their 
planning and can be easily set off by perceived injustices. 
There are a number of outstanding issues that have the potential 
to spark renewed large-scale gang activity.  This is 
particularly true of possible developments in high-profile legal 
cases, including the cases against former Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri, former Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato, and 
dissident armed forces Major Alfredo Reinado.  End comment. 
REES