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Viewing cable 06DILI404, INCREASED GANG ACTIVITY STRETCHES LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI404 2006-08-08 10:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO3644
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0404/01 2201016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081016Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2870
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0641
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0715
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0632
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0470
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0497
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0571
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0365
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2198
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000404 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PHUM ASEC AU TT
SUBJECT: INCREASED GANG ACTIVITY STRETCHES LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLICE IN DILII 
 
 
DILI 00000404  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: There has been a notable increase in 
disturbances around Dili in recent days, beginning late last 
week and continuing through today.  These have mostly occurred 
in neighborhoods that have been regular sites of conflict during 
the last few months.  Additionally, there has been a resumption 
of threats to internally displaced people (IDP) camps, but while 
in the past these mostly involved loud intimidation only, there 
have now been more concerted attacks.  The incidents have mostly 
involving stone throwing, but in a number of cases attackers 
have also been armed with machetes and other sharp-edged 
weapons.  Groups involved have a variety of profiles including 
local groups of unemployed youth, groups that claim to be 
protecting their neighborhoods, and martial arts groups and 
organized gangs.  There is a noticeable trend of increased 
organization among the groups, as well as indications that many 
have a sense of impunity in their actions.  International police 
resources are reportedly stretched thin in their ability to 
respond, especially as incidents often occur concurrently, but 
note that they are adjusting their operations to more 
effectively address the situation.  End summary. 
 
Increased disturbances in Dili 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (U) There has been a marked increase in disturbances, 
particularly attacks and intimidation tactics carried out by 
gangs or ad hoc groups of mostly young men.  This has been most 
severe in the Comoro area in western Dili and its adjacent 
neighborhoods, but has occurred in several other areas as well. 
There have been a number of reports of injuries, primarily 
resulting from rock throwing or beatings, but numbers are 
anecdotal at this point.  On Friday, a mob of over 100 attacked 
the IDP camp at the airport, which has a mostly Lorosae (people 
from the eastern part of the country) population.  The 
international NGO, Care, also reported repeated attacks over the 
weekend on one of their IDP camps by a gang of about 20 men 
armed with machetes and able to escape quickly on motorcycles. 
While the attacks on IDP camps have reportedly resulted in few 
injuries, they are effectively terrorizing the population 
within.  Aid workers are also reporting a number of cases where 
people who have gone home have been attacked, resulting in their 
return to the camps.  They are concerned that this new spate of 
gang activity will further underscore the extreme reluctance of 
most IDPs to return home. 
 
3. (SBU) In addition to the IDP camps, examples of the recent 
incidents include: 
-- In one of the Comoro neighborhoods, an Embassy staff member 
reported that four groups staged simultaneous attacks on his 
neighborhood.  However, the community had organized its own 
security and successfully rebuffed the attacks. 
-- Staff at the clinic in Bairopite, adjacent to Comoro, have 
reported nightly intimidation and rock throwing attacks, 
resulting in some property damage.  Over the weekend, an 
ambulance carrying an injured patient came under a rock throwing 
attack that resulted in three minor injuries. 
-- In the Marconi neighborhood, a group of young men, including 
teenaged and younger boys, has been staging attacks on Lorosae 
(easterners) houses, causing considerable property damage, for 
several nights and yesterday morning severely beat a Lorosae man 
from the Comoro neighborhood. 
 
Profiles of gangs vary 
---------------------- 
 
4. (U) The profile of the mobs or gangs involved in the attacks, 
or in other cases in fighting each other, varies.  The attack on 
the airport IDP camp was reportedly carried out by members of a 
single community after one of their members reported coming 
under a rock-throwing attack from the camp.  Many communities in 
Dili have organized neighborhood protection groups, some of 
which have played a positive role in keeping communities intact, 
while others have taken on a much more negative role as 
 
DILI 00000404  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
indicated in this incident.  In the Care IDP camp attack and the 
incidents in Marconi, smaller groups of 20-30 young men gather 
on a nightly basis to carry out attacks, often first getting 
intoxicated on the local Timorese palm liquor.  Although most 
martial arts group leaders are trying to stay clear of the 
fighting, it is clear that at least sub-groups and members of 
these groups have also been involved.  The attack of four groups 
simultaneously reported by an Embassy staff member involved 
members from several well-known martial arts groups.  In all 
cases, there has been a strong Loromonu versus Lorosae (West 
versus East) element, with Loromonu targeting of Lorosae being 
the most common. 
 
Trends: increased organization and sense of impunity 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5. (U) There are a couple trends of note in this recent increase 
in unrest.  First, the various groups seem to have increased 
their level of organization in carrying out the attacks. 
International police report that many of the weekend incidents 
took place nearly simultaneously, indicating coordination. 
Moreover, groups comprised primarily of unemployed youth, 
including younger teenage boys, often have cell phones and 
motorcycles, both normally out of reach luxuries. 
 
6. (U) A second trend we have observed is an increased sense of 
impunity on the part of many perpetrators.  There is a sentiment 
shared among many of them that they can continue to successfully 
evade arrest and that even if they are arrested, they are likely 
to be quickly released.  This has contributed to a somewhat 
dismissive attitude towards international police.  Over the 
weekend, US Defense Representative observed a group of young men 
taunting AFP officers.  It is hoped that this perception will 
change as international police adapt their operations to the new 
developments (see para 7). 
 
7. (SBU) Another factor contributing to a sense of impunity is 
the widespread reluctance on the part of Dili residents to 
provide the names of perpetrators, although in many cases they 
have this information.  Residents note their fear of retribution 
and do not trust that there are sufficient mechanisms in place 
to protect them.  In a meeting yesterday (August 7) with Embassy 
Charge d'Affaires, Minister for State Administration Anna Pessoa 
remarked on this issue and reported that she is working with 
community leaders and the Prosecutor General to make 
arrangements to ensure confidentiality and witness protection. 
However, other Embassy contacts note that the fear behind this 
reluctance is very ingrained and may be difficult to overcome. 
 
International police stretched thin, but adapting 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. (SBU) During a security briefing late last week Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) contingent commander Steve Lancaster 
reported that the overall situation had quieted down to the 
point that many police now had time on their hands to pursue 
lesser crimes.  The developments in the days since then appear 
to have reversed this.  A number of international police 
reported to IDP relief workers over the weekend that they were 
now spread too thin to address all the security incidents and 
concerns emerging in the city.  During a conversation with 
Emboff today, acting AFP contingent commander, Tom Dahlstrom, 
noted that the international police have been flat out since 
Friday, August 4.  He said that the majority of their resources 
were initially absorbed in reacting to calls and incidents as 
they occurred, but that they are now endeavoring to shift their 
focus to proactively pursuing perpetrators, especially gang 
leaders.  He reported that 40 arrests were made over the weekend 
and an additional 21 last night. 
 
American citizens not being targeted, but risk of cross-fire 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
DILI 00000404  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
9. (SBU) Although American citizens are not a direct target, 
there is an increased risk of getting caught in the crossfire. 
An American Embassy family car was hit by rocks yesterday 
afternoon, apparently being thrown in an altercation between two 
groups.  Additionally, there have been incidents reported of 
direct attacks on Portuguese targets, probably reflecting the 
anti-GNR (Portuguese Republican National Guard) sentiment that 
arose in the wake of the arrest of dissident leader Major 
Alfredo Reinado earlier this month.  The Embassy has sent a 
warden message to American citizens advising them of the 
increased security concerns and advising extra caution. 
WHITMAN