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Viewing cable 06CAIRO5430, AMBASSADOR SCHULTE DISCUSSES IRAN WITH FM ABOUL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CAIRO5430 2006-08-31 10:33 2011-03-15 18:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
Appears in these articles:
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Brooke F Adams  09/06/2006 09:40:47 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
C O N F I D E N T I A L        CAIRO 05430

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM:SJONES
DRAFTED: ECPO:LSKENNA
CLEARED: ECPO:CHH/WS

VZCZCCRI230
PP RUEHC RUCNIRA
DE RUEHEG #5430/01 2431033
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311033Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0988
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 005430

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC EG IR LE IS KNNP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SCHULTE DISCUSSES IRAN WITH FM ABOUL
GHEIT

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

1. (C) U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Mission in
Vienna Ambassador Schulte discussed Iran's nuclear weapons
program with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit on August 28.
Aboul Gheit warned Ambassador Schulte that the U.S. handling
of Lebanon had strengthened Iran, that economic sanctions
against Iran would not work, and that military action would
spur Iran to target U.S. personnel in Iraq. Aboul Gheit said
he had told Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mohamed Baqiri
that Iran must be more flexible and transparent with its
nuclear program. He also urged the U.S. to prove it is
serious about the Middle East Peace Process, explaining that
this would deprive Iran of the support of the Muslim world.
Referring to the upcoming General Conference, Aboul Gheit
pledged to support the U.S. on Iran in a manner that will not
embarrass Egypt. End summary.

-------------------------
Warning Against Sanctions
-------------------------

2. (C) Aboul Gheit told Ambassador Schulte that Egypt does
not want Iran to have a military nuclear capability because
then Israel would never denuclearize, and it would spark
others in the region to acquire nuclear weapons. An economic
embargo, he observed, will not produce results because
opportunists in adjoining countries will violate sanctions.
Questioning Russian and Chinese support for sanctions, Aboul
Gheit said that without China's support, Iran will cast the
nuclear issue as one between the West and the Muslim world.
Ambassador Schulte said Russia and China are concerned about,
but increasingly resigned to, endorsing targeted sanctions
against Iran. The U.S. must not, Aboul Gheit urged, take
military action against Iran because it would drive Iran to
target oil supplies and U.S. personnel in Iraq.

--------------------
Peace Process is Key
--------------------

3. (C) Aboul Gheit advised the international community to
"give Iran a package that will tie their hands." Making
progress on the Middle East Peace Process, he stressed, would
deny Iran the support of the Muslim world. He explained that
the Lebanon crisis has led millions of Egyptians to believe
Iran should acquire nuclear weapons. Aboul Gheit said the
U.S. must understand the depth of Arab frustration over
Israel's daily humiliation of the Arab people. Iran is
exploiting this frustration, Aboul Gheit noted, by working
with Hamas, Hizbollah, insurgents in Iraq, and perhaps even
with the Taliban. The U.S. (not the British or the French)
must diffuse the tension in the region by reengaging in the
Peace Process.

------------------------------
Iran's Response to the Package
------------------------------

4. (C) Ambassador Schulte said the U.S. believes Iran has
already decided to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
Ambassador Schulte noted that Iran's response to the P5 1
offer reaffirmed its unwillingness to halt enrichment and
indicated that regional security would need to be addressed
before other matters. Aboul Gheit warned that the U.S. would
lose friends if it discusses regional security with Iran
without including Egypt and Jordan. He said the Secretary
had agreed to include Egypt and Jordan in any future
discussions with Gulf foreign ministers on Iran. Ambassador
Schulte reassured Aboul Gheit that the U.S. was not
interested in pursuing regional security discussions with
Iran under the present circumstances.

--------------------
GOE Pressure on Iran
--------------------

5. (C) Aboul Gheit said he told Iran's Deputy Foreign
Minister Mohamed Baqiri in a meeting August 27 to be flexible
and transparent when negotiating on its nuclear program.
Ambassador Schulte asked for Egypt's support on Iran at the
NAM summit and the upcoming General Conference. Noting that
he (not Mubarak) will go to Cuba, Aboul Gheit agreed to
support the U.S., but said "we will do this without
embarrassing ourselves. We will tell (Iran) publicly what we
say to them privately." Ambassador Shulte advised that the
General Conference will focus on the peaceful uses of nuclear
power. Aboul Gheit called the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP) a "good project" and asked for additional
information on the concept. He also thanked Ambassador
Schulte for providing information on the Concept Paper on
Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel. Aboul Gheit acknowledged
that the GOE tends to prolong internal studies of concepts
like the GNEP and said it would be helpful if the U.S. would
continue to provide background information.
-------------------
Additional Protocol
-------------------

6. (C) Aboul Gheit said Egypt will not sign the Additional
Protocol (AP) at this time, confirming that the obstacle is
the fact that Israel is not a party to the NPT. In a
separate conversation, Aboul Gheit's Disarmament Office
Director Hossam Aly expressed frustration at the move to make
the AP the international standard when it was originally
intended to be optional. But, Aly qualified, if Israel
becomes party to the NPT, Egypt would sign the AP the same
day, "or even a day earlier."
RICCIARDONE