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Viewing cable 06BRASILIA1826, EMBASSY BRASILIA B1, B1/B2, B2 VALIDATION STUDY CY2004

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRASILIA1826 2006-08-31 09:57 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0128
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1826/01 2430957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310957Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6526
INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 7893
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 2774
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 5371
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/VO/F/P, CA/FPP, CA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CMGT BR
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BRASILIA B1, B1/B2, B2 VALIDATION STUDY CY2004 
 
 
1. Summary: In August 2006, the Consular Section of Embassy Brasilia 
concluded a validation study of the 6,620 B1, B1/B2 and B2 Visas 
issued by the section in calendar year 2004. Results showed that 
83.4% returned, 12.2% did not return, 4.1% never traveled, and data 
was inconclusive on 0.2%. The initial survey was carried out by 
telephone and had an initial inconclusive rate of 13.6%. Embassy DHS 
then used TECS to check our inconclusive cases, providing conclusive 
data on all but a few cases, greatly increasing the accuracy of our 
study. End summary. 
 
Definitions 
 
2. Post classified the study results into four categories: 1) 
Confirmed Return or Current Legal Stay in the U.S. - those cases for 
which Post was able to contact the visa holder and determine a 
return from the United States and/or travelers still legally present 
in the U.S.; 2) Confirmed Overstay - those travelers who are still 
in the United States or who stayed for more than the six months of 
stay CBP typically authorizes and who did not file for extension; 3) 
Never Traveled - individuals who have not used their visas and 4) 
Inconclusive - cases which remain unclear even after obtaining DHS 
data. 
 
Data Analysis General Observations 
 
3. Post determined that 83.4% of all B1, B1/B2 and B2 visa holders 
who were interviewed by Embassy Brasilia in 2004 left the United 
States after a temporary visit or were in the U.S. for less than six 
months. Post confirmed that 12.2% of the travelers failed to return 
from the United States or misused their visas by remaining in the 
U.S. for more than six months. 4.1% never traveled, while we were 
unable to determine the whereabouts of 0.2% of travelers. 
 
4. Post noticed that 80.2% of all confirmed overstay cases were 
issued between August and December 2004. Post attributes this to two 
factors: 1) a significant decrease in the refusal rate in B1, B1/B2 
and B2 issuances, from 57% in January 2004 to 30% in December 2004; 
and 2) a gradual slide in the dollar - real exchange rate from the 
highest of 3.1 reals to one dollar in May to 2.7 in December 2004. 
The stronger Brazilian currency improved the purchasing power of 
applicants and, therefore, increased their income in USD terms.  The 
strong Brazilian real also made U.S. travel affordable for segments 
of Brazilian society who previously would never have considered 
travel to the U.S. 
 
Confirmed Overstay Cases Analysis 
 
5. Analyzing the confirmed overstay cases by age revealed that age 
group most likely to overstay are 21 to 35 year-olds (40.6%), 
followed by individuals under 14 (20.8%). 
 
6. Of the group studied, men are slightly more likely to abuse visas 
than women (51.5% vs.48.5%). 
 
7. Although the majority of B1, B1/B2 and B2 visas in 2004 were 
issued to the residents of the Federal District, followed by the 
applicants from the State of Goias (37% compared to 29%); 66.3% of 
the confirmed overstay cases resided in Goias, and only 19.8% were 
from the Federal District. 
 
8. Interestingly enough, only 2% of all overstays were overcome 
cases, and only 5.9% had their visas previously denied, whereas 
12.9% were limited validity visas. 
 
Methodology 
 
9. Utilizing FPP guidelines,  principally based on the following 
cables, 04 STATE 172283 SOP 74: Updated Guidance on Conducting 
Validation Studies, 00 STATE 63463 Validation Studies - Report on 
Pilot Project and Recommendations; Validation Studies Handbook 
(1999); and 99 STATE 43495 - Validation Studies for Anti-Fraud Work 
- A Simplified Approach, the Consular Section chose a sample of 800 
successful visa applicants. Post contacted each and every applicant 
by phone and then determined the percentage of visa recipients in 
this particular category who returned to Brazil after a temporary 
visit to the United States. 
 
10. Using CCD data post generated an Excel file of all 6,620 B1, 
B1/B2 and B2 visas granted in 2004. Next, we organized the 
spreadsheet according to the following categories: Random Number, 
Sample Frequency, Gender, DOB, Nationality, phone number, alternate 
phone number, date to call, first call date, second call date (if 
missed on the first), third and final call date (if missed on first 
two) and six result columns: confirmed overstay, confirmed return, 
probable overstay, inconclusive, and never traveled. 
 
11. Subsequently, post generated a random sample of 827 cases, using 
the Random Number Generator program in Excel, and sorted the 
spreadsheet by the Random Number Column. After creating a list of 
 
BRASILIA 00001826  002 OF 002 
 
 
cases to call, post simplified the call back procedure by organizing 
the spreadsheet by the Visa Printed Date and creating separate 
worksheets, one for each month in 2004. 
 
Call-Back Process General Observations 
 
12. Originally, Post decided that only the Consular Section's FSNs 
were to make phone calls to the randomly selected visa holders. The 
premise for the decision was the idea that it would be easier to 
establish the current whereabouts of the selected visa holders by 
not divulging the caller's identity, which is an easier task for a 
native Portuguese speaker. The section created several scenarios for 
phone calls such as credit card company data verification, a call 
from an old friend from school/college, etc. While this strategy 
proved to be successful in a number of cases, a lot of families were 
reluctant to give out personal information. However, when U.S. 
members of the Consular Section made the calls, respondents were 
much more likely to provide personal information about the 
whereabouts of the visa holder. 
 
13. Soon after commencing, Post discovered that the majority of 
phone numbers and addresses of the visa holders have changed and 
that it was difficult to locate the B1, B1/B2 and B2 travelers. 
Using application forms DS-156 and DS-157 helped determine the 
location of some of the visa holders with the help of family 
members, U.S. or work contacts. Often times the Consular staff had 
to obtain telephone numbers through the Brazilian directory 
assistance, which considerably slowed down the validation study, but 
at the same time reduced the number of inconclusive cases. 
 
Using DHS Data 
 
14. After completing Stage 1 of the study, Post was unable to 
determine the whereabouts of 13.6% of all the cases examined. The 
Embassy's DHS office, however, provided us with the entry/exit data 
of the 126 inconclusive cases through TECS queries. Having access to 
the information was a tremendous help in completing the study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
15. While we are pleased with the results of the validation study, 
we managed to identify two problem groups of applicants who tend to 
breach the terms of their visas: 1) under-14-year-olds, and 2) 
applicants from the State of Goias. Post is also advising 
pre-screeners to improve data entry and verify the accuracy of the 
information visa candidates provide on their application forms. 
 
16. Additionally, the Post's validation study proved to be a 
successful exercise in cooperation between the Consular Section and 
DHS. Entry/exit data obtained from Post's DHS team was invaluable to 
the success of the study and helped us to practically eliminate the 
number of inconclusive cases, thus making the results of the study 
far more accurate. The exercise was a vivid reminder of how much 
consular officers could benefit from direct access to U.S. 
entry/exit records either through TECS and/or inclusion of such data 
into the CCD. 
 
Chicola