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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2804, LEBANON: CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH PM SINIORA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT2804 2006-08-29 16:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO6274
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHLB #2804/01 2411601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291601Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5331
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0201
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH PM SINIORA 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  Prime Minister Siniora asked CODEL Shays for help in 
lifting the air and sea blockade of Lebanon by IDF forces. 
PM Siniora stated that not only was the blockade severely 
impairing humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, but it 
made the Lebanese people feel that the current period is 
simply a hiatus in a continuing conflict.  As he has with 
many recent visitors, PM Siniora also emphasized the 
importance of dealing with Shebaa Farms.  If a just 
resolution could be found, Siniora argued that Hizballah's 
militia would lose its legitimacy with the Lebanese people, 
Iran and Syria would lose influence in Lebanon, and Israel 
would gain a stable northern border.  Although the Prime 
Minister discussed reconstruction assistance, he stated that 
the U.S. aid would be even more valuable in helping the LAF 
develop the necessary capabilities it needed to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibility of securing Lebanon's borders. 
CODEL Shays conveyed the support of the American people for 
Lebanon and said they would ensure that their colleagues in 
the U.S. House of Representatives understand the 
precariousness of the cease-fire and the challenges faced by 
the country's pro-reform forces.  End summary. 
 
2.  CODEL Shays, comprising Representative Christopher Shays 
(R-CT), Representative Al Green (D-TX), Representative Robert 
Inglis (R-SC), and Representative Brian Higgins (R-NY), and 
the Ambassador met with Prime Minister Siniora at the Grand 
Serail on August 23.  Senior GOL advisors Mohammad Chatta and 
Rola Nouraddine also attended the late afternoon meeting. 
 
3.  The Prime Minister described the difficult challenges his 
Government and the Lebanese people were facing as it tried to 
stabilize a post-conflict environment that many of the 
country's citizens believe may only be a pause in a much 
longer war.  PM Siniora said he was concerned about comments 
coming out of Israel that could be interpreted as signaling 
further hostilities.  He also spoke of the considerable 
damage inflicted on Lebanon, not only the loss of life, but 
the leveling of many towns, and the destruction of a 
significant portion of the country's industrial and 
agricultural productive capacity. 
 
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE 
------------------ 
 
4.  PM Siniora also explained to CODEL members that his 
country was not exhibiting the same resilience it had shown 
after prior conflicts, because few Lebanese now had 
confidence in the future.  He spoke of increasing emigration 
of the best and the brightest of its citizens, and a notable 
reluctance to re-invest in the country's badly damaged 
economic base. 
 
5.  The Prime Minister spoke in grave tones about other 
damage -- both material and in terms of morale -- from the 
continuing air and sea blockade of his country by IDF forces. 
 He argued that unless this "state of siege" was removed, the 
unique nature of Lebanon, which had made it a force for 
moderation, tolerance, and democratic principles in a 
difficult region, could well be lost.  He cautioned that 
unless the pro-reform Government was able to change things 
for the better in Lebanon, extremist forces would take 
advantage of the resulting desperation. 
 
6.  PM Siniora stated that despite the dangers, not all was 
bleak.  The Government has been able to garner sufficient 
support across the political spectrum to authorize and 
implement the first deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) to south Lebanon in almost 40 years.  Siniora also felt 
that his Government now had the instrument it needed to 
compel the disarmament of Hizballah -- and that was UNSCR 
1701's acknowledgment of the issue of Shebaa Farms. 
 
7.  PM Siniora asked the CODEL members to help his Government 
find a just solution to the persistent problem of Shebaa.  If 
the people of Lebanon perceived that Shebaa was settled in a 
fair manner, Siniora argued that they would then demand that 
Hizballah put down its arms.  In this manner, the Prime 
Minister maintained the state could reclaim its 
constitutional authority to be the only bearer of arms 
throughout the country.  He further stated that such a result 
would not only bring stability to Lebanon, but to Israel as 
well.  In an ironic way, Siniora said that the "terrible 
experience" of the recent war might lead to a rare 
opportunity for Israel to finally live in peace with its 
 
BEIRUT 00002804  002 OF 002 
 
 
neighbors. 
 
8.  Representative Shays stated he was speaking for his 
colleagues when he said that Lebanon's capacity to withstand 
the many challenges of the past month had elicited wide 
admiration in America.  Rep. Shays said that the USG wanted 
to assist in such a way that this would be the last war that 
Lebanon would have to suffer, and asked the Prime Minister 
for his priorities for U.S. support. 
 
REQUEST TO LIFT THE BLOCKADE 
---------------------------- 
 
9.  PM Siniora immediately stated that his most urgent 
request was for America to use its influence to lift Israel's 
"suffocating" air and sea blockade of his country.  Siniora 
said he understood Israel's concern that the flow of weapons 
that prevailed prior to the conflict had to stop and that it 
required his Government to implement much firmer control of 
the country's borders.  He insisted that the focus, however, 
was misplaced by the on-going blockade.  PM Siniora 
maintained that neither the international airport nor the 
port of Beirut were the principal routes for arms, but rather 
it was Lebanon's border with Syria.  And even here, Siniora 
argued that recent deployments of additional LAF troops to 
the border areas had begun to stanch such activity. 
 
10.  Next in importance for the Prime Minister was a request 
for the USG to help focus international attention on Shebaa 
Farms.  In his opinion, not only was the "return" of Shebaa 
the key to disarming Hizballah, but it also provided the 
means to reduce Iranian influence in Lebanon.  The popular 
appeal of Hizballah relied on its reputation as a 
"resistance" movement, and similarly, the importance of this 
perceived mission allowed it to receive heavy Iranian 
subsidies without much scrutiny from the Lebanese.  If Shebaa 
could be resolved, reasoned Siniora, the heavy influence of 
Iran would no longer be tolerated.  Regardless, Siniora 
acknowledged the complexity and difficulty of the issue by 
remarking, "...only the U.S. can solve the tough ones." 
 
11.  PM Siniora also noted that USG assistance with 
reconstruction and rebuilding the country's security services 
in accordance with modern, democratic principles would be 
effective and most welcome, but he also admitted that other 
nations could handle these tasks as well.  The Prime Minister 
emphasized again that the unique power and leverage of the 
U.S. should be applied foremost to the issues of the blockade 
and Shebaa. 
 
"A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY" 
------------------------- 
 
12.  When asked by Rep. Shays why his Government doesn't 
engage directly with the Government of Israel, PM Siniora 
said that in the present context that would not be feasible. 
But he did state that with a just and stable cease-fire, with 
the LAF in control of the south, and Lebanon's borders 
secure, the opportunity for solutions to region-wide issues 
was more possible than ever before. 
 
13.  PM Siniora stated his belief that the violent and 
basically inconclusive four weeks of warfare must have 
convinced the Government of Israel that its security could 
not be attained on the battlefield -- it would only be 
achieved through honest negotiations with all its neighbors 
and the eventual resolution of the long-standing grievances 
of both sides. 
 
14.  PM Siniora stated that, with the probable exception of 
Syria, all the Arab countries were finally beginning to speak 
of the incalculable waste of the past decades and of a 
lasting solution that would at long last stabilize and bring 
prosperity to the region.  Siniora also remarked that even 
Syria, at some point, could be persuaded by the moderate Arab 
world to end its alliance with a radicalized Iran.  He 
postulated that the Arab and Muslim worlds were frustrated 
that decades of war and antagonism had done nothing but 
enable the rise of extremism.  With patience and reason, PM 
Siniora contended, both the moderate Arab world and the 
Government of Israel could find a way to once and for all put 
away the instruments of war. 
 
15.  CODEL Shays has cleared on this cable. 
FELTMAN