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Viewing cable 06LIMA2743, HUMALA MOVEMENT LOSING STEAM IN AREQUIPA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA2743 2006-07-13 19:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2743/01 1941956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131956Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1381
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3659
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6888
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9671
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL QUITO 0540
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0733
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
UNCLAS LIMA 002743 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA MOVEMENT LOSING STEAM IN AREQUIPA 
 
REF: A. LIMA 2625 
 
     B. LIMA 2582 
     C. LIMA 2428 
     D. LIMA 1154 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  Radical opposition leader and former presidential 
candidate Ollanta Humala carried the Arequipa region by a 
wide margin in Peru's 6/4 presidential race.  Despite that, 
the prospects for pro-Humala candidates in upcoming regional 
and municipal elections are uncertain.  Humala has lost 
credibility as splits have appeared in his movement. 
Furthermore, many young Arequipenos favor the Peru-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) as a way of boosting local tourism. 
Allegations of corruption have weakened the prospects for 
APRA party incumbents in both the Regional Presidency and the 
Mayor's Office of Arequipa.  All this should be good news for 
Evangelical-based Restauracion Nacional (RN) party.  However, 
RN's followers in Arequipa are deeply divided.  Right now, 
the most likely outcome for November elections appears to be 
municipal and regional governments run by independent local 
actors.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  Poloff visited Arequipa 6/28-7/4 to gauge how local 
residents view upcoming regional elections.  Arequipa is 
Peru's second-largest metropolitan area and capital of a 
politically and economically important region in the 
country's south.  It has a history of resentment toward Lima 
and has steadily shifted to the left becuase of significant 
migration from neighboring Puno.  Former Peruvian Nationalist 
Party (PNP)/Unidad por el Peru (UPP) alliance presidential 
candidate Ollanta Humala handily defeated APRA 
President-elect Alan Garcia 64.6% to 35.4% in Arequipa, in 
the 6/4 presidential election. 
 
3.  Poloff met with a diverse range of local residents, 
including: Father Javier Len, Catholic priest, Director of 
the Arequipa Social Action Movement (MASA), a faith-based, 
pro-development NGO; Alonso Quintanilla, Rector of the 
Catholic University of San Pablo; Gabriele Cabieses, Director 
of the Institute of the South, a prominent vocational school 
educating Sector C and D youth; Marcio Soto, mayor of the 
township of Paucarpata and candidate for mayor of Arequipa in 
November 2006 regional elections; Jorge Losada, Arequipa city 
Councilman and APRA party leader; and Jaime Gutierrez, 
Evangelical Pastor of the Agua Viva (AV) Christian Community 
of Arequipa and local Restauracion Nacional (RN) party 
activist. 
 
-------------------------- 
HUMALA'S POPULARITY WANING 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  Ollanta Humala remains popular in Arequipa, but his 
support has waned since the 6/4 run-off election (Ref D). 
Many Arequipenos now question Humala's competence, 
leadership, and organizational abilities since divisions in 
his UPP-PNP political alliance first appeared in mid-June. 
So far, three congressional representatives have left the 
UPP-PNP legislative bloc (Ref C).  Furthermore, over the 
weekend of 7/8-7/9, spokespersons for both the UPP and the 
PNP indicated that each organization would run its own 
candidates in November regional elections. 
 
5.  Contacts in Arequipa said that voters had overwhelmingly 
chosen Humala on 6/4 not out of any fundamental loyalty, but 
instead had used him as a vehicle to protest against 
"politics as usual."  Humala's actions since the election -- 
splits in his movement and problems with his UPP partners -- 
suggest to locals that Humala may, in fact, represent more of 
the same.  Local interlocutors added that President-elect 
Garcia,s development plans for the south, if successful, 
would further undercut Humala,s support in the region. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
MANY PRO-HUMALA AREQUIPENOS ARE PRO-FTA 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6.  Arequipa,s post-election political ambivalence was on 
display during Poloff,s visit, which coincided with a call 
for national protests by opponents of the recently approved 
Peru-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Ref B).  Although 
Arequipa has been a bastion of anti-FTA activity, attendance 
at two anti-FTA protests was modest, with only 80 persons 
showing up in the central plaza for a protest on 6/28 (the 
same day that the Peruvian Congress approved the FTA) and 300 
marching on 7/4. 
 
7.  Local interest in the FTA is based on Arequipa's growing 
tourism sector, which has provided jobs for increasing 
numbers of local youth.  In conversation, young residents 
equated the FTA with increased tourism.  Locals also 
explained the modest turnout for the protests as the result 
of poor UPP-PNP political leadership.  A number of contacts 
alleged that UPP party members are often paid to protest. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
HUMALA'S WEAKNESS PROVIDES NO ADVANTAGE FOR APRA 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
8.  APRA currently controls both the Arequipa Regional 
Presidency as well as the city Mayor.  However, both 
incumbents are unpopular, and local observers did not expect 
either to win continued support from APRA, much less 
re-election.  Arequipa suffers from sub-standard public 
services, and infrastructure remains decrepit or non-existent 
in many areas -- particularly the poor slums surrounding the 
city-proper.  APRA leader Jorge Losada predicted that his 
embattled party might not formally run candidates in local 
elections, but might instead throw its financial support 
behind independent local candidates who both agree with, and 
have the administrative capacity to help implement, Alan 
Garcia's national and regional development agendas. 
 
9.  With the political standing of both Humala and APRA 
weakened, there remain 35 different groups -- in addition to 
the well-established political parties -- that are poised to 
offer candidates for both regional and municipal posts in the 
November elections.  Four candidates will likely compete for 
the departmental presidency, and, as of now, only one is 
associated with a known political party.  Similarly, the 
three leading candidates for mayor all have local roots and 
are not associated with national parties (although there are 
rumors that one of these candidates may join Humala's PNP 
party ticket). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
RESTAURACION NACIONAL DIVIDED IN AREQUIPA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10.  The weakened positions of both Humala and APRA at the 
local level should spell opportunity for RN, the 
Evangelical-led party that proved to be the surprise 
vote-getter in national presidential elections held 4/9. 
However, while RN appears strong and well organized in other 
poor departments (Ref A), the party's leadership in Arequipa 
is deeply divided.  RN's presidential candidate, Humberto 
Lay, does not enjoy good relations with the local branches of 
the Agua Viva Church (AV), one of the best-organized 
Evangelical churches in Peru and a key logistical supporter 
of Lay's presidential campaign.  Local AV Pastor Jaime 
Gutierrez told Poloff that Lay had appointed his own people 
to run RN's local headquarters and that they were not 
religious leaders who commanded respect within the 
church-going community.  Consequently, Gutierrez was unable 
to predict RN's performance in the upcoming regional 
elections. 
 
------- 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
11.  It appears that Humala's vision of a "solid south" may 
fade as local political forces reassert themselves.  There is 
no lack of political activism in Arequipa where, as in much 
of Peru, local caudillos, candidates, and mini-movements 
abound.  These continued political divisions at the local 
level could make it difficult for President-elect Alan Garcia 
to find rliable partners for his development plans.  In the 
south, the fragmentation factor may become Garcia's next big 
challenge.  END COMMENT. 
STRUBLE