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Viewing cable 06KINSHASA1080, NORTH KATANGA: THE WEAKEST SECURITY LINK IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA1080 2006-07-06 11:43 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO0501
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR
DE RUEHKI #1080/01 1871143
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061143Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4310
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: NORTH KATANGA: THE WEAKEST SECURITY LINK IN THE 
VOLATILE EAST? 
 
REF: A. 95 KIN 1940 
 
     B. KIN 56 
     C. KIN 747 
     D. KIN 774 
     E. KIN 572 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  The north Katangan region of Tanganyika, 
larger in size than North Kivu, South Kivu, or Ituri district 
but also volatile, is the final geographic piece of the 
eastern border of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Plagued by insecurity, Tanganyika nevertheless receives far 
less attention than its sister provinces and districts to the 
north.  In a June 17-18 visit to Kalemie, the capital of 
Tanganyika district, Poloff talked to MONUC officials, NGOs, 
UN aid agencies, and Tanganyika District Administrator 
Jean-Robert Tshimanga about security.  All agreed that three 
major security threats exist in the district -- ex-Mai Mai 
militia, unintegrated Congolese Army Forces (FARDC), and 
competing state security organs -- and that MONUC and CONADER 
attempts to handle them have so far proved largely 
unsuccessful.  End summary. 
 
Congolese, Not Foreign, Armed Groups 
------------------------------------ 
2. (SBU)  During the last conflict (1998-2003), Katanga 
province was divided by fighting between the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy - Goma (RCD-G) faction, supported by 
Rwanda, and the ex-Government faction, supported by local Mai 
Mai troops.  While the RCD-G and some Mai Mai militia have 
been subsumed into the FARDC, many Mai Mai elements remain 
outside of government control.  According to MONUC Kalemie 
Poloff, an estimated 5,000-6,000 Mai Mai militia are still 
active in the Tanganyika region and have strongholds around 
Nyunzu-Kabalo-Kongolo and the so-called "death triangle" of 
Manono-Mitwaba-Pweto.  The majority of these Mai Mai form 
small, unstructured units with no chain of command and have 
largely devolved, she said, into common bandits. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The FARDC 6th Military Region began operations 
against Mai Mai militia in November 2005 (Ref A).  More than 
75,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had fled Mai 
Mai attacks in the first half of 2005 began to return home. 
However, an additional 30,000-50,000 IDPs fled their homes to 
escape FARDC - Mai Mai fighting (Ref B).  On May 12, renegade 
Mai Mai leader Gedeon and approximately 350 of his troops, 
responsible for some of the most horrific human rights 
violations in the district, surrendered and requested 
demobilization (Ref C,D).  According to Tanganyika District 
Administrator Tshimanga, the Mai Mai situation has 
significantly improved since the surrender.  MONUC Eastern 
Division confirms a dramatic decrease in the activities of 
certain Mai Mai elements, but notes that continued looting of 
villages and harassment of the local population has been 
reported as recently as 13 June in Moba and Pweto territories. 
 
FARDC Brassage Departure Leaves (In)security Vacuum 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
4.  (SBU)  There are nearly 19,400 FARDC in north Katanga, 
none of whom have gone through integration.  These 
non-integrated brigades are individually composed of ex-Mai 
Mai, ex-government, and ex-RDC-G soldiers, headed by 
commanders from other ex-militia components.  (Note:  For 
instance, the 6th Military Region Commander, General Lukole, 
is ex-Mai Mai and a friend of the late President Laurent 
Kabila.  End note.)  The FARDC troops have been accused of 
contributing to the instability of north Katanga, both 
through attacks on Mai Mai militia which caused massive 
population flight and through continued predatory behavior 
against the local population. 
 
5.  (SBU)  In a bizarre symbiotic relationship, Mai Mai 
militia and FARDC troop actions have tended to complement one 
another in terrorizing the population -- Mai Mai elements 
burn villages and FARDC elements loot whatever remains. 
According to MONUC, both contribute to the lack of freedom of 
movement and basic security for civilians due to road blocks 
and systematic extortion.  Both armed elements (as well as 
state security organs discussed below) have been accused of 
committing acts of violence and gross human rights violations 
while competing for illegal tax collection and control of 
rich mines in the district. 
 
6.  (SBU) The recent departure for brassage (integration) of 
many of the FARDC battalions in north Katanga has left a 
security vacuum in the area, according to MONUC Kalemie 
 
KINSHASA 00001080  002 OF 004 
 
 
Poloff.  With limited MONUC resources (discussed below), 
Tanganyika province could be left open to Mai Mai or local 
police harassment of the population.  Conversely, however, 
the departure of some FARDC troops could lead to increased 
Mai Mai demobilization as there is an unresolved crisis of 
confidence between FARDC and those relatively cooperative Mai 
Mai groups willing to enter the Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration (DDR) process.  The 2005 "Lunga War" 
incident, in which FARDC reportedly ambushed ex-Mai Mai 
commanders wanting to disarm, frightened some Mai Mai away 
from giving up arms. 
 
 
Rival Intelligence Services Harass Population 
--------------------------------------------- - 
7.  (SBU)  In a late 2005 directive, President Joseph Kabila 
replaced governing RCD-G officials in all top district 
administrative positions with People's Party for 
Reconstruction and Development (PPRD) officials.  However, 
the RCD-G's intelligence agency, the Department of Security 
and Intelligence (DSR), continues to exist pending an order 
from the President directing otherwise.  The GDRC 
intelligence structure, the National Intelligence Agency 
(ANR), which reports to the president, is also operating in 
the district.  Thus another security threat to the population 
is the existence of not one, but two, intelligence agencies 
functioning as ad-hoc police and extortionists.  Neither the 
DSR nor the ANR (nor the Congolese National Police (PNC), nor 
the FARDC, for that matter) are receiving salaries from the 
national or provincial governments -- all derive their 
earnings from the local population.  The state security 
agencies and the police, along with the Mai Mai and FARDC, 
have been investigated by MONUC Human Rights Division for 
illegal road blocks, extortion, house burning, looting, 
exactions, appropriations of land, rapes, and torture.  Added 
to the mix, according to the UN Office for Coordination for 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Kalemie representative, are 
twenty Presidential Guards (GSSP) who, having arrived in 
advance of President Kabila's June 14 visit to Kalemie, have 
not left town.  They have been accused of exactions and 
sexual violence. 
 
CONADER's Mission Failure 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  CONADER, the national DDR agency, opened its doors 
in Kalemie on January 16, 2006 and received its first 
combatants on January 26.  A tidal wave of unverifiable 
ex-Mai Mai militia arrived for demobilization as did a large 
number of civilians looking for ways to qualify for the 
demobilization payout (Note:  By bringing in found hand 
grenades, for example.  End note).  Through May 2, when 
CONADER closed its door to any new soldier wishing to 
demobilize, 3000 ex-militia were received; only 2 requested 
integration into the FARDC.  Since May 2, according to MONUC 
Kalemie Poloff, the only option now available at the CONADER 
Kalemie office is integration into the Congolese military. 
CONADER officially closed the center due to the high level of 
fraud in the ID process and the unwillingness of MONUC to act 
as anything but a witness to the process.  (Note:  MONUC does 
not have the lists of Mai Mai militias that CONADER wants to 
verify military status.  In fact, no one does, as the Mai Mai 
were largely an ad-hoc army with no central command.  End 
note.)  According to the visiting OCHA Lubumbashi 
Representative, one proposed solution to the problem of local 
people coming to CONADER as "ex-combatants" with discarded 
weapons to get money, is to create a mobile DDR which would 
travel directly to Mai Mai groups for demobilization. 
However, given the vast insecurity in the region, mobile DDR 
is not currently feasible.  At present, 600-700 ex-Mai Mai 
are in Kalemie town waiting for demobilization.  They and 
their families represent both a humanitarian crisis -- they 
have no food or shelter or means of support -- and a security 
problem -- the risk of rerecruitment increases as they wait 
with no assistance. 
 
9.  (SBU)  MONUC Kalemie Poloff claims that hundreds of Mai 
Mai want to demobilize; however, with no place to go and no 
CONADER center to assist them in the reintegration to 
civilian life, they remain in the bush and prey on the local 
population.  (Note:  MONUC Kalemie officers have regular 
contact with ex-Mai Mai militia and indeed facilitated the 
surrender of warlord Gedeon in April.  End note.)  Tshimanga, 
the Tanganyika District Administrator, believes that 
increased Radio Okapi advertising about DDR for Mai Mai 
 
KINSHASA 00001080  003 OF 004 
 
 
willing to disarm would be particularly effective.  Internal 
MONUC documents call the downsizing of Radio Okapi in Kalemie 
"a major setback in promoting the DDR campaign and 
pacification of local militia elements."  MONUC Kalemie 
Poloff added that education and sensitization are crucial for 
Mai Mai who have been in the bush so long they still believe 
they are fighting Rwanda. 
 
10.  (SBU)  According to the OCHA Kalemie Representative, the 
DDR process in Tanganyika is dysfunctional not just because 
of weak sensitization of combatants about the DDR process, 
but also due to the lack of planning and coordination between 
institutions in charge of the process (CONADER, MONUC, civil 
and military authorities), the difficulties of transporting 
soldiers, and delays in paying civil reinsertion fees to the 
3800 demobilized militia estimated to be residing in 
Tanganyika district.  Furthermore, according to MONUC, 
confusion reigns among ex-combatants on disarmament 
procedures and eligibility for assistance.  Those who have 
handed over their weapons to local non-integrated FARDC 
brigades in the past month were not accepted into Kalemie's 
CONADER orientation camp because CONADER procedures require 
disarmament at disarmament focal points, not to random FARDC 
troops. 
 
11.  (SBU)  One final problem with DDR in the region comes 
from Molunda, a local pastor with reported ties to the PPRD, 
who started his own demobilization program to distribute 
bicycles to any soldier wishing to disarm.  Unlike CONADER, 
he provided no livelihood assistance to those he "disarmed," 
nor was he able to issue demobilization certificates.  Mai 
Mai hearing about this program swamped CONADER demanding 
bicycles.  Others, demobilized through Pastor Molunda's NGO, 
have no proof of demobilization and can re-demobilize for 
additional cash.  Without demobilization certificates, they 
are also subject to charges of desertion by FARDC troops, 
according to MONUC.  Pastor Molunda's program has ultimately 
proved unsustainable and has created false expectations among 
ex-combatants.  It has also led to children looking for 
weapons (Note:  Northern and central Kantanga are littered 
with land mines and unexploded ordinance from the 1998-2003 
war) to receive bicycles. 
 
MONUC Understaffed for Uncertain Mission 
---------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU)  MONUC's military presence in north and central 
Katanga is just that, a presence.  Despite their 2005 request 
for a full brigade to focus exclusively on Katanga (Ref E), 
MONUC's total military strength is 700 troops and 89 military 
observers including the long-awaited and recently-arrived 
Benin battalion.  With such a small contingent, compared to 
many times the number in each of the much smaller Kivus, 
MONUC forces have limited their duties to 1) acting as eyes 
and ears, 2) protecting UN and humanitarian workers, and 3) 
monitoring the arms embargo.  Unlike in Ituri, the MONUC 
mission in Kalemie defines itself as there strictly for 
observation, not disarmament.  Furthermore, the small MONUC 
Katanga force does not conduct joint operation with FARDC (as 
is done in other provinces) as the FARDC troops in the area 
are not integrated.  According to their interpretation of the 
mandate, MONUC may not support non-integrated FARDC brigades 
in joint operations or in training.  MONUC cooperates with 
FARDC only in filling logistical gaps, i.e. helping with food 
and gas distribution, and in sharing patrol plans for 
security operation. 
 
 
What This Means for Elections 
----------------------------- 
13.  (SBU)  The continued insecurity in the region raises 
flags for elections participation.  Most violence against 
civilians occurs not in the center of Kalemie town, according 
to MONUC, but 15 kilometers outside of it, where even the 
state security organs are not in control.  MONUC Kalemie 
Poloff said that MONUC cannot ensure the security of polling 
stations for the north Katanga population residing outside of 
major population centers -- that is the responsibility of the 
poorly-functioning FARDC/PNR.  The reality, she said, is that 
the majority of people in Tanganyika district will not vote 
for safety reasons.  (Comment:  Although MONUC made similarly 
dire predictions before the December referendum vote, when 
security conditions in Katanga province were the same (or 
worse), 74% of voters still turned out.  This is probably a 
good indicator of what to expect for the upcoming elections. 
 
KINSHASA 00001080  004 OF 004 
 
 
End comment.) 
 
14.  (SBU)  Comment:  Tanganyika, the last contiguous part of 
volatile eastern Congo, has largely been left out of the 
military, DDR, and other security operations targeted at the 
neighboring Kivus and Ituri.  Largely because the militias in 
the district are home-grown and not foreign fighters on 
Congolese soil, MONUC's mission, as interpreted by the 
Kalemie office, gives them far less leeway to stabilize their 
sector via military action.  Even if they were so inclined, 
however, 789 troops, aided by a mishmash of non-integrated 
and largely untrained FARDC soldiers, have a limited ability 
to establish order.  Furthermore, CONADER's abject failure in 
Kalemie, because of fraud, insufficient funds, and the 
unanticipated proportion of soldiers opting out of future 
military service, not only fails to help the situation, but 
actually exacerbates it.  For the southern part of DRC's 
eastern frontier to finally find some measure of peace will 
require far more commitment among national and international 
actors.  End comment. 
MEECE