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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1771, UNDSS BRIEFS ON SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTH DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1771 2006-07-24 09:47 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8993
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1771/01 2050947
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240947Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3856
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001771 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO US SU
SUBJECT: UNDSS BRIEFS ON SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTH DARFUR 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The United Nations Department of Safety and 
Security (UNDSS) Coordinator continues to assess the current 
situation in North Darfur as volatile and unpredictable.  Fighting 
in the north has fallen off; however, the UNDSS Coordinator believes 
this is due to militia consolidation and preparations to regain lost 
territory.  He expressed concern over the building trend of attacks 
on NGOs and other international organizations specifically detailing 
recent vehicle hijackings and compound attacks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
NRF/G-19 ATTACKS ON SLM/A-MINAWI JULY 14-18 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) UNDSS Coordinator provided an overview of security 
incidents in North Darfur over the past week, reviewing the National 
Redemption Front (NRF) attacks on SLM/A-Minawi forces in Al Khosh on 
July 13, followed by Chadian-supported NRF attacks in Muzbat, Lil, 
Turba, and Gurbura on July 14-15.  The Chadian forces were reported 
to have withdrawn across the border by late July 18, with the 
exception of a small group left in Shegeg Karo.  UNDSS also stated 
that there were reports of Chadian Army helicopters extracting their 
wounded soldiers in Shegeg Karo on July 17.  Overall control of the 
region is unclear, with both NRF (G-19) and SLM/A-M commanders 
claiming local control.  UNDSS further stated that there was an 
apparent effort ongoing to find and attack SLM/A leader Minni Minawi 
and other SLM/A-M leaders' families in that area.  Minawi later 
confirmed that he was worried about these families and was obliged 
to move forces into the area to protect them.  UNDSS provided 
sketchy information on Arab and SLM/A-Wahid fighting near Funung and 
intra-SLM/A-Minawi fighting at Kulkul. 
 
3.  (SBU) UNDSS confirmed that SLA-Minawi controls Korma and the 
corridor to Tawila.  He estimated that SLM/A leader Abdel Wahid is 
currently regrouping his forces and gauging his support after 
defections to G-19.  Wahid continues to decline affiliation with the 
NRF.  He predicted that the NRF will soon be attacked by 
SLA-Minawi. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
REPORTS OF CHADIAN INVOLVMENT CONTINUE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) While UNDSS did not have hard proof on Chadian regular army 
participation the credible evidence continues to build.  He observed 
that the NRF appeared freshly re-supplied, including new weapons 
(AK-47), vehicles and provisions.  In a sidebar, UNDSS confided that 
during his discussions in Birmaza with G-19 leaders, he observed two 
individuals in Chadian uniforms, but could not confirm their status 
or roles (deserters or active duty).  Several sources had reported 
Chadian helicopter sightings.  (NOTE:  UNDSS also noted NRF's 
preference to forego past affiliations such as JEM and G-19, though 
members of the NRF would retain their ties to original factions.  He 
explained that NRF personnel told him that the rebel group considers 
SLA-Minawi, SAF, and AMIS all to be legitimate targets for attack. 
The G-19 commanders also admitted that they had participated in the 
attack on Hamrat al Sheik in Kordafan.  END NOTE.) 
 
------------------------------- 
SPATE OF NGO VEHICLE HIJACKINGS 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) UNDSS also highlighted a series of recent incidents 
involving international NGO organizations.  Five vehicle hijackings 
had taken place in North Darfur and in the northern reaches of South 
Darfur in the last six days.  He detailed three new vehicle 
hijackings in Saraf Omra, Shangil Tobaiya, and Duma, South Darfur 
between Nyala and El Fasher, as well as an incident in Kabkabiya 
involving the loss of one local national worker.  Meanwhile two PAE 
drivers captured in conjunction with the stolen, AMIS-escorted fuel 
truck have been in contact with PAE and would likely be released 
within the next five days.  Separately, a bus north of Duma came 
under small arms fire by unidentified assailants, with five wounded 
civilians seeking help at an NGO compound in Shangil Tobaiya.  They 
were later transported to the hospital in El Fasher.  Finally, UNDSS 
noted that SAF CPT Omar (NFI) was blocking the movement of UNMIS 
personnel in Kebkabiya and harassing them for paperwork/travel 
documents, most likely as a result of a misunderstanding their 
mission to destroy outdated food stuffs. 
 
6. (SBU) UNDSS expects that thefts of vehicles, rebel "land-grabs," 
and some Arab militia attacks, while declining in severity and 
frequency from prior months, will continue.  He reiterated that 
there was an active ongoing propaganda campaign, particularly by the 
non-signatory rebel groups.  He predicted that general tensions are 
likely to increase, perhaps exacerbated by the northward migration 
of nomads in search of grazing/watering areas, and concluded that 
the situation will remain predictably unpredictable. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001771  002 OF 002 
 
 
STEINFELD