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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1625, Update on Darfur Security and Humanitarian Access - July

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1625 2006-07-11 09:31 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5091
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1625/01 1920931
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110931Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3626
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/EA AND DCHA SUDAN GROUP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO PREF UN AU SU
SUBJECT:  Update on Darfur Security and Humanitarian Access - July 
11, 2006 
 
1.  Security Update: 
 
A.  According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), on July 8, a G-19 (SLM/Minni Minawi breakaway 
faction) senior field commander reported that the towns of Birmaza 
and Um Sidir were under attack by Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi 
(SLA/MM) forces.  In Birmaza, a Sudanese government aircraft joined 
by a white government helicopter was observed circling the area 
heading in the direction of Muzbat, according to the G-19 field 
commander.  A representative of AMIS stated on July 10 that rumors 
are circulating in North Darfur, in an apparent attempt to discredit 
the organization, that the helicopter had "AMIS" painted on its 
sides.  AMIS also reported that the event was being referred to the 
Darfur Ceasefire Commission.  In Um Sidir, SLA/MM forces, allegedly 
supported by Sudanese Armed Forces from El Fasher, attacked and 
captured the formerly G-19-controlled area, located 90 km north of 
El Fasher.  The UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) issued 
warnings to UN agencies and NGOs to suspend all humanitarian 
operations in these areas until further notice.  OCHA has also 
expressed grave concern regarding the government's purported use of 
white helicopters, as the color white is generally reserved for 
parties neutral to the conflict.  (Note:  septel will address 
fighting in the Korma area, as well as allegations of rapes of IDPs 
by SLM/Minni Minawi's faction.  End note.) 
 
B.  On July 10, OCHA reported that since the signing of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement on May 5, nine vehicles belonging to humanitarian 
agencies have been carjacked in the area around Kutum, North Darfur. 
 OCHA expressed concern that further fragmentation of the SLA is 
creating major disruption to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and putting humanitarian agencies at heightened risk. 
 
2.  Humanitarian Access Update: 
 
A.  On July 10, USAID partner GOAL reported the cessation of 
operations in areas north of Kutum due to the ongoing fighting and 
insecurity around Birmaza.  GOAL reports that its two health clinics 
in Kutum town, however, continue to function. 
 
B.  These latest reports follow closely after several security 
incidents in Kassab camp forced USAID partners GOAL and the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) and UN World Food Program (WFP) 
implementing partner German Agro Action (GAA) to temporarily 
suspended activities on July 2.  According to IRC, on June 30, 60 to 
70 internally displaced persons (IDPs) burned down the government 
police station in Kassab and then set fire to the IRC Justice and 
Confidence Center (JCC) funded by the UN Development Program.  The 
Kassab camp population and residents of surrounding villages are 
divided between supporters and opponents of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement.  IRC staff are working to determine the motivation for 
the burning of the JCC.  Unconfirmed reports relate that IDPs burned 
the JCC because it is believed to be associated with the Sudanese 
government and Darfur Peace Agreement dissemination activities. 
NGOs in the area have not yet resumed activities in the camp. 
 
C.  On July 10, Oxfam announced the official closure of its offices 
and operations in the Saraf Omra and Birkat Seira areas of North 
Darfur.  Oxfam had suspended activities in the Saraf Omra area after 
the May 3 abduction of a local employee during a carjacking, and was 
threatening to permanently close operations for several weeks in an 
attempt to secure more information the employee's whereabouts and 
condition.  Oxfam reported that all efforts to locate the man, his 
captors, or the stolen vehicle have failed.  Oxfam has four other 
offices in North Darfur and continues to work throughout the rest of 
Darfur. 
 
D.  Due to ongoing insecurity in North Darfur, on July 10, WFP 
reported that 350,000 beneficiaries did not receive rations in the 
month of June.  These included 250,000 people living in northern 
North Darfur and 100,000 others living in other areas.  WFP also 
reported that as of June 28 the GAA warehouse located in Kutum was 
intact, a positive sign that armed groups are respecting 
humanitarian assets and that food security in the area has not 
deteriorated. 
 
E.  On June 27, Partner Aid International (PAI) lost communication 
with its field team operating in the village of Kera, located south 
of Tawila and west of Tabit in North Darfur.  The same day, PAI 
received notification that staff members were safe, but the PAI 
health facility had been fired upon, communications equipment stolen 
including a Thuraya, and one vehicle taken by unknown armed men. 
UNDSS reports that residents in the area observed armed men on 
camels approach an NGO vehicle.  The men reportedly hit the driver 
and drove the vehicle in the direction of Tabit.  On June 28, PAI 
suspended all operations.  PAI operated two heath facilities in 
Kazan Tunjur and Kera.  In a debriefing with the humanitarian 
community, PAI's departing health coordinator expressed his belief 
that the shots and carjacking were blatant attacks on their 
operations. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001625  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
HUME