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Viewing cable 06HELSINKI701, FINNISH U/S OFFERS UPDATE ON EU PRESIDENCY'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HELSINKI701 2006-07-24 12:54 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0027
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0701/01 2051254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241254Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2202
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0070
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0618
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV MOPS EUN FI
SUBJECT: FINNISH U/S OFFERS UPDATE ON EU PRESIDENCY'S 
RESPONSE TO MIDDLE EAST CRISIS 
 
REF: A. HELSINKI 680 
 
     B. HELSINKI 697 
 
Classified By: A/DCM GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOF welcomes Israel's announcement 
that it could eventually accept NATO peacekeepers in 
Lebanon.  However, U/S for Political Affairs Lyra 
suggested that an EU- or UN-led force -- perhaps with 
NATO support under Berlin Plus arrangements -- would be 
better than a strictly NATO-led mission, both because it 
would avoid the impression in the region of heavy US 
involvement and because key players such as France would 
be more willing to participate.  Lyra also emphasized 
that a robust UN mandate for the mission would be 
crucial, although he predicted that including a strong 
call for international troops to enforce UN Resolution 
1559 could prove "problematic."  When and if an 
international force is mustered, the GOF is committed to 
providing a significant troop contribution.  Finland 
also welcomes the Secretary's trip and the subsequent 
Rome Lebanon Core Group meetings, after which FM 
Tuomioja will travel to the Middle East.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador Ware and A/DCM met July 24 with Markus 
Lyra, MFA Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 
for an update on the Finnish EU Presidency's response to 
the crisis in the Middle East.  Lyra said that the GOF 
is pleased with Israel's announcement that it would 
accept a NATO mission in Southern Lebanon.  He 
acknowledged that circumstances on the ground did yet 
permit a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission; 
however, he expressed the hope that progress could be 
made toward a ceasefire and the mustering of an 
international force shortly after Secretary Rice's trip 
to the region and the meeting of the Lebanon Core Group 
in Rome. 
 
3. (C) Turning to the specifics of a potential peace 
mission, Lyra suggested that while the GOF and the EU 
would certainly not rule out a NATO lead, it might pose 
some political difficulties.  First, perceptions in the 
Middle East (be they right or wrong) associate NATO 
directly with the US and, as regards Israel, the US is 
not seen as an honest broker by many Arab states and 
leaders, he said.  Second, some EU member states -- 
namely France, Lyra predicted -- are likely to oppose a 
NATO force and press strongly for an EU-hatted mission. 
The best way to satisfy key players like France and 
Israel, while also ensuring the best operational 
capacity, might be an EU interpositional force backed by 
NATO airlift and other logistical support, operating 
under the Berlin Plus series of agreements, he 
concluded. 
 
4. (C) Lyra also made clear that the EU would expect a 
strong UN mandate for any international force in 
Lebanon.  The Ambassador acknowledged this, but also 
suggested that such a UN mandate might have to include 
specific language empowering the international troops to 
enforce UN Resolution 1559.  Lyra responded by noting 
that for many EU member states -- and, perhaps, for the 
UN Security Council -- heavy emphasis on 1559 might 
prove "problematic."  That said, "problematic" does not 
mean impossible, and there is general agreement within 
the EU and in much of the wider international community 
that the failure to disarm Hezbollah and other Lebanese 
was clearly a major factor in the current crisis, he 
added. 
 
5. (SBU) Finally, Lyra again stated Finland's intention 
to demonstrate leadership as current EU President by 
offering as large a contribution as possible to whatever 
international force ultimately comes together (reftel 
a).  This will require an extraordinary budget request 
to Parliament, but "that is something we must do," he 
emphasized.  Lyra also confirmed that Finnish Foreign 
Minister Erkki Tuomioja will travel to Rome July 26 to 
attend the Lebanon Core Group (LCG) meeting (reftel b). 
The GOF warmly welcomes Secretary Rice's trip to the 
region, and Tuomioja looks forward to working with her 
at the LCG and thereafter to chart a course forward. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: Lyra may be correct in pointing out the 
potential hurdles we may face -- once the time is right 
-- in pulling together a peace enforcement mission in 
Lebanon.  However, the Finns clearly want to play a 
leadership role in defusing the Middle East crisis, and 
we should be able to count on them to assume a 
pragmatic, "honest broker" stance in moving the EU 
 
toward effective participation in whatever mission 
emerges.  Lyra assured the Ambassador that the Embassy 
has open access to the Foreign Minister and his staff. 
WARE