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Viewing cable 06HELSINKI680, FINLAND EU PRESIDENCY VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HELSINKI680 2006-07-19 12:31 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO3420
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0680 2001231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191231Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0068
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4664
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0616
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2182
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MARR EUN FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND EU PRESIDENCY VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU has agreed to offer peacekeepers 
for a mission in Lebanon if called upon by the UN. 
Privately, Finnish MFA Secretary of State Torstila told 
us that UN and EU hopes to send a force to the region 
any time soon are "unrealistic," given the current level 
of violence and apparent opposition to such a force from 
both Tel Aviv and Beirut.  Should such a mission 
ultimately go forward, Torstila believes that at least 
20,000 troops -- with a clear "peace enforcement" 
mandate -- will be necessary, as opposed to the 10,000 
the EU Ministers apparently discussed informally.  He 
was pointedly non-committal in response to a question 
regarding how EU troops might be involved in enforcing 
UNSC Resolution 1559.  Should an EU PKO eventually go 
forward, Finland intends to show leadership by seeking a 
supplemental budget allocation that would allow it to 
make a robust national contribution.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Over a tour-d'horizon lunch with Ambassador Ware 
and PolChief, Finnish Secretary of State Pertti Torstila 
offered several insights into the EU Foreign Ministers' 
announcement this week of its willingness to send 
international peace monitoring forces to Lebanon in 
response to a United Nations request.  While emphasizing 
that the EU stands ready to do so if called upon, 
Torstila stated bluntly that "Kofi Annan's dream" -- 
which is shared by the EU -- of sending such a force 
anytime soon is "unrealistic."  The current level of 
violence on the ground simply will not permit it and, it 
appears, neither Tel Aviv nor Beirut is prepared to 
accept such a force.  For now, Torstila said, the EU 
will have to stand by and wait to see how events in the 
region develop. 
 
3. (C) As regards the force itself, Torstila said that 
the EU Ministers had informally talked about a mission 
numbering about 10,000 troops.  However, in his view, 
this would be far too few; at least 20,000 would be 
necessary.  In addition, even though the EU and the UN 
have used terms such as "stabilization force" or "peace 
monitoring mission", any force that might eventually be 
sent to Lebanon would have to be empowered with a clear 
"peace enforcement" mandate.  When asked, he was careful 
not to specify at this stage what role -- if any -- EU 
troops might play in helping to enforce UNSC Resolution 
1559 by disarming Hezbollah.  However, he agreed with 
the U.S. that implementation of 1559 is ultimately one 
of the keys to peace, and said the EU role vis--vis 
the resolution would certainly have to be defined by 
the Security Council and agreed to by the EU if the 
mission were to proceed. 
 
4. (C) As regards Finland's national role, Torstila 
referred to the GOF's public announcement that it would 
provide a robust contribution to any EU peace operation 
in the Middle East, to show leadership during its EU 
Presidency (among other reasons).  He noted that 
Finland's legislative ceiling for crisis management 
operations (CMOs) abroad is 2000 troops under arms at 
any given time, and that currently it is well under that 
number.  (NOTE:  Finland currently has 780 troops 
involved in CMOs worldwide; its largest current 
operations are in Bosnia and in Afghanistan.)  He 
acknowledged that the GOF's CMO budget is currently 
fully committed, but expressed confidence that 
Parliament would approve a supplementary budget for a 
Middle East operation. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: Clearly the Finnish EU Presidency 
understands that several factors need to fall into place 
or be negotiated before the EU can realistically 
consider responding to a UN call for peacekeepers in the 
Middle East -- not the least of which would be a 
dramatic change in the current situation.  The Finns, 
who have experience and a strong track record in CMO, 
are also acutely aware that such a mission would be 
dangerous, politically difficult, and carry no 
guarantees of success.  That said, they are ready to 
move forward nationally and in their current EU 
leadership role if and when such a mission becomes a 
possibility.  END COMMENT. 
WARE