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Viewing cable 06COLOMBO1140, SRI LANKA: ARMY'S U.S.-FUNDED HUMANITARIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06COLOMBO1140 2006-07-12 10:42 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO6345
PP RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #1140/01 1931042
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121042Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3822
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9780
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6203
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 4238
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9309
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 3170
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2248
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3084
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 6753
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4628
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1247
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY'S U.S.-FUNDED HUMANITARIAN 
DEMINING PROGRAM A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The Sri Lanka Army's  (SLA) U.S.-sponsored 
humanitarian demining program, begun after the Government of 
Sri Lanka (GSL) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in February 2002, has 
lately hit snags which bring into question the program's 
viability in a no peace, no war environment.  Low-level LTTE 
and paramilitary attacks on Sri Lanka military targets and 
each other have led to suspension of work at sites in the 
North and East, and mine detection dogs (MDD) have failed to 
uncover live mines in areas being cleared for civilian 
resettlement.  Nevertheless, representatives from the U.S. 
government contracting organization RONCO deem the SLA's 
humanitarian demining program a crucial confidence-building 
measure that will falter without continued U.S. government 
funding and support.  End summary. 
 
Returning Land to Civilians 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) specializes its 
humanitarian clearance activities in low-density mine fields, 
which it prepares for civilian resettlement.  Since 2002, 
US-funded contractor RONCO has trained 600 deminers and mine 
detection dog (MDD) handlers within the SLA and overseas 
clearance activities at  sites throughout the island.  As 
these soldiers rotate, approximately 40 soldiers work on 
demining sites at any given time.  The Marshall Legacy 
Foundation donated 12 MMD to the SLA. 
 
3. (SBU) Violence and low-level military engagement between 
the LTTE and security forces has increased in two phases 
since the November 2005 Presidential election which brought 
former Prime Minister Rajapaksa to power, with a lull in 
March 2006 following ceasefire talks between the two parties 
in Geneva in February.  The unstable situation caused the 
suspension of demining sites throughout the north and east 
through much of this period.  Because military vehicles have 
been repeat targets of LTTE claymore and shelling attacks, 
moving demining teams near north-central Vavuniya, in 
particular, presents a security risk.  RONCO Deputy Sri Lanka 
program manager Mike Walsh told poloff June 29 that demining 
activities in Jaffna and some areas of Trincomalee district 
were unaffected by increased security concerns because of the 
presence of military-controlled High Security Zones (HSZ), 
which allowed demining equipment and personnel to be moved 
freely. 
 
4. (SBU) Sri Lanka's national humanitarian demining program 
"will always be semi-military," RONCO technical advisor Craig 
Crosby explained to poloff July 6, "because they can't put 
Sinhalese civilians in Tamil areas or they'll become a 
target" of the LTTE.   He added that the SLA, with the 
assistance of RONCO, facilitates 70% of humanitarian demining 
work in the north of the island, because international 
demining agencies also use them as a liaison to work in areas 
with a heavy military presence. 
 
 
Disoriented Dogs 
-------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) RONCO technical advisor Craig Crosby described to 
poloff on July 6 an incident in which mine detection dogs 
(MDD) overlooked two live mines in a low-density field near 
Trincomalee.  The area had been deemed mine-free and ready to 
be returned for civilian repopulation when manual de-miners 
discovered the two mine with rakes.  The entire minefield had 
to be reworked manually after the dogs failed.  However, 8 of 
12 dogs were reaccredited in a UN-observed test July 11, with 
100 percent detection of mines up to 6 centimeters.  The dogs 
will be trained to detect mines up to 15cm within three 
weeks. 
 
6. (SBU) K-9 Consultant Dan Hayter explained to poloff on 
July 6 that the MDD's mistakes were not surprising given 
their lack of experience in live mine fields.  The security 
situation has kept them primarily at the SLA's training 
 
COLOMBO 00001140  002 OF 002 
 
 
facility in the southern area of Embilipitiya: "The dogs have 
learned short cuts, like humans do.  They pick up the odor 
from the person handling the mine, or the scent of freshly 
dug soil rather than the explosive material." 
 
7. (SBU) Hayter felt sure that if the dogs could get back in 
the field, the dogs would rise to the occasion and their 
handlers would gain the confidence to read when the dogs were 
having an off day.  While international NGOs tend to work in 
high-density mine areas and therefore have "strong numbers" 
in terms of the number of mines recovered, the SLA focuses on 
low-density areas.  Added Crosby, "the figures don't reflect 
the real value of what (the SLA deminers) are doing."  These 
low-density areas, Hayter explained, are "suspect" areas near 
other mine fields which must be completely clean before they 
can be turned over to civilian populations, but make 
difficult work for "starting-level" dogs.  Hayter stressed 
that all the assets, including the MDD, handlers, deminers 
and brush clearance equipment, must be on the field for the 
humanitarian demining program to be a success. 
 
Rallying for the SLA 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Clearly passionate about Sri Lanka's demining 
program, Crosby argued to poloff on July 6 that the SLA's 
humanitarian demining program "is absolutely critical to the 
national plan" as a "functioning structure" within the 
military with "all the ingredients for a sustainable, 
world-class clearing body."   There had been miscommunication 
and mistakes made within the military, he lamented -- such as 
newly-trained deminers or dog handlers being rotated to other 
jobs soon after completion of training -- adding it could 
take as many as twenty years for humanitarian demining to 
become a manageable national program. With RONCO likely 
pulling out in December 2006, and international NGOs such as 
HALO and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) expecting to pull 
out by 2008 according to the UNDP Mine Action Office, the SLA 
will be the only remaining -- but severely underfunded -- 
humanitarian demining body in Sri Lanka. 
 
9. (SBU) Crosby noted that Sri Lanka's biggest humanitarian 
demining resource is manpower within a poor country that 
without assistance is unlikely to allocate limited resources 
to humanitarian demining.  He argued, "If the Department of 
State pulls out all funding now, everything we've done here 
will disappear because they can't sustain it operationally 
yet."  But the program is crucial: "This is the military 
assisting with the national capacity, rebuilding Sri Lanka, 
and correcting its own mistakes."  On July 11 Crosby told 
poloff he had called on SLA humanitarian demining liaison 
Brigadier A.W.J.C. de Silva on July 7 to inform him the GSL 
demining program is "in a critical phase."  According to 
Crosby, Brigadier de Silva spoke with Defense Secretary 
Gothabaya Rajapaksa on the evening of July 7 to express his 
commitment to keeping the program viable. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Comment: Despite the understandable bias of our 
contracting organization, Crosby makes valid points about the 
sustainability of a GSL humanitarian demining program in a 
resource-poor country.  Dan Hayter's unbiased assessment of 
the MDD is also reassuring.  SLA humanitarian demining 
represents a confidence building measure similar to the 
others we have been recommending to the GSL.  It is vital 
that USG funding of this program continue as a key element of 
the U.S. commitment to the peace process here.  End comment. 
ENTWISTLE